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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to consider in some detail a few of the 
important theoretical and policy issues associated with unemployment 
and inflation, using a fairly standard framework which many economists 
would accept as plausible.
Part 1 is concerned with "The Role of Expectations and Deficit 
Financing." Here we introduce the rational expectations approach to 
economic modeling and also show how the short-run responses of endog­
enous variables can be calculated. We do this in conjunction with an 
examination of the stability properties associated with alternative 
forms of deficit financing. In Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis we use the 
techniques developed in Part 1 to examine some policy issues more closely.
Frequently, a government policy maker may want to lower both infla­
tion and unemployment in a manner which is as painless as possible. One 
solution to the policy maker's problem is presented in Part 2, entitled 
"Optimal Stabilization Policies Under Perfect Foresight." Here we formal­
ize the policy maker's objective and discuss what policy instruments can 
be used to achieve that objective. We also spend some time discussing 
whether it is desirable for prices to jump and if this is the case what 
is the magnitude of the appropriate jump. Time consistency of the opti­
mal solution is also considered.
"Some Relevant Policy Issues" are discussed in Part 3. When unemploy­
ment becomes high, two issues that are frequently raised concern "easy" 
methods for lowering unemployment and ways of relieving the hardship of 
the unemployed. One method of lowering unemployment is by lowering the 
length of the standard working week and hence lowering the aggregate
Vsupply of labor. A way of making life more acceptable to those who are 
unemployed is by paying higher unemployment benefits to those without 
work. Both these "solutions" are examined in Part 3.
An important part of this thesis is the way in which the issues 
mentioned above have been analysed within a consistent framework of 
models. This framework provides a common thread which, along with the 
common theme of the issues discussed, unifies the thesis into a coherent 
whole.
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NOTATION CONVENTIONS
Throughout this thesis, unless otherwise stated, a tilde, " ~ ”,
denotes the steady state equilibrium value of a variable, and a bar,
M —  ”, denotes an exogenously fixed variable.
Frequently when variables are functions of time, the arguments will
be omitted. Also time derivatives will be denoted by dots about the
• dxvariable concerned. Thus x = —  .dt
Let f = f(x, , x0 , ..., x ) denote a function of n variables. If 
the jth partial derivative is positive then the following notations will 
be used interchangeably:
f (x<| , * •••> » • • • > )
f. > 0 J
f > 0  x .
J
A similar convention (with the signs reversed) will apply when the 
jth partial derivative is negative.
Also we shall let f
Jk
p
3 r
3x. 3x, 
J k
The notation g = g(tQ , y^, y • • • ,  yn ) where the y^’s are all
functions of time will denote that each of the y.'s are evaluated at
J
time, t^.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
From the massive hyperinflations in Central and Eastern Europe 
after World War I to the world-wide bouts of inflation that followed 
the oil-price shocks in the 1970's, from the misery that resulted 
during the Great Depression in the 1930's to the high levels of 
unemployment that have accompanied the recent world-wide recession, 
unemployment and inflation have been and probably always will be 
two of the major concerns of macroeconomics.
This thesis is an attempt to consider in some detail a few of the 
important theoretical and policy issues associated with unemployment 
and inflation using a fairly standard framework which many economists 
would accept as plausible.
A central part of any modern approach to macroeconomic theory 
must be the mechanism by which expectations, and in particular inflation­
ary expectations, are formed. Accordingly, a significant part of this 
study deals with the mechanism of expectations formation.1 Throughout 
the thesis there is a gradual development in the approach to inflation­
ary expectations.
Chapter 2 discusses the consequences for stability of the economy 
under the assumption that inflationary expectations are generated by one 
of the simplest expectations schemes, adaptive expectations. In simple 
models of the economy adaptive expectations are frequently associated 
with an economy that converges to equilibrium. We show that when the 
presence of unemployment is allowed for, stability (in the sense of
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convergence to an equilibrium) is no longer guaranteed under adaptive 
expectations, even in the context of a fairly standard model of the 
economy.
The adaptive expectations mechanism is essentially a mechanistic 
backward looking extrapolative rule. Thus it gives total emphasis to 
past values, a rather undesirable property when one is primarily 
concerned with what will happen in the future. Under adaptive expecta­
tions, systematic forecasting errors for many periods in succession are 
possible. In other words, it is assumed that the agents in the economy 
make predictable errors yet take no action to revise their rule for 
forming expectations. For these reasons, adaptive expectations have 
often been criticized as being ad-hoc and not derivable from any formal 
optimizing behaviour.
As an attempt to overcome these difficulties associated with adaptive 
expectations, an alternative expectations scheme, rational expectations, 
has commanded considerable attention in the past decade. This has been 
due to several factors. Firstly, it is based on a rather plausible 
optimizing principle: individuals should not make systematic mistakes
in forecasting the future. Secondly, it takes account not just of the 
past but also of the general equilibrium or system-wide effects. In 
other words, it is assumed that economic agents make use of all the 
information that is available within the system. Thirdly, rational 
expectations is always associated with convergence to long-run equilibrium. 
The rational expectations hypothesis assumes that optimizing individuals 
do not make systematic forecasting errors in expectations formation, 
since if they do there will be an incentive to revise the expectations
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mechanism so as to eliminate the source of the systematic error. One 
way that economists can implement this hypothesis in their modeling is 
to assume that individuals "know" the systematic part of the model and 
use this to form expectations. These expectations are rational in the 
sense that when these expectations are fed back into the model the 
time-path of the economy will imply that there are no systematic fore­
casting errors which could have been discovered by individuals using 
information available at the time when expectations were formed. In a 
model which is characterized by the absence of even random forecasting 
errors (i.e., a deterministic model), rational expectations reduces to 
perfect foresight. If systematic influences are much more important 
than random influences, the assumption of perfect foresight captures 
much of the spirit of the rational expectations approach with as little 
complexity as possible.
Another expectations scheme which has many of the properties of 
perfect foresight and rational expectations is perfect myopic foresight, 
which occurs in deterministic models if current instantaneous expecta­
tions are forecast accurately.
Throughout this thesis, from Chapter 3 onwards we assume that expecta­
tions satisfy either perfect myopic foresight or perfect foresight. In 
dynamic macroeconomic models these assumptions are frequently accompanied 
by the property of saddlepoint instability. This property is illustrated 
in the Phase diagram of Figure 1.1. Unless the endogenous variables (x 
and y in the diagram) happen to lie on the stable arm given by AOAT the 
economy will diverge from the equilibrium point 0. The real world is 
generally perceived as being relatively stable. Accordingly, at first 
the saddlepoint property was seen as an undesirable property for rational
- 4-
Figure 1 .1
EXAMPLE OF SADDLE-POINT INSTABILITY
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expectations models, because it was generally associated with instability. 
However, more recently, rational expectations theorists have argued that 
if expectations are derived from an optimizing framework then the economy 
will always converge to its long-run equilibrium. In this rational ex­
pectations approach to economic modeling, if the endogenous variables 
do not lie on the stable arm then decisions by economic agents will 
ensure that at least one of these variables (i.e., x or y) will "jump", 
i.e., move instantaneously to a new value, so as to keep the economy on 
a stable path.
This can be illustrated in Figure 1.1 by the following example: If
the economy is at the initial point I then without a jump in the endogenous 
variables the economy will follow the unstable arm CIC’ until it eventually 
diverges. If a stabilizing jump in the endogenous variable, x, is per­
mitted, then the economy will jump initially to the equilibrium point E 
and then follow the stable arm AOEA' to the steady-state equilibrium 0.
Because of this rational expectations approach to economic modeling 
and provided sufficient endogenous variables are allowed to jump, rational 
expectations will lead the economy to always converge to a stable equilib­
rium. Also, as will be observed, rational expectations are essentially 
forward looking rather than simply forming forecasts of the future from 
what has happened in the past.
Although perfect foresight (rational expectations) has many desirable 
properties, this does not mean that it is without weakness. Obviously 
perfect foresight cannot be meant to be a literal description of the 
uncertainties associated with the real world in which we live. How far 
are we going to relax this assumption? How much information do agents
in the economy acquire?
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Usually, individuals’ information about the world is acquired 
from linear econometric models. Yet, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
because of non-linearities, equilibria may not be unique and different 
equilibria might require different short-run responses so that the 
economy will converge to equilibrium. This raises the question of 
whether agents in the economy can acquire enough information to react 
in the manner suggested by the rational expectations approach.
The question of whether jumps in endogenous variables are appro­
priate responses for the economy is also raised in Part 2 (Chapters 5-7) 
where it is shown that if policy variables are not fixed but chosen 
optimally it is possible for the economy to converge to its steady-state 
equilibrium in an optimal manner without the requirement that endogenous 
variables jump. Thus it appears no longer clear when and by what formal 
mechanism endogenous variables will adjust under perfect foresight.
Many other questions have been raised about the appropriateness of 
the rational expectations assumption. Overall, however, it remains the 
best expectations scheme that economists have so far been able to develop. 
Accordingly, the expectations approach that is overwhelmingly emphasized 
in this thesis is the rational expectations approach. Thus, except in 
Chapter 2, whenever necessary to attain stability, the rational expecta­
tions approach to economic modeling is adopted. In particular, in Part 
3 (Chapters 8-10), where we deal with some practical examples, stability 
is always attained by a short-run jump in the price level.
A central issue in macroeconomics has always been the question of 
what policy objectives are desirable for fighting unemployment and
inflation.
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In particular, it has long been held that there is a short-run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In economic theory, 
this is embodied in the Phillips curve relationship. Thus when in­
flationary expectations are static (i.e., they do not change over time), 
the Phillips curve relationship shows that if government policy is able 
to reduce inflation in the short-run then unemployment will typically 
increase. In the past five years, the Fraser Government in Australia 
and the Thatcher Government in Britain both adopted policies which 
emphasized "fighting inflation first." The fact that these policies 
have typically been accompanied by increased unemployment could be 
interpreted as empirical support for the Phillips Curve short-run trade­
off.
The new Hawke Labor Government in Australia "sought and received
a very clear mandate from the Australian people . . . .  to deal with
2inflation and unemployment simultaneously." This heralds a new approach 
to unemployment and inflation in Australia and gives rise to the question 
of how a government which is concerned with eliminating both these problems 
simultaneously can best achieve its objectives.
If we can quantify the government's objectives this question lends 
itself to a formal solution. Thus, if government policy can be used to 
control inflation, we might formalize this problem in a static framework 
as follows: Choose inflation, p, so as to
minimize L = ap2 + U2 (1)
subject to
P - - a ( U - U ) + 7 T
TT =  7T
(2a)
(2b)
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where
p = actual rate of inflation 
U = rate of unemployment 
U = natural rate of unemployment 
7T = expected rate of inflation 
and a, a, t t, are fixed constants.
In the simple model above equation (1) is a quadratic loss function; 
thus as unemployment and inflation diverge from their desirable levels 
(of zero unemployment and zero inflation) then the loss function increases. 
Equation (2a) represents a simple Phillips curve with the rate of price 
inflation increasing with excess demand in the labor market and with the 
expected rate of inflation. Finally equation (2b) tells us that expecta­
tions are static.
The solution to this problem is represented in Figure 1.2A. Thus
the loss function (equation 1) represents a family of concave curves
like that given by AEA’, the Phillips curve (equations 2a, 2b) is given
by BEB’ and the optimal solution is given by the intersection of the
Phillips curve with the loss function that is closest to the origin. This
optimal solution is given in the diagram by E and is associated with a
3non-zero rate for both inflation and unemployment.
Typically we might expect therefore that if the Australian govern­
ment is going to fight both inflation and unemployment simultaneously, 
then they could have to accept possibly higher levels for both variables 
than they desire.
The approach we have outlined has assumed inflationary expectations 
are static. If expectations satisfy perfect myopic foresight (rational 
expectations), then equation (2b) is replaced by
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Phillips Curve
1.2A: STATIC EXPECTATIONS
Vertical Phillips Curve
1.2B: PERFECT MYOPIC FORESIGHT
FIGURE 1.2: OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT/INFLATION TRADE-OFF
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TT = p (2b' )
and as a result there is no longer any trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation. Unemployment will always be at its natural rate and 
inflation will be governed by expectations.
In this case the government cannot control unemployment at all and 
the policy of fighting both unemployment and inflation simultaneously, 
has the same policy consequences as ’’fighting inflation first,” i.e., 
the government must try to drive inflation to its desirable level. Thus 
it can be seen that the government’s interpretation of its policy goals 
depends, to some extent, on how it perceives expectations behaviour is 
generated in the real world.
More formally, faced with the objective of fighting both unemploy­
ment and inflation simultaneously the government now faces a problem 
which is given by equations (1, 2a, 2b’). The solution to this problem 
is given in Figure 1.2B. The Phillips curve, given by BEB’, is now 
vertical and the government's optimal policy decision involves driving 
inflation instantaneously to zero while unemployment remains at its 
natural rate.^
The preceding discussion indicates that, even in a static frame­
work, the mechanism by which expectations are formed will affect the 
optimal policy followed by the government in fighting inflation and 
unemployment simultaneously. In Part 2, we formalize the policy maker's 
problem in a continuous framework with perfect foresight. The appropriate 
policy instruments are discussed. We also spend some time discussing 
whether it is desirable for prices, and hence for unemployment to jump
and, if this is the case, what is the magnitude of the appropriate jump.
While the previous Australian Government was preoccupied with
fighting inflation, the unemployment rate in Australia had continued
to climb. In the last twelve months of the Fraser government, from
March 1982 to March 1983, the unemployment rate increased from a
5seasonally adjusted 6.4% to 10.1%. This was not necessarily a 
consequence of the government's economic policies but rather may 
have reflected a worldwide phenomenon that does not have a single 
cause.
Thus there was a sharp worldwide rise in unemployment following 
the first oil price shock in 1973. In such countries as Canada, 
Australia, and the United States, the 1970’s had also seen a rising 
rate of labor force participation which had not been accompanied by 
a corresponding increase in labor demand thus increasing unemployment 
trends in these countries over the period.^* Unemployment had also 
increased because of the economic consequences of the recent world­
wide recession.
In Part 3, we discuss some policy issues which are particularly 
relevant in times of high unemployment. Two issues that are frequently 
raised, when unemployment becomes high, concern "easy" methods for 
lowering unemployment and ways of relieving the economic hardship of 
the unemployed.
One method of lowering short-run unemployment involves lowering 
the supply of labor. This can be achieved either by lowering the 
participation rate (e.g., early retirement, longer schooling) or by 
reducing the length of the standard working week. In Chapter 8, we 
examine the economic consequences of the second of these alternatives.
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Frequently, efforts to lower unemployment by decreasing the length 
of the standard working week may be accompanied by workers' attempts to 
maintain the nominal weekly wage. This will increase the hourly cost 
of labor. As a result employers may insist on changed work rules in 
order to achieve productivity gains before they will allow the reduction 
in the standard working week. In Chapter 8, the consequences of a 
reduction in the length of the standard working week are examined when, 
firstly, there is no attempt to maintain the nominal weekly wage (i.e., 
the hourly nominal wage-rate remains constant) and, secondly, there is 
a successful attempt to maintain the nominal weekly wage (i.e., the 
hourly nominal wage-rate increases). The economic consequences of 
associated productivity gains are also considered.
A way of making life more acceptable to those who are unemployed 
is by paying higher unemployment benefits to those without work. It 
has been suggested that such a policy will actually increase long-run 
unemployment by raising the reservation wages of the unemployed. Hence 
raising the unemployment benefit will prolong job search and raise the 
natural rate of unemployment. Nevertheless, this option becomes more 
politically acceptable in times of high unemployment when it becomes 
more obvious to a large proportion of the population that those who are 
without work can do little to change their situation.
In times of high unemployment, increasing the unemployment benefit 
can increase the fiscal deficit by considerably more than it would in 
times when unemployment is lower. The full effect on the deficit will 
depend upon what percentage of the increased unemployment benefit is 
financed out of taxes and what percentage is not.
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It can also be argued that the extent to which individuals in the 
economy foresee that higher unemployment benefits will have to be 
financed out of household taxes will influence the household’s consump­
tion decision. Thus if individuals foresee that they or their descen­
dants will have to pay back the amount received in unemployment benefits 
in the form of taxes, then increased unemployment benefits will have 
little or no effect on consumption. This results since individuals 
will save more now to compensate for the taxes they or their descen­
dants will have to pay in the future. On the other hand, if individuals 
believe that they will never have to pay higher taxes as a result of 
higher unemployment benefits, then an increase in unemployment benefits 
will lead to an increase in planned consumption.
The consequences for the household sector of whether or not an 
increase in unemployment benefits is financed out of taxes are examined 
in Chapter 9, while Chapter 10 examines the full macroeconomic impact 
of a change in unemployment benefits. This question is examined in a 
general equilibrium framework which takes account of the effects on 
unemployment, inflation, output and investment, both initially and in 
the longer term. The economic consequences of a change in retirement 
benefits are also examined.
An important part of this thesis is the way in which the issues 
mentioned above have all been analysed within a consistent framework 
of models. Specifically the models are rather closely related in that 
they have the following features in common. Firstly, all the models are 
deterministic models. Secondly, all models are expressed in continuous­
time formulations. This emphasis in continuous-time models is total —
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even micro-foundations of the models, when they are derived, are 
developed within a continuous-time structure. Thirdly, the models are 
all closed economy models which incorporate inflation, inflationary 
expectations and (except for Chapter 4) unemployment. Finally the 
models are dynamic models,' thus allowing us to examine the short-run 
behavior, long-run behavior and intermediate stability properties 
of the economy.
The present study deals with but a few of the important issues 
associated with unemployment and inflation. It is believed, however, 
that the analysis could be extended, without too much difficulty beyond 
the questions discussed. In particular, similar techniques could be 
used to examine further related problems. The concluding chapter returns 
to this theme and provides a number of indications as to what directions 
future research might take.
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PART 1
’’THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS AND DEFICIT FINANCING”
- 1 6 -
CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS AND THE EFFECTS 
OF POLICY CHANGES: CONTINUOUS ADJUSTMENT
FROM A GIVEN INITIAL POINT
2.1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Turnovsky (1979) considered the dynamic behav­
ior of a simple closed economy as well as the short-run and long-run 
responses under three alternative forms of passive monetary policy. Two 
expectations hypotheses —  the adaptive and perfect myopic foresight —  
were also considered and their implications related at some length. In 
order to examine the dynamic properties of the economy, Turnovsky employed 
a model which consisted of an IS curve, an LM curve and a Phillips curve 
with the dynamics arising from the accumulation of wealth and the evolu­
tion of inflationary expectations. He found that while the forms of 
passive monetary policy share many common features, they do differ in 
many important respects. The three policies also illustrated how the 
effects of expansionary fiscal policies depend critically upon the form 
of passive monetary policy which is simultaneously in operation, as well 
as how expectations are formed.
In this chapter, the Turnovsky model is extended to allow for a 
labor market and the possibility of unemployment in the short-run. In 
the model developed here unemployment occurs in an essentially Keynesian 
manner because of the sluggish evolution of the real wage. As a result 
the short-run responses and the dynamic properties of this model under 
adaptive expectations differ significantly from the Turnovsky model. This
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result occurs because of the added complexity of wage dynamics, which 
are essentially destabilizing under adaptive expectations.
Specifically, we consider the case when all variables evolve 
continuously from a given initial condition and contrast the different 
dynamic properties of the model under different forms of expectations 
and under alternative forms of monetary policy. This analysis excludes 
the more forward looking analysis of the rational expectations literature 
(see Sargent and Wallace (1973), Gray and Turnovsky (1979)) in which the 
initial conditions are treated as endogenous in order to stabilize the 
model. This rational expectations approach to economy dynamics will be 
treated in subsequent chapters.
Two mechanisms for the formation of expectations will be considered. 
The two mechanisms which will be employed here are "adaptive expectations" 
and "perfect myopic foresight." Expectations derived from an adaptive 
hypothesis were first introduced by Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1958). Such 
expectations are arbitrary in the sense that they have a systematic fore­
casting error associated with them. This has led to a preference in the 
more recent literature for expectations derived from the assumption of 
perfect myopic foresight, where the expected instantaneous rate of change 
of inflation equals its actual instantaneous rate of change. Interest in 
perfect myopic foresight also stems from the fact that it is, in a sense 
which will be made clear subsequently, a limiting case of adaptive expec­
tations, and it may also be considered a deterministic equivalent of 
rational expectations.
It is a familiar conclusion from the literature that the mechanism 
for the formation of expectations will influence short-run effects of a
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policy change as well as the stability properties of the economy (see 
Tobin and Buiter (1976;, Foley and Sidrauski (1971)). By contrasting 
the different dynamic properties of these expectations mechanisms, we 
are able to highlight the importance of expectations in the analysis 
of dynamic models such as those examined here.
Of special importance for the dynamics of the model is the mechanism 
by which deficit financing and inflationary expectations affect the time- 
path of the economy. Dynamics arise from the government budget constraint 
because the government expenditure on goods and services, less taxes, plus 
the interest owing on outstanding government debt, must be financed either 
by issuing more bonds or by issuing additional money. It has been shown 
that different choices of policy for financing the deficit give different 
results for the time-path and long-run equilibrium of the model (see Ott 
and Ott (1965), Christ (1968)). In this chapter we shall consider three 
alternative monetary policies —  these are the same policies as were 
discussed by Turnovsky (1979) and hence our introduction can be brief:
The three policies are:
(i) A Fixed Real Stock of Money Policy: i.e.,
Mm = p = m
This is often referred to as an "accommodating" monetary policy —  
it will be assumed that the government is able to immediately adjust the 
nominal money supply to compensate for any changes in the price level.
(ii) A Constant Rate of Monetary Growth Policy: i.e.,
• •M = pM or m = (p.-p)m
This approach yields an equilibrium in which either the real money 
supply is zero or the rate of inflation is equal to the rate of monetary 
growth. Throughout this chapter we shall assume that the economy is in
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the neighborhood of the second of these equilibria.
(iii) A Fixed Real Stock of Bonds Policy: i.e.,
b = f = 5
This is a corresponding "accommodating" bond policy. Here we shall 
assume that the government is able to immediately adjust the supply of 
bonds to accommodate a jump in the price level.
2.2 A Dynamic Macroeconomic Model
The analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 will be based on the following
macroeconomic model which is derived under the assumption that labor
S Dsupply is greater than labor demand, i.e., N > N .
Y = D(YD , r-T T ,  A) + G
0 < D1 < 1, D2 < 0, D3 > 0
(1a)
YD = Y - T + rb - ttA (1b)
A = m + b (1c)
m = L(Y, r, A)
L1 > 0, L2 < 0, 0  ^ L3  ^1
(Id)
N = N (z) , < 0 (1 e)
NS = NS (z), N® > 0 (If)
Y = f(N°) = Y (z), Y1 < 0 (is)
u = N : N
IT
= U(z) , U1 > 0 (1 h)
w = -aU + tt, a > 0 (1 i)
•z = (w - p) (2a)
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'
where
Y
r -
A = G- T + r b - p A  
m = in
m = (p-p)m
b = b
•
7T - y(p-TT), Y > 0 
TT = P
Y = real output
D = real private disposable income 
D = real private expenditure 
G = real government expenditure 
T = real taxes
r = nominal rate of interest
7T = expected rate of inflation
tt = real rate of interest
P = price level 
pp = p- = actual rate of inflation 
M = nominal money supply 
Mm = — = real money supply 
L = real demand for money balances 
W = nominal wage-rate 
Wz = log (-p) = log of real wage-rate 
Ww = -g = rate of nominal wage growth 
B = nominal supply of bonds
gb = — = real supply of bonds 
A = real private wealth
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
(4a)
(4b)
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ND = aggregate labor demand 
5N = aggregate labor supply 
f = production function
U = rate of unemployment (assumed positive)
Equation (1a) is the product market equilibrium condition, in which 
real private demand increases with real private disposable income and 
real private wealth and decreases with the real rate of interest.
Equation (1b) defines real private disposable income to be real factor 
income plus returns on government bonds, less expected capital losses 
on financial wealth (the expected inflation tax on real private wealth) 
and exogenous real taxes. Real private wealth is defined in equation 
(1c). Equilibrium in the money market is described by equation (1d) 
where the demand for real money balances depends upon the real level of 
income, the nominal rate of interest and real private wealth.
The supply of, and demand for, labor are given by equation (1e) and 
(1f). Both are dependent on the real wage (with the appropriate sign). 
Equations (1g) and (1h) describe the production function and the level 
of unemployment. The production function is written under the assump­
tion that Np < N^.
Equation (1i) is a simple Phillips curve with the rate of wage 
growth increasing with excess demand in the labor market and with the 
expected rate of inflation. It is a standard version of the "expecta- 
tions hypothesis" with the unitary coefficient on expectations reflecting 
the "accelerationist" view.
The dynamics of the system are described by equations (2), (3) and 
(4). Equation (2a) is the definition of the evolution of real wages 
while equation (2b) defines the evolution of real private wealth. This
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demonstrates how the time-path of nominal government debt P(G-T) and 
the rate of return on government bonds (rB) determine the evolution
• . i
of nominal private wealth (M + B).
The three alternative forms of monetary policy are given by equa­
tions (3a-3c). These are, respectively, a fixed real stock of money 
policy, a constant rate of monetary growth policy and a fixed real stock 
of bonds policy.
Two alternative policies for the formation of inflationary expecta­
tions are also given in equations (4a), (4b). These are, respectively, 
adaptive expectations and perfect myopic foresight.
The short-run model is given by equations (1 a— 1 i). Following a 
shock to an exogenous variable (e.g., Government expenditure, G), 
variables which will change in the short-run include: Y, YD , A, r, ND ,
SN , U, w. However, with only these endogenous variables the model is 
underdetermined since the short-run model is described by 9 equations 
and we have listed only 8 endogenous variables.
Under perfect myopic foresight (PMF), it is natural to choose the 
expected rate of inflation, tt, as the additional endogenous variable 
which closes the short-run model.
Under adaptive expectations, we shall assume that the price-level,
P, is able to jump to clear the market. This will result in corresponding 
jumps in z, A, m, and b and lead to jumps in Y and U. If price expecta­
tions are of an adaptive form, the jump in the price level may also affect 
inflationary expectations. This jump in the price level may be considered 
as a once-for-all jump; then it would be valid to interpret the jump in
the price level as having no short-run effect on inflationary expectations, 
2i.e., dTT = 0. This situation will be referred to throughout this chapter
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as instantaneously static adaptive price expectations (ISAPE). On the 
other hand, if the jump in the price level is interpreted as the 
limiting case of a particularly high inflation of exceedingly brief 
duration then it would be valid to interpret the jump in the price 
level as affecting expectations, the relationship being given by 
dP 3dir = y— • This will be referred to as instantaneous jump adaptive 
price expectations (IJAPE).
When there is a jump in the price level, P, it will be assumed that 
under the fixed real stock of money policy, i.e., m = m (the fixed real 
stock of bonds policy, i.e., b = 5) that the level of nominal money 
supply (nominal bond supply) immediately jumps to accommodate the change 
in the price level, so that m = m (b = 5) even in the short-run. This 
can be justified intuitively if we consider the short-run to be suffi­
ciently long to allow the government to maintain its policies or if we 
consider that the government knows the new price level instantaneously.
On the other hand for the fixed rate of monetary growth policy, any 
jump in the price level will be reflected in a short-run jump in the 
real money supply.
After the immediate short-run, the price level evolves continuously, 
as do the other endogenous variables and the dynamic variables given by 
z, m, b, 7T.
It will be noted that the model is essentially a short-run model 
which abstracts from the dynamics of physical capital accumulation. This 
has been done primarily to maintain the tractability of the analsis.
2.3 Fixed Real Stock of Money Policy
Let us consider the first form of monetary policy, specified by 
m = m. In this case the short-run system under adaptive expectations
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can be reduced to a set of equations of the form:
rtP[(1-DjY, - DnA K f  + D dr + D dTT = D, rdm - dG (5a)1 1  A P r TT 1
dP[L1Y1 + L A]^- - L2dr = - dm (5b)
f riPdTT = y-y- (I JAPE) (6a)
du = 0 (ISAPE) (6b)
It will be observed that the effect on aggregate demand, D, of a 
change in the interest rate is given by (A-m) + This effect
is made up of a direct effect (substitution effect) and an income effect. 
Throughout this chapter we shall assume that the direct effect dominates. 
Hence:
D = D (A-m) + D < 0 (7a)r 1 2
Similarly, we shall assume that
D = - D,A - D0 > 0 (7b)IT 1 2
and Da = D^r-n) + > 0 (7c)
The instantaneous effects on P, r and n of a change in fiscal and 
monetary policy under adaptive expectations are given in Tables 2.1 A, 
2.1B. It will be observed that while the short-run effects under the 
ISAPE assumption can, more easily, be signed unambiguously, the sign 
of the effects under the IJAPE assumption depend on the speed of price 
expectations adjustment, y. This is exhibited most clearly by Figures 
2.1A, 2.1B, 2.1C which show examples of how possible short-run compara­
tive static effects are influenced by the size of y. It will be observed 
that the polar cases, y -*■ 0 and y ■* 00, correspond respectively to the 
ISAPE assumption and the PMF assumption. The short-run comparative
- 25-
TABLE 2.1: m = m POLICY
Table 2.1 A 
IJAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G m
On
P T [D1rL2 - Dr]P
r Jt-hVb*3 ^ r f L ^ ^ U j A )  - (-(1-D1 )Y1+DaA) + yD^]
L0
TT 2 7 [D1L2r-Dr]
where J = L2[ (1 -D1 ) -DAA] + D ^ L ^ + L ^ A ]  + y D ^
Table 2.1B 
ISAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G m
-r[D rL_ - D ]P
r(L. Y.+L-A)
L0[(1-D )Y,-DnA]where J
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Table 2.1C 
PMF ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G m
On
P 0 0
r 0 r < 0 L2
-IT < 0
D.L0r - D
TT 1 2 r
TT D L0 TT 2
Table 2.1D
INTERMEDIATE-RUN EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
A z
D U Y ,  + L0Y„ (1-Dr 1 1
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Table 2.1E
LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G m
on
r 1 [l3d2 - *4 (1-0, >] i[D2 (r-w) - D2L3r - D3A]
7T j[L3 (D2-b(1-D1)) + j[D2 (r-7i) - D2L3r + D3 (L2r-b)]
A
L2 ((1-D,)(r-u) - D3)] 
jtLgAd-D,) - L2D2] jC>2m (1 +e)
L0r
where J = (r-7T)L0D0 + mL_D0 - L_D_A 2 2 3 2 2 3 e = m
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3P 3r 3P
2.1 A
2.1B
Figure 2.1: POSSIBLE GRAPHS OF SHORT-RUN EFFECTS
UNDER IJAPE ASSUMPTION
All graphs assume rL^
L0[(1-D )Y 
Hence, y = ---------- k
- Dr > 0, L3 = 0.
1 - V ] + Wl
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2.1C
FIGURE 2.1: POSSIBLE GRAPHS OF SHORT-RUN EFFECTS
UNDER IJAPE ASSUMPTION (continued)
All graphs assume D„rL0 - D > 0, L- = 0. Hence1 2 r 3
L2[(1-D1)Y1 - DaA] + DrL1Yl
Y = TT 2
; L2[(1-Di )Yi _ D aA] + L ^ r L ^
and Y < Y
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statics under perfect myopic foresight can also be calculated by solving 
the following set of equations for changes in it and r:
D dr + D dir = D. rdm - dG (8a)r 7T 1
-L^dr = -dm (8b)
Of most interest from the point of view of this thesis is the effect 
of changes in fiscal and monetary policy on unemployment and the price 
level or inflation. Under the ISAPE assumption (if y is close to zero 
and relatively small) an increase in government expenditure will
result in a short-run increase in the price level, leading to a corre­
sponding decline in the real wage and hence to lowered unemployment.
The effects on the price level of an increase in the supply of money 
are indeterminate. Under PMF, monetary and fiscal policy have no short- 
run effect on the price level or unemployment although an increase in 
government expenditure will lower inflation and an increase in the supply 
of money will have an ambiguous effect on inflation.
Proceeding from analysis of the immediate short-run we shall now 
examine the subsequent dynamics of the system. In order to achieve this 
we can first simplify the model of equations (1-4) by writing the equa­
tions in the following form:
Y(z) = D[Y(z) - T + (r-ir)A -rm, r-TT, A] + G (9a)
m = L[Y(z), r, A] (9b)
• •yz + TT = -ayU(z) (9c)
yÄ + ttA = y[G - T + (r—TT)A - rm] (9d)
Examination of equations 9 shows that the dynamical system which 
describes the economy is of the second order. We can approximate the
- 3 1 -
dynamics of t h i s  system in  the neighborhood of the  s t e a d y - s t a t e  by
4
l i n e a r i z i n g  the  system to o b ta in  the l i n e a r  approximat ion system.
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  equa t ion  of t h i s  l i n e a r  approximat ion system i s  
of  the  form
H2A2 + H A + H = 0 (10a)
The Routh-Hurwitz c o n d i t io n s  provide a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n  f o r  
the  l o c a l  s t a b i l i t y  of the  model. These c o n d i t io n s  are  s a t i s f i e d  i f  
Hq , , and a l l  have the  same s ig n .  Provided the  system i s  w e l l -  
behaved in  the neighborhood of  the  s t e a d y - s t a t e  such c o n d i t io n s  a lso
5
provide  a necessa ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  l o c a l  s t a b i l i t y .  Throughout the 
r e s t  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  we s h a l l  assume t h a t  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  of  the 
system a re  such t h a t  the  Routh-Hurwitz c o n d i t io n s  always provide  nec­
e s sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  l o c a l  s t a b i l i t y .
By c a l c u l a t i o n ,  we can demonst ra te  t h a t
H2 = L2 C (1-D1 )Y1 -  DaA] + Dr (L1Y1 + L3A) + y (10b)
I f  | L^ D | i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  small  and y  i s  sm al l ,  then H2 i s  unambig­
uously p o s i t i v e .  On the  o th e r  hand when y -* °°, H2 < 0. Since when 
y •* 00, the  dynamics in  the  neighborhood of the  s teady  s t a t e  approach 
the dynamics under p e r f e c t  myopic f o r e s i g h t ,  thus  under PMF, H2 < 0. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  we can show t h a t
H = yaU [D L0A + D (-L0 (r-7r) + L_(A-m)) -  D L A] (10c)0 1 r  3 7 T 2  3 A 2
In  o rde r  f o r  the  model to  be l o c a l l y  s t a b l e  in  the  neighborhood
of  the  s t e a d y - s t a t e ,  i t  i s  necessa ry  t h a t  and H2 have the  same s ig n .
Accordingly ,  given t h a t  |L^D^J i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  sm al l ,  under adap t ive
e x p ec ta t io n s  i t  i s  necessa ry  t h a t  > 0, while  under p e r f e c t  myopic
f o r e s i g h t  i t  i s  necessa ry  t h a t  < 0. In  o th e r  words, provided
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is sufficiently small, the model cannot be simultaneously stable under 
both adaptive expectations and perfect myopic foresight; this is a 
familiar result from the monetary growth literature and was also shown 
in the Turnovsky (1979) model. Also interesting is the fact that 
and H , as well as being the coefficients in the characteristic polynominal 
are also respectively the Jacobians of the short-run system (under the 
IJAPE assumption) and the long-run system. Hence if the system is to 
evolve continuously from a given initial point and if the system is 
stable, then the comparative statics of the long-run model may be of 
equal but opposite signs, depending on the mechanism by which expecta­
tions are formed and the magnitude of | L^D^J . In fact, as will be shown 
below, stability of the model of this chapter under adaptive expectations 
requires that |L^Dr| is sufficiently large that in general < 0. Hence 
the conditions for stability under adaptive expectations will be identical 
to the conditions for stability under perfect myopic foresight (i.e.,
HQ < 0, H1 < 0, H2 < 0).
In order to examine more closely whether the economy is likely to 
be stable under either type of expectations mechanism, we can employ
Table 2.1D, derived from equations (9a, 9b), which shows the intermediate
• •run effects on r and tt of changes in A and z and on tt of changes in A,
•z. Thus after the initial short-run jump to equilibrium occurs, the
change in short-run variables will lead to changes in the dynamic variables,
• • •A, A, z and z; these will in turn lead to changes in r, tt and t t , which
• •will lead to further changes in A, A, z and z. Such a procedure will 
continue until the system either converges to a new steady-state or
diverges.
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Assume that initially the economy is at steady-state equilibrium
and that there is an increase in Government expenditure. Under adaptive
expectations (ISAPE assumption) this could lead to an increase in the
nominal interest rate, r, and an increase in the price level, P. The
latter will lead to short-run falls in real private wealth, A, and the
real wage z. Assuming the effect on A is sufficiently small, the result
will be a rise in the budget deficit and thus A will increase. Using
intermediate-run Table 2 .1D, an increase in A will lead to effects on 
• 3 ttr and on it and fr. If ( g ^ j p  is sufficiently large and negative then an
• •increase in A will lead to a fall in it and tt and hence will be destabi­
lizing. Since, abstracting from the dynamics of z,
dp = , 3 tt . ,.(aI)iRdA 1 , 9 ^  h a  - (— ) dAY 3A
(11a)
and since (%L) = <g)
3A
3 TTthus when (g^)jp is sufficiently positive and
Y is very small, a small increase in A will lead to a very large increase 
in the rate of inflation. This will lead to a fall in A and hence have 
a stabilizing influence on A.
Abstracting from the dynamics of wealth accumulation, we can now 
rewrite equation (9c) in the form
yz + (— 7) TDz = -ayU(z) 
3z IR
(11b)
3 TTThis system is stable if and only if < Y*
3 TTHence, provided ("gj^ jp is positive, y is sufficiently small and 
3 tt| (g^ipl < Y the economy will be stable. Such parameter configurations 
are certainly possible and thus stability is attainable.
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We can examine this argument more formally by considering the 
determinants H , H^  and H^. The following heuristic conditions for 
stability have been derived
<— >3A IR > 0,
, 9tt. .
3z IR >
Hence (ii) Al3AJIR (— )l32'lR > -Y
and this implies < 0. 
Similarly,
H 1 = - D rL lY 1 (r-TT) - (1-D.j )Y L (r-ir) + (y+cO^ ) ( D ^ A - D ^ A )
- D a L 1 Y 16 + (1-D1 )Y1L35 - D 1TL2Y(r-TT) + D ^ b  + a U ^ L ^ y  
3 7Tand hence with IR sufficiently positive, <0. Similarly
3  TTHq = aU^AD^L2(-gA)IR + D7T(-L2(r-TT) + L3(A-m)) ]
3 TTand with sufficiently positive H_. < 0. Hence H_, H. and H_
or ln U <L I U
have the same sign and the necessary conditions for stability have been
satisfied.
The stability requirements will be observed to differ from precondi­
tions for stability in the Turnovsky (1979) model. This difference can 
be explained in terms of the incorporation of the real wage-rate, z, 
which is potentially destabilizing and also from the different specifi­
cation of the Phillips curve which means that the dynamic path of infla­
tion is affected differently in the intermediate-run.
Under perfect myopic foresight (PMF) and again starting at steady- 
state equilibrium, an increase in G will lead to a fall in tt in the 
short-run; this will lead to an increase in A which will lead to an
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increase in r and an ambiguous effect on i t . If is sufficiently
negative, this will lead to a further fall in tt and a further increase
• 3 7Tin A which will thus diverge. On the other hand, if (■grJjp is sufficiently 
positive this will mean that tt increases, the deficit becomes balanced 
and A tends to decline, thus providing a stabilizing influence.
This relationship can be illustrated more formally by calculating 
the characteristic roots of the model under PMF. These characteristic 
roots are given by
-aU < 0 (12a)
D L 0 (r-T T) -  D AL_ + D„L_.A - D L.(A-m) tt 2 r 3  A 2  tt 3
D U (12b)
i.e.,
•V . / on
X2 = -A "5X IR +
D^ tL2 (r-TT) - D^L (A-m) 
TT 2
(12b*)
Hence, if < 0, then > 0 and we have exhibited the commonly
observed property of saddlepoint instability. It will also be observed 
9 ttthat if (-5 7-)ttj is sufficiently positive then X_ < 0 and the model is o A  i n  2
stable.
Provided the model is stable the economy will attain its long-run 
equilibrium. This equilibrium is described by the following set of 
equations
Y - D (Y-G, r-TT, A) - G = 0 (13a)
m - L(Y, r, A) = 0 (13b)
G - T + r(A-m) - ttA = 0 (13c)
U (z ) = 0 (13d)>
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w = p = tt ( 13 e )
where Y is the level of output fixed by choice of z so that U(z) = 0.
In the long-run, there is no unemployment whatsoever and changes 
in fiscal and monetary policy will have an ambiguous effect on infla­
tion. Furthermore, as previously observed, if the model is stable 
under adaptive expectations the long-run comparative statics will be 
of the same sign as when the model is stable under perfect myopic 
foresight. Under the assumption that the model converges to its steady- 
state, the long-run effects are given in Table 2.1E.
2.4 Constant Rate of Nominal Monetary Growth Policy
We shall now consider the second form of monetary policy, where 
the government allows the nominal money supply to increase at a con­
stant rate, p. In order to examine the short-run effects of a change 
in G, we can reduce the short-run system under adaptive expectations 
to a set of equations of the form:
[(1 - D 1
dP)Y, - D m -  D . b P £  + D d r  + D dTT = -dG 1 m b P r  tt (14a)
[ L ,  Y. 1 1
dP
-  ( 1 - L 3 )m + L b ] ^ -  -  L2 d r  = 0 (14b)
rdn = Y^r (I JAPE) (15a)
dTT = 0 (ISAPE) (15b)
Once again we assume that, in the effects on aggregate demand, the 
direct effect dominates over the income effect. Hence,
Dr = D b + D2 < 0
DIT -D,A - > 01 2
(16a)
(16b)
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-D^ tt + > 0 (16c)
D 1 (r-TT) + D 3 > 0 (16 d )
As revealed in Tables 2.2A, 2.2B, the short-run effects on P, r 
and tt of a change in G are similar to those under the m = m policy.
Once again, while the short-run effects under the ISAPE assumption can, 
more easily, be signed unambiguously, the sign of the effects under the 
IJAPE assumption depend on the speed of price expectations adjustment.
However, the instantaneous impact effects of an increase in the 
rate of monetary growth, p., on such variables as the price level, P, the 
nominal rate of interest, r, and the expected rate of inflation, it, are 
all zero. This reflects the fact that it takes a finite time for a change 
in the growth rate of money to affect the level of money supply and hence
to affect these variables. Instead an increase in p, affects the rates
• • • • •of change of the endogenous variables, i.e., z, r, tt, m, and b. These
short-run effects are derived by rewriting equations (1-4) in the following 
form:
Y ( z ) = D [ Y ( z )  -  T +  ( r - T T ) b  -  TTm, r - T T ,  m + b ]  +  G ( 1 7 a )
m = L [ Y ( z ) , r ,  m + b ] ( 1 7 b )
• •
Y Z  +  TT :: - a y U ( z ) ( 1 7 c )
• •
y m  +  TTm =  y ( p . - T T ) m ( 1 7 d )
• •
y b  +  TTb =  y[G - T +  ( r - T T ) b  -  pm] ( 1 7 e )
These short-run effects are given in Table 2.2D. As will be observed, 
under both the IJAPE assumption and the ISAPE assumption the sign and
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TABLE 2 . 2 :  m = (p,-p)m POLICY
T a b le  2.2A 
IJAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN G ON
L2P
J [ L 1Y1 ( 1 - L  )m + L3b ]
YU
where J = Ln [ (1 -D 1 ) Y, -D m-D.b ]  + D [ L Y ^ d - L l m + L b ]  + yD_L0 2 1 1 m b  r  1 1 3 3 tt 2
T a b le  2.2B 
ISAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN  G ON
(1-L_)m + L_b]-  t Cl , Y
L0 [ (1 - D . )Y . -D  m-D, b ] + D [ L 1Y1- (1 -L _ )m + L _ b ]where J
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Table 2.2C 
PMF ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN G ON
P
r
IT
Table 2.2D
ISAPE AND IJAPE ASSUMPTION 
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN \l ON
- 4 m[D rL_ - D ]
(1-D- ) Y1 - D1rL1Y1 - yD l'37 b
- 4 m[D.rL0 - D l
r 11
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Table 2.2E 
PMF ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN \i ON
m > 0
-m < 0
Table 2.2F
INTERMEDIATE-RUN EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
on
r
(1 -L 3 )
< 0
(9tt) - (A71)
3m IR " 3m IR
D (1-LJ + D L_ r 3 m 2
-D L0 TT 2
< 0
L3
- —  > 0L2
(|i) = <ii>3b IR IR3b
DrL3 ' DbL2 
D ttL 2
L,Y, 1 1 < 0
(3tT) _ {3ttj
3z IR 3z IR
Dr L1Y1 + L2 (1- D1 )Y1— -
TT 2
< 0
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Table 2.2G
LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF A 
G
CHANGE IN
M-
on
r •j[-(1-D1 ) (r(1 — L3) —(j.) + D3] ■j [ D 2 (r-(i) -  D2L3r - D3A]
TT 0 1
a
[(b-L2r)(1-D1) - D2] D2m(1+e)
J J
where J = (r-|i)D0 + L_D_r - rD0L_ - bD_ and where e = —2.2 2 3 2 3 3 m
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magnitude of the short-run effects on the rates of change of the endog­
enous variables will depend on the magnitude of y.
The short-run effects of a change in G and p. under perfect myopic 
foresight are given in Tables 2.2C and 2.2E. It will be observed that 
these effects are the limit as y + 00 under the IJAPE assumption. Alterna­
tively, the comparative static effects can be obtained directly from the 
model. For changes in G this involves solving the system given by 
equations (8a, 8b). For changes in p,, the effects can be obtained by
noticing that since unemployment, U, and the real wage-rate, z, are
3zfixed under PMF thus -s—  = 0. For the variables r and tt note that thesecp,
variables are functions solely of the dynamic variables m, A and z. Thus 
r = r(z,m,A) and
• 3r • 3r • 3r •
r = 'Szz + 3 m m + 3 A A (18a)
3r 3r 3m ,3r.r\ “ r\ rv — I T l i r v /  —9p, dm dp, 9m m=m (18b)
where (-*— ) - is as given in Table 2.1C.
3 m  m = m
In a similar fashion we can show that under perfect myopic foresight 
9 TT 9 TT= m(-~— ) Thus an increase in the rate of monetary growth, p,, willdp, dm m=m
tend to lower the future rates of interest, by lowering r, will increase
• •the rate of monetary growth, m, and lower the rate of bond growth, b,
while the effects on the future rates of inflation, i.e., on tt, will be 
ambiguous.
Proceeding from an analysis of the immediate short-run we now 
examine the subsequent dynamics of the system. The dynamical system 
given by equations (17a-17e) can be observed to be of the third order.
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The economy described by this policy will be observed to have at least 
two steady-state equilibria; one associated with the long-run rate of 
inflation equal to the rate of monetary growth, i.e., p = 7 T ,  and one 
associated with a long-run zero supply of real money, i.e., m=0. Since 
we shall examine the dynamics by linearizing in the neighborhood of 
the steady-state, it is important to first determine which steady-state 
is appropriate. Because the economy would collapse long before the 
real money supply, m, converged to zero and since therefore the model 
given by equations (1-4) would not describe the economy in the neighbor­
hood of the steady-state, we shall restrict our analysis to the first 
of these steady-states, i.e., one characterized by |i = t t .
Approximating the dynamics by linearizing in the neighborhood of 
this steady-state, the characteristic equation is of the form
J A 3 + J A 2 + X + JQ = 0
In order for the system to be stable, it is necessary that and 
Jq have the same sign. Calculation from the linearized system reveals 
that:
J3 = L2[(1-D1)Y1 - Dmm - Dbb] + - (1-L3)m + L^b]
+ yD L 7T 2 (19a)
Provided that the wealth elasticity of the demand for money, i.e.,
L3A
, is less than 1, then J_ > 0 for small y (i.e., under adaptive m 3
expectations) and J3 < 0 if the speed of expectations adjustment, y, 
is sufficiently fast. In particular, therefore, under perfect myopic
foresight, J3 < 0.
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Similarly we can show that
JQ = -YaU1m[D2(r-iJ.) - D ^ r  + D3L2r - bD3] (19b)
J3 is the determinant for changes in G of the short-run system 
while Jq is the determinant of the long-run system. Thus in order for 
stability to prevail, if the system is to evolve continuously from a 
given initial point, the comparative statics of a long-run change in 
G will have different signs, depending on the speed of the expectations 
adjustment.
To examine under what conditions the economy is likely to be stable
we employ Table 2.2F which shows the intermediate run effects on r and
• • • •7T of changes in m, b and z and on it of changes in m, b and z.
Assume that initially the economy is at the steady-state equilibrium 
characterized by p = tt and that there is an increase in Government expen­
diture. Similar arguments to those in Section 2.3 of this chapter will 
3 7Treveal that if (-g^ )IR is sufficiently positive, b will be stable provided
3 7T 3 TTm is stable. However, because (-*— )__ = < 0, examination ofdm IR dm IR
equation (17d) reveals that m is most likely to be unstable. This result 
is consistent with that of Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979) who showed that 
for a simpler model but the same monetary policy the economy was stable 
in only 0.06% of cases.
Similar arguments show that, in general, under perfect myopic fore­
sight this model is also unstable. This result is consistent with that 
of Turnovsky and Nguyen (1980) who for a simpler model but the same policy 
showed this policy was unstable in all cases examined.
Some feeling for the results under PMF can also be obtained by 
solving for the characteristic roots. These are given by
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X
1 -air < 0 (20a)
and the two characteristic roots of the equation
- m[(r-|i)D2 + L2D3r “ rD2L3 “ bL3^ (20b)
In order for stability to prevail, all coefficients of (20b) must
be of the same sign.
3 7TNote that if is large positive this implies that
is large and positive. This makes the constant term in (20b) more likely 
to be negative but the coefficient of X more likely to be positive. In 
other words, in order for b in equation (17e) to be stable, we would like 
3 tt •^"3b^IR larSe anc* positive. However, in order for m in equation (17d) to
3 ttbe stable we would like to be large and negative to counteract
3 7Tthe destabilizing effects of the negatively valued Overall,
this conflict means that it is quite possible that very few combinations 
of parameters are consistent with stability.
Although stability is expected to be very rare, Table 2.2G gives 
the comparative static effects under all expectations mechanisms if 
stability does occur. In the more general case, when the model is 
unstable, the variables of a system evolving continuously from a given 
initial condition will diverge unboundedly or possibly begin to converge 
to the other steady-state equilibrium which is characterized by m = 0.
2.5 Fixed Real Stock of Bonds Policy
The third and final policy we shall consider is one where the real 
level of bonds is kept constant, i.e., b = 5. Under adaptive expecta­
tions, the short-run system can be reduced to a set of equations of the
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form:
H D[(1-D )Y - DÄA]^- + Drdr + D^dn = -D rd5 - dG (21a)
HP[L1Y1 - (1-L )A]-^ - - L2dr = d5 (21b)
( dPdTT = Y—  (I JAPE) (22a)
,d7T = 0 (ISAPE) (22b)
Assuming that, in the effects on aggregate demand, D, the direct 
effect dominates, we have
D = D^5 + < 0 (23a)r
= -D A - D2 > 0 (23b)
d a = -D^tt + > 0 (23c)
The instantaneous effects on P, r and tt of a change in fiscal and 
monetary policy are given in Tables 2.3A, 2.3B. The effects of an increase 
in G are similar to those under the fixed real stock of money policy, 
while the effects of an increase in 5 are usually opposite in sign to 
an increase in m. Thus under the ISAPE assumption an expansionary fiscal 
policy will result in a short-run increase in the price level, leading 
to a corresponding decline in the real wage and hence to lowered unem­
ployment. The effects on the price level of lowering the level of real 
bonds is very similar to the effect of raising the level of real money. 
Meanwhile the sign and magnitude of short-run comparative static effects 
under the IJAPE assumption will depend on the speed of expectations 
adjustment, y.
Since the short-run comparative statics under PMF, can be derived 
as the limiting case as y ^ 00 of the comparative statics under the IJAPE
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TABLE 2.3: b = 5 POLICY
Table 2.3A 
IJAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN 
G 5
- -dD rL0-D ]P
(1-L_)A] (1-LjA)
- -UD-rL- - D ]
L0[(1-D,)Y, - D.A] (1 — L_ ) A ] + yD L.where J
Table 2.3B 
ISAPE ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G 6
o n
P - L 2 P 
J > 0 - 1  [DlrL2 - Dr]P
r j[-L1Y1 + (1-L3)A] > 0 - -j [Dlr(L1Yl - (1 -L )A) -
(-(1-D1)Y1 + DaA)] > 0
7T 0 0
where J = L^d-D.,^ - DaA] + - (1 -L3)A] > 0
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Table 2.3C 
PMF ASSUMPTION
SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN
G b
Table 2.3D
INTERMEDIATE-RUN EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
A z
on
r < 0
L,Y, 1 1 < 0
(_9tT) _ ,9tTj
V8A IR " IR
(_3iT) _ .3tt>
3z IR " ^z  IR
Dr(L3-1 ) - DaL2 
DttL2
<  0
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Table 2.3E
LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN 
G b
on
r
1 -L3
[A(1-Dl ) - D 2 ] -j  [-D^ (n-TT) + D2L3 r + D 3A ^
7T -J [ (1 -L3 ) ((1 -D1 )6-D2 ) j  [-D2 (r-n) + D2L3 r
- L2 (D3+ tt(1-D1 ) )] - (L^r-E) ]
A
L2
-J [A(1-D1 ) - D2 ]
D2m(1+e)
H J
L rwhere J = -ttL^D^ - mD^d-L^) - L^D^A and e = ^
m
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assumption, the comparative static effects of an increase in G and a 
decrease in 5 under the fixed real stock of bonds policy will be the 
same as the comparative static effects of an increase in G and an 
increase in m under the fixed real stock of money policy. Under PMF, 
monetary and fiscal policy Will have no short-run effect on the price 
level. However, an increase in government expenditure will lower 
inflation and a change in b will have an indeterminate effect on 
inflation.
In order to examine the dynamics of the system we can simplify the 
model to the following:
Y(z) = D[Y(z) - T + rb - ttA, r-n, A] + G (24a)
A - 5 = L[Y(z), r, A] (24b)
• •yz + tt = -ayU(z) (24c)
• •
yA + ttA  = y[G - T +r5 - ttA] (24d)
The characteristic equation of the system is of the form
K 2 \ 2 + K A + Kq = 0 (25a)
and we are able to calculate the coefficients from the linear approxima­
tion system. In particular,
K_ = L_[ (1 -D )Y - D.A] + D [LY. - (1-L_)A] + yD L (25b)2 2 1 1  A r  1 1 3 tt 2
and
Kq = yaU1[-D2L27T - mD2(1-L ) - L ^ A ]  (25c)
Note that these are respectively, the determinants of the short-run 
system (under IJAPE assumption) and the long-run system. When y is small 
and D^ .L2 is small, K2 > 0, while for y large (including PMF), < 0.
- 5 1 -
Thus unless | I  is very large, it is impossible for the economy to
be stable under both adaptive expectations and perfect myopic foresight.
In fact, using the intermediate run effects of Table 2.3D, we can show
9 ttby similar arguments to that of Section 2.3, that because < 0
the economy will not be stable under adaptive expectations or perfect 
myopic foresight unless (4r)Tn + 0 ,  i.e., unless |d L_| is very large.o A  l n  7T 2
Hence, in general, the same stability conditions will exist under both 
adaptive expectations and perfect myopic foresight (i.e., < 0,
K1 < 0, Kq < 0).
This property can be exhibited more formally under the PMF assump­
tion by noting that the characteristic roots are given by:
X1
X2
-aU1 < 0
D2L27T + mD2 ^ " L3^ + L2D3A
(26a)
(26b)
Note that X^ < 0 only if |D^ L^ I is sufficiently large. In general, 
therefore, this fixed real stock of bonds policy will be associated with 
saddlepoint instability under all mechanisms for the formation of expec­
tations. This result is consistent with the results of Turnovsky and 
Nguyen (1980) who showed that for a simpler model under perfect myopic 
foresight a fixed real stock of bonds policy is always unstable for a 
large range of parameter values. However the results are different from 
those of Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979) who considered the simpler model under 
adaptive expectations. They showed that for the model the policy of 
pegging the real stock of bonds was stable in 96% of the cases considered. 
The different behavior in the model considered here is a result of the 
destabilizing influence of the incorporation of unemployment and the
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real wage under adaptive expectations. In the unlikely event that 
stability occurs, Table 2.3E gives the long-run comparative static 
effects. In the more general case where instability occurs and the 
economy is not on the stable arm, the endogenous variables in the 
economy will diverge.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined a dynamic macroeconomic model 
which specifically incorporates unemployment. This unemployment is 
derived in an essentially Keynesian manner from a sluggishly evolving 
real wage. The model also incorporates the dynamics of asset accumula­
tion and expectations formation.
In particular, we consider the evolution of the economy under the 
specific assumption that the economy evolves continuously from a given 
initial condition. The possibility of initial stabilizing jumps, e.g., 
under rational expectations, will be considered in Chapter 3.
Unlike a simpler model by Turnovsky (1979) which abstracts from 
the dynamics of wage evolution, the results for the more complex model 
of this chapter indicate that the stability properties of the model 
differ very little according to the mechanism by which expectations 
are formed. This result occurs primarily because of the incorporation 
of real wage dynamics; as a result the expected rate of inflation, tt, 
as well as its rate of change, tt, and hence the actual rate of infla­
tion, p, are always determined by equilibrium in the goods and money 
markets, irrespective of the mechanism of expectations formation. Hence 
we obtain very similar conditions for stability under both adaptive 
expectations and perfect myopic foresight.
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By contrast, the short-run comparative statics depend strongly on 
how expectations are formed instantaneously. We have considered three 
different mechanisms for the short-run formation of expectations and 
show how the sign and magnitude of the short-run comparative statics 
depend on these mechanisms.
Of the three methods of deficit financing that we have considered, 
the most stable is the fixed real stock of money policy. The fixed 
rate of monetary growth policy proves to be highly destabilizing while 
the fixed real stock of bonds policy is also likely to be unstable, 
although stability cannot be ruled out completely in any case. Under 
the perfect myopic foresight assumption, saddlepoint instability is 
quite common.
Overall, by comparing this analysis with that of Turnovsky (1979), 
we conclude that the effects of a policy change are very sensitive to 
the model specification. In particular, the incorporation of the real 
wage and unemployment tends to destabilize this model of the economy 
under adaptive expectations, but has little effect on the stability 
properties under perfect myopic foresight.
- 54-
CHAPTER 3
SHORT-RUN RESPONSES UNDER PERFECT FORESIGHT 
WITH ENDOGENOUS INITIAL JUMPS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the short-run effect of a policy change 
in a model which is characterized by perfect foresight in the formation 
of inflationary expectations. The models employed are perfect foresight 
versions of the models considered in Chapter 2.
Despite the fact that we are assuming perfect foresight in the forma­
tion of expectations we shall assume that the consequences of Lucas' (1976) 
critique are of no great significance. The Lucas critique states that we 
cannot use conventionally estimated macroeconometric models for evaluating 
policy changes, e.g., a change in government expenditure, G, because the 
parameters of the models will change as a result of policy changes. The 
Lucas critique has been incorporated into the specification of simple 
macroeconomic models, see McCafferty and Driskill (1980), but since the 
models of this chapter are essentially ad-hoc models which have not been 
derived from specific microfoundations, such an analysis is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
Under perfect foresight, it is a common result that an economy will 
be characterized by one or more unstable roots. One procedure for 
stabilizing such a system has been suggested by Sargent and Wallace (1973) 
who allow the system to undergo some appropriate endogenously determined 
initial jump thereby in effect eliminating the unstable path. This 
procedure is commonly justified by an appeal to transversality conditions, 
e.g., as in Brock (1974, 1977) who obtains the results for models in which
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the underlying utility function is separable in real money balances and 
consumption and for which appropriate "super-Inada" type conditions hold. 
The extent to which it holds for more general utility functions is not 
known. Alternatively, the procedure can also be justified by an appeal 
to the recent empirical work of Flood and Garber (1980) who test the 
proposition that the market can launch itself into a price bubble with 
price being driven by arbitrary, self-fulfilling elements in expectations. 
They show that, for the German hyperinflation, they are unable to reject 
the proposition that bubbles were absent during this period. Finally, 
under some conditions all non-convergent paths eventually may be inconsis­
tent with competition and hence are dynamically inefficient in the 
Samuelson sense (see Burmeister, Caton, Dobell and Ross (1973), Samuelson 
(1967), Shell and Stiglitz (1967)).
Such arguments as the above are not without their critics. Burmeister
(1980) has shown that the arguments that require the use of transversality 
conditions rely on the assumption of a non-changing world with an infinite 
horizon and such an assumption is not valid in the finite and ever-changing 
world in which we live. Also more recent work by Flood, Garber and Scott
(1981) has cast some doubts on the earlier empirical results. Finally in 
the concluding section of his important survey of the rational expectations 
literature Shiller (1978) discusses a couple of additional problems for 
the application of rational expectations models. First, they assume indi­
viduals possess more knowledge than they could possibly have considering 
their limited knowledge about the current economic structure and second,
it may be unrealistic to suppose that an economy could converge to a 
rational expectations equilibrium in a reasonable amount of time.
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Having noted the doubts that have been expressed in the Sargent and 
Wallace (1973) methodology we shall merely note that the justification for 
choosing a stable solution is far from complete but choose the most plausi­
ble assumption, i.e., that the economy does follow a stable path.
Even if we accept that the economy converges, it is still necessary 
to answer the question as to what is the mechanism for attaining a stable 
solution. Two of the broadest ways we can categorize the endogenous 
variables which jump to bring the economy onto a stable path (jump variables) 
is into those variables which are driven by market forces (e.g., the price 
level) and those variables which jump because the government chooses to 
intervene to stabilize the economy (e.g., an open market operation). The 
choice of appropriate "jump" variables is an unanswered question. In this 
chapter we shall examine in turn what happens when each type of jump variable 
is employed.
Calculation of the magnitude for the appropriate jump for an endogenous 
variable in the simplest two dimensional cases can be made via a graphical 
approach (see, e.g., Gray and Turnovsky (1979)). However very little has 
been written about the appropriate jumps in more complex models. In the 
discrete case when the models are described by difference equations,
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) have provided an algorithm for solving for 
appropriate jumps together with conditions for existence and uniqueness 
of stable solutions. In the continuous case a corresponding theorem has 
been proved by Buiter (1982). In this chapter we prove three simple theorems 
which re-establish some of these results and in particular provide a mechanism 
for calculating the magnitude of appropriate jumps. We also provide some 
simple applications of the theorems and show how the results are comparable 
with those obtained under the more usual graphical approach.
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The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: Section 3.2 intro­
duces the theorems. Section 3.3 considers application of the theorems to 
a perfect foresight model with one unstable eigenvalue while Section 3.4 
considers application of the theorems to a perfect foresight model with 
both one and two unstable eigenvalues. Finally Section 3.5 makes some 
concluding comments.
3.2 Three Theorems
1Assume a dynamical system is described by the following equations
•
y = Ay + Bx + c (1a)
y(0) = Dz(0) + e (1b)
y(t)| < “ (1c)
where
y = (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables
x = (p x 1) vector of exogenous variables, assumed constant
2A = (n x n) non-singular matrix 
B = (n x p) matrix
c = (n x 1) vector
z = (m x 1) vector of "jump" variables
D = (n x m) matrix of full-rank
e = (n x 1) vector of constants
and where y and z are both functions of time.
Equation (1a) defines the dynamics of the system. Equation (1b) defines 
the initial conditions for y —  these initial conditions can be changed in 
order to (say) stabilize the model by an appropriate choice of the jump 
variables z. Equation (1c) is a non-explosion condition which requires 
that the endogenous variables, y, remain bounded.
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We shall say that a solution to the model exists if, given any matrix 
of exogenous variables x, we can choose a z (0) so that equations (1a-1c) 
are satisfied. As will be demonstrated below, depending on the number of 
jump variables it is possible that a unique solution to the model exists, 
no solution exists or an infinite number of solutions exist.
Following a similar argument to that of Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
A can be transformed into Jordan Canonical Form as follows (see Halmos 
(1958))
A = H“1JH (2a)
where J is a diagonal matrix, the diagonal elements of which are eigen­
values of A. Assume that m of these eigenvalues are unstable then J can 
be further decomposed as
1
mxm
(n-m)x (n-m)
(2b)
where J is partitioned so that all diagonal elements of J have positive
real part and all diagonal elements of have negative or zero real part.
~  -1Then writing y(x) = -A [Bx + c] we can rewrite equation (1a) in the
form
«<• II > 1—
1 
*< 1 X 1 _1 (3a)
y = H_1JH[y - y (x )] (3b)
Hy = JH[y - y(x) ] (3c)
The solution to this differential equation will be a function of both 
time, t, and the exogenous variable, x, which we have assumed is fixed for 
all future time periods. Let us denote the solution to equation (3c) by
$(t,x). Hence,
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H[$(t,x) - y(x)] = Ke^ (3d)
where K is a diagonal matrix of constants and e ^  is an (n x 1)-column 
matrix of exponential functions with exponents equal to the diagonal 
elements of J multiplied by t.
Let
' 'S
- H imxn 3t
 X r 0
H =
H2
(n-m)xn
<
, K =
0 K2
(n-m)x(n-m)
In order for equation (1c) to be satisfied it is necessary that is
a matrix with all zero entries, i.e., the initial conditions eliminate the
3unstable eigenvalues, i.e.,
H [$(0,x) - y(x)] = 0 (4a)
where 0 denotes an m x 1 column matrix, all of whose elements are zero.
Given a value of the exogenous variable x, which is expected to hold 
at all times in the future, equation (4a) describes the initial condition 
that $(t,x) must satisfy if equation (1c) is to be satisfied, i.e., if 
lim| $>( t,x) | < °°.
t-KXJ
If there is an unexpected change in the exogenous variable x to 
x + Ax, and if this new value for the exogenous variable is expected to 
hold at all time in the future, then the new solution which is given by 
$(t,x+Ax) must satisfy the initial condition
[$(0,x+Ax) - y(x+Ax)] = 0 (4b)
Combining equations (4a, 4b)
H [$(0,x+Ax) - $(0,x)] = H^ytx+Ax) - y(x)] (4c)
Since from equation (1b) the initial conditions for $(t,x) can only 
be changed through changes in z we can let |Ax| + 0 and, using the chain 
rule, rewrite equation (4c) in the form:
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H D (*9z (0) - H[ 9x 1 tel (Ad)
where 9y9^x, denotes the long-run effect of a change in the exogenous 
variable, x, on the steady state value of the endogenous variable y,
i.e., = -A_1B and - denotes the short-run change in the
jump variable z required to force the endogenous variable to continue 
to satisfy the non-explosion condition given by equation (1c). H^D is 
an mxm matrix and we shall assume this matrix is of full rank. We can 
now state the following theorems, which are all a direct consequence of 
the solution to equation (Ad):
THEOREM 3.1: If m = m, i.e., if the number of jump variables is equal to
the number of unstable eigenvalues, then there exists a unique solution 
for the jump variables so that equations (1a-1c) will be satisfied. This 
solution is given by
3z(0)
9x
c ~ \dy
A*
= -[H D]“1H1[A"1B] 1 I (Ae)
THEOREM 3.2: If m > m, i.e., if the number of jump variables is less than
the number of unstable eigenvalues, then no solution to equations (1a-1c) 
exists.
THEOREM 3.3: If m < m, i.e., if the number of jump variables is greater
than the number of unstable eigenvalues then an infinite number of solutions 
to equations (1a-1c) exist.
3.3 Fixed Real Stock of Money Policy
Under perfect foresight, the fixed real stock of money policy discussed 
in Chapter 2 is described by the following equations:
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Y (z) = D[Y(z) - T + (r-n) A - rm, r - t t , A] + G (5a)
m = L[Y(z), r, A] (5b)
z = - aU(z) (5c)
Ä = G - T + (r-TT)A - rm (5d)
These equations can be linearized about the steady-state to give a 
linear dynamical system of the form:
f • \A
I z J
where a tilde denotes the steady-state.
This model is characterized either by total stability or a saddle- 
point instability. Assuming that the parameters are such that a saddle- 
point instability results, the coefficients of equation (6a) are given by:
a 11 = (r—tt ) + rA(A-m) - tta A
= ' W  - lDrL3 - DAL2 )A
D ttL2
> 0 (6b)
a 10 = r (A-m) - tt A 12 z z
= -D2L1Y^m - L2Y1(1-D1)A > 0 (6c)
V L 0 TT 2
a21 = 0 (6d)
a22 = 'aU1 < 0 (6e)
The eigenvalues of the system are given by X = a n  > 0, X 2 = a 22  <
and the system can be solved for explicit solutions for A and z given by:
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Hence
A - A
=
1 a12
r , h i
kie
. a22t,z - z . .0 a. -a,, . II(DC
(7a)
a., t
(al 1 "a22}
( 'I3, . 3,, — A - A ' r , m ie
1 1  2 2  1 2 1
a 2 2 t
0  - 1  V. z - zV. l V  J
(7b)
Assuming the economy remains on a stable path, the effects on the 
steady-state of an exogenous change in government expenditure, G, which 
is to be maintained at all time in the future is given by
3A [L^A(1 -Dj ) - L2D2 ] 
9G ~D7TL2ai1
< 0
9z
8G 0
(8a)
(8b)
If we assume that the available jump variable is given by the price 
level, P, then we can linearize the initial conditions to give
(9)
Then, we can use theorem 3.1 and equations (7b), (8a-b), (9) to derive 
the appropriate initial jump in P, which is given by:
( a11 “ ai 2 ) p0
"(ai1_a22)A0 al2
3P
3G
3A
8G > 0 (1 0 )
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This result which has been derived algebraically can also be illus­
trated graphically as follows:
From equation (7b), the economy will be on the stable arm if k^=0, 
i.e., if (a^-a^ 2 )(A-A) = -a^^{z-z). Hence the slope of the stable arm 
is given by
In Figure 3.1 this stable arm is initially given by the line XqXq .
Following a positive jump in the endogenous variable, G, the steady-state
^ »
is moved to and the corresponding stable arm is given by . If
the economy starts at the equilibrium given by AQ and if the only avail­
able jump variable is the price level, P, then the economy must move from
~  *the old equilibrium AQ to the new stable arm X X  along a ray which has 
slope given by
(derived from equation (9)). This ray is shown in Figure 3.1 by .
It can be observed from Figure 3.1 that following an increase in G 
an appropriate jump will be one which initially reduces A and z, i.e., 
the appropriate jump will be a rise in P. This result is the same as that
suggested by equation (10). Once the stable arm has been reached the
* ~economy will then evolve along X^X^ until the new steady-state, A^, is 
reached.
Since the steady state effects of a change in m are given by 
D2m(1+e)
3m ' < 0 (11a)
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Figure 3.1
PERFECT FORESIGHT: SADDLEPOINT INSTABILITY WITH
PRICE JUMPS; FIXED REAL STOCK OF MONEY POLICY
3P
3G > 0
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9z = 0 (11b)
d A  ^ 2 ^where the sign of -*=• assumes that e = --- > -1 .am m
Hence the appropriate short-run response of the price level, P, 
would be qualitatively the same under an increase in m as under an 
increase in G, although the magnitudes may differ.
3.4 Fixed Rate of Monetary Growth Policy
We can describe the fixed rate of monetary growth policy under per­
fect foresight (introduced in Chapter 2) by the following equations:
Y(z) = D[Y(z) - T + (r-TT)b - TTm, r-7T, m + b] + G 
m = L[Y(z), r, m + b] 
z = -aU(z) 
m = (y-7T)m
b = G - T + (r-7T) b - p,m
(12a) 
(12b) 
(12c) 
(12d) 
(12e)
Once again, the equations can be linearized about the steady-state 
to give a linear dynamical system of the form:
11 al2 al3
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33J
m - m 
b - b 
z - z
(13a)
where
a . . = -7T m  m
a12 = - V
tDr(1-4* + DmL2]m
^ 4
> 0
[DbL2 - DrL3]m > n
4 L2
(13b)
(13c)
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a. _ = -TT m  13 z
-[DrL1Y1 + )Y1 ]m
> 0 (13d)
a 01 = ( r  — tt )b - Li 21 m m  r
[-D m( 1 -L-) + D L0 ] - \lD L 0 3 m 2  tt 2
D L0 TT 2
< o (13e)
a„  = (r.-TT. )b + ( r - T T )  22 b b
[D^ raL^  + D ^ l b  + D - ^ M tt) >
ölilTT 2 ( 1 3 f )
a . _  =  ( r - T T  ) b  23 z z
[D1mL1Y1 - L2 (1“D1)Y1]b
Dll TT 2
> 0 (13g)
a31 = 0
a32 = 0
a33 = -OU, < 0
(13h) 
(131) 
(13 j )
The eigenvalues of the system satisfy the following equalities:
'12
X. + X- = a.. + a_0 (14a)1 2 11 22
M o = a.„a _ — a - _ a _„ (14b)1 2 11 22 12 21
X3 = -aU < 0 (14c)
We shall consider two cases. Case 1 will be characterized by
> 0, a > ’ 21 °, a22 < 0 (this can be obtained if j. is small, m large
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and positive but close to zero). In this case one of the eigenvalues 
is positive, i.e., A > 0, while the rest are negative.
Case 2 will be characterized by & > 0, a. < 0, a^2 > 0 (which can
be obtained if p is large positive and there are no wealth effects in the 
demand for money, i.e., = 0). In this case two of the eigenvalues have
positive real parts. Either both these eigenvalues are real, i.e., A > 0, 
A^ > 0 or the eigenvalues are complex conjugates, i.e., A^  = r\ + ip,
A^ = n - ip, where r\ > 0.
In both cases the solution to the dynamical system is given by:
f >
m - m ai2 al2 q13 k e
A t
b - b 
z - z<
xi ■ an 
0
X2 ' a11 q23
0 q33
k2e d  
A t
k36 j
where
qi3 = ai3(a33_a22} + a23ai2 
q23 = al3a21 + a23(a33~al1) 
q33 = _a2iai2 + (a33”al1)(a33~a22)
4and this dynamical system can be rewritten in the form:
X2 “ al1 “ai2 h13
- (X1 - ai1} ai2 h23
0 0
k^ eV
k^e
A-1
C3e
(15b) 
(15c) 
( 1 5 d )
(16a)
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where
13
al2q23 ~ (X2~a11)ql3 
q33
(Xr al1)Q13 “ ai2q23
ai2(X2"X1}
(16b)
(16c)
(I6d)
The effects on the steady-state of an exogenous change in Government 
expenditure, G, which is to be maintained at all time in the future is 
given by
[-D2L3 + D3L2 + (1 -D.J ) (”^2 (r-M-) + L^ b) ]m
3G DTTL2 (a1la22 - ^12a21 )
3b t-D2 (1~L3 ) “ D3L2 " )(M-L2-b(1-L3 ))]m
15 = DttL2 (al 1 a22 - ai2a21}
(17a)
(17b)
3z
3G = 0 (17c)
The numerator of Equation (17b) is always positive while the numerator 
of Equation (17a) is positive provided is close to zero (which we shall 
assume throughout the rest of this chapter). Hence the steady-state effects,
and have the opposite sign to ( a ^ a ^  ~ ai2a21^ a,e*
3m 3bis the case of a saddlepoint instability, > 0, > 0.
3*rn 3 bthe case of two unstable eigenvalues, < 0, < 0.oG oG
in case 1 which 
While in case 2,
In order to stabilize the model we shall allow either a jump in the 
price level, P, which will be assumed to be achieved by market forces 
which act in a way as to stabilize the economy, or an open market operation,
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which assumes that the government deliberately acts to keep the economy 
on a stable path. In the case of one unstable eigenvalue only one of 
these forces will need to come into play in order to stabilize the economy. 
If both forces come into effect, Theorem 3.3 shows that there are an 
infinite number of combinations of jumps which will keep the economy stable.
In the case of two unstable eigenvalues it will be necessary for both 
forces to be at work in order to stabilize the economy. If only one 
variable jumps initially (or if no variables jump initially), Theorem 3.2 
shows that it will be impossible to stabilize the economy.
The initial conditions corresponding to a jump in P and an open market 
operation (constrained jumps in m and b) are given by Equations (18a) and 
(18b) respectively:
m A
’ p o
3 O
b =
B n
p2o
P + b o
z
k.
1
T>|
 -*
O z o
m +1
mo
b = -1 (m-mQ ) +
b o
(1 8 b )
. z. ■ z 0'
Given Equations (12-18) we are now in a position to analyze more 
closely the appropriate jumps needed to stabilize the economy.
3.4.1 Case 1: One Unstable Eigenvalue
If there is one unstable eigenvalue and if the appropriate stabilizing 
policy is an open market operation then the appropriate initial jump in m
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is given by
3m
3G
,, >3m 3b
2" 11 3G " ai23G
(X2 " ai1 + al2}
£ 0 (19)
3 m  ^ ✓Hence < 0 according as  ^ y 0. This result is illustrated
graphically in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In these figures, the slope of the
„ a„«
stable arm is given by
X2 ' al1
< 0. Initially this stable arm
is given by XQXQ. Following an increase in Government expenditure, the
t
equilibrium moves to E and the new stable arm is given by X^X^. If the 
only mechanism for stabilizing the economy is an open market operation 
and if the economy is initially at the equilibrium given by 0, then the 
economy must move to the new stable arm along the ray which has a
slope of -1.
»
Figure 3.2 illustrates the case when the slope of is greater than
the slope of Y.Y. , i.e., -r------11 A'_ — a. > -1 It will be observed that the2 “ 11
appropriate response is an increase in m with a compensating decrease in
ai
b. Since 12
X2 - al1
> -1 implies ai2 + X2 ” ai1 "" this result is
equivalent to that suggested by Equation (19). Once the economy has 
reached its short-run equilibrium (denoted by I) it will evolve slowly 
along the stable arm until it reaches its new equilibrium.
ai 2Figure 3.3 illustrates the case when t-------  > -1. This results
X2 * a l1
in a short-run fall in m, which is also equivalent to the impact effect
suggested by Equation 19.
It is also interesting to note that in Figure 3.2, the initial jump 
in m overshoots the steady state equilibrium value of m. This is in a 
sense a closed economy analogue of the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting of
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Figure 3.2
PERFECT FORESIGHT: SADDLEPOINT INSTABILITY WITH OPEN
MARKET OPERATION; FIXED RATE OF MONETARY GROWTH POLICY
9m
9G > 0
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Figure 3.3
PERFECT FORESIGHT: SADDLEPOINT INSTABILITY WITH OPEN
MARKET OPERATION; FIXED RATE OF MONETARY GROWTH POLICY
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the exchange rate in an economy characterized by rational expectations.
If the appropriate stabilizing policy is a jump in the price level, 
rather than an open market operation, then the short-run jump is given 
by:
3P
■3Ü
n  v 3m 3b 
1 2~al1 3G " ai23G
r
o
h  h J-ai2p2 + n13PQ
(20)
u 9P >Hence < 0 according as
(V an>7 h j_- ai2p2 13P0
The magnitude of the short-run effect can thus be calculated provided 
the parameter values of the model are known. However, the results cannot 
be exhibited graphically because this would require a three-dimensional 
diagram. Hence, Theorem 3.1 provides a mechanism for calculating the 
short-run effects which is more general than the graphical approach.
3.4.2 Case 2: Two Unstable Eigenvalues
If there are two unstable eigenvalues, in order to stabilize the 
economy we require two variables to jump, e.g., the price level and an 
open market operation. Application of Theorem 3.1 gives as the appropriate
jumps:
r3pS
3G
3mUGJ
V ai 1
- <X2-all >
-a12 13
po
4p0
-1
A2”a11 3G " a123G
I \ —-U r ai1 3G + al23G
(21 )
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Equation (21) applies whether the eigenvalues are real-valued or
complex-valued. (If X^rX^, then h z-h^» and the aPPr°Priate jumps, 
3 P 3mand are still real-valued). In either case, if we know the
parameter values of the model, we can calculate the required jumps,
We can also simplify the model by abstracting from the dynamics of 
the real wage; i.e., by removing Equation (12c) from the model and 
assuming Y is fixed at its full employment level given by Y. Then the 
linearized version of the model is of the form:
m cLm - cL m  - m11 12
•
IbJ k b - E
where the a _ rs are as given in Equations (13b, 13c, 13e, 13f). Then if 
there are two jump variables, the number of jump variables will be equal 
to the number of unstable eigenvalues and to the number of dynamic vari­
ables. Then Theorem 3.1 shows that the appropraite jumps can be given
by
But H,
and so
[HD]“ 'H
D are both non-singular 2x2 matrices.
3m(0)
3b (0)
Hence,
(23a)
(23b)
(23c)
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Figure 3.4
PERFECT FORESIGHT: TWO UNSTABLE EIGENVALUES, TWO JUMP VARIABLES
AND TWO DYNAMIC VARIABLES —  THE CASE OF A JUMP 
FROM OLD EQUILIBRIUM TO NEW EQUILIBRIUM WITH 
NO INTERMEDIATE DYNAMIC PATH
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i.e., if an exogenous change in G results in a movement of the steady- 
state to a new equilibrium, the appropriate stabilizing jumps will be 
ones which move the initial values from the old equilibrium to the new 
equilibrium.
This result is revealed graphically in Figure 3.4. Because there 
are no stable eigenvalues there will be no stable arm and the only way 
the stable equilibrium can be reached is by movement along the ray 
associated with a jump in P (denoted by ) which has a slope of
Mo > 0 followed by a movement along the ray associated with an openBo
Imarket operation (denoted by Y^Y^) which has a slope of -1. Any jumps 
which do not bring the economy to the new equilibrium denoted by E will 
be unstable and not appropriate. Also as can be seen from the diagram, 
with movement along one ray (equivalent to only one jump variable being 
available), the new equilibrium cannot, in general, be reached and the 
resulting trajectory for the economy will be unstable (thus confirming 
the conclusions of Theorem 3.2).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the results of a policy change 
when the economy stays on a convergent path. By comparison with Chapter 
2 it will be observed that the short-run effects when the initial condi­
tions for the endogenous variables are fixed can differ drastically from 
the short-run effects when the economy is forward looking and seeks to 
keep the economy on a stable path. Also the dynamic properties of the 
economy will also differ greatly.
By deriving a simple theorem along the lines of the more complex 
results of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Buiter (1982) we have estab­
lished the familiar results that depending on the number of jump variables
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and the number of unstable eigenvalues, it is possible to have no solution 
which stabilizes the economy, a unique solution which stabilizes the 
economy or an infinite number of solutions which will stabilize the 
economy. Theorem 3.1 has also been used to calculate the magnitude 
of appropriate jumps in the endogenous variables in order to stabilize 
the economy. These calculated jumps have been shown to be equivalent 
to jumps obtained by a graphical approach.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NON-UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIA, STABILITY PROPERTIES 
AND SHORT-RUN RESPONSES UNDER PERFECT FORESIGHT
4.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis we have examined in some detail 
the stability properties of the economy when inflationary expectations 
satisfy perfect foresight and assuming various policies for financing 
the deficit. The stability of similar monetary models under perfect 
foresight (rational expectations) has been widely discussed in the 
recent macroeconomic literature. One of the familiar conclusions to 
emerge is that the dynamics of such models will typically be associated 
with unstable characteristic roots. In the simplest cases this may 
involve just one unstable root; see e.g., Sargent and Wallace (1973).
But in other cases, this instability may be accompanied by sluggish • 
behavior elsewhere in the system, leading to "saddlepoint" type insta­
bility; see e.g., Sidrauski (1967), Burmeister, Caton, Dobell, and Ross 
(1973), Burmeister, Flood, and Turnovsky '(1981), Dornbusch and Fisher 
(1980), etc. As Chapter 3 demonstrates it is possible to find parameter 
values and models which give examples of a wide range of stability 
properties.
In any case, the introduction of an unexpected shock requires the 
system to undergo an instantaneous jump, in order for it to remain 
bounded following the disturbance. In the Sargent and Wallace example, 
the system must jump instantaneously from the initial to the new steady 
state. In the example of a saddlepoint instability, the system must
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jump onto the stable arm, which it then follows continuously into the 
new steady state. Examples of appropriate stabilizing behaviour have 
also been discussed in Chapter 3. The rationale for this behavior is 
typically the absence of "speculative bubbles," or more formally, an 
appeal to transversality conditions, applicable in associated optimizing 
models and which usually impose such boundedness; see Brock (1974, 1977) - ^ 
Many existing models make particularly simple assumptions regarding 
the financing of the government budget deficit, assuming, often only 
implicitly, that it is entirely bond-financed. The present chapter 
uses a simple dynamic inflationary model, which is a simplified version 
of the model discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The model considered in 
this chapter was developed in a previous paper by Turnovsky (1979) and 
is employed here to consider two, closely related, issues. First, we 
show how the stability properties of the model depend critically upon 
the interaction between: (i) the sign and magnitude of the government
deficit; and (ii) the method of deficit financing. Secondly, we discuss 
how the presence of interest payments and inflation taxes in the govern­
ment budget constraint and elsewhere renders the model intrinsically
nonlinear, giving rise to problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of 
2equilibria. Moreover, the stability properties associated with a 
particular combination of government deficit and mode of deficit 
financing are closely aligned with the choice of steady state. Thus 
the saddlepoint instability typically associated with perfect foresight 
is shown to depend critically upon these two aspects, as well as upon 
other parameter values of the model. In general, the dynamic behavior 
of the model can encompass: (a) total instability (all eigenvalues
having positive real parts); (b) saddlepoint instability; (c) total
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stability (all eigenvalues having negative real parts), depending upon 
the choice of steady state, the size of the deficit, and its chosen 
mode of finance.
While problems of nonuniqueness of equilibria arising from non- 
linearities are not new to macroeconomics, they are not generally con­
sidered in the rational expectations literature. This is because this 
literature has typically dealt with (stochastic) systems which are
linear in the endogenous variables and treat the coefficients as given 
3parameters. Under these assumptions, these problems of nonexistence 
and nonuniqueness cannot arise. However, recent work on rational ex­
pectations models has begun endogenizing the coefficients by deriving 
them from some underlying microeconomic optimization. In this case, 
the model becomes inherently nonlinear in the endogenous variables, 
giving rise to the kinds of problems encountered in this chapter; see 
e.g., McCafferty and Driskill (1980).
In what one might call traditional economic dynamics, the problem 
of nonuniqueness of equilibria is frequently (but not always) resolved 
by appealing to Samuelson’s Correspondence Principle. In effect, this 
proposition asserts that only the stable equilibria are economically 
relevant. However, this approach is inapplicable in the rational ex­
pectations context, where frequently all equilibria are associated with 
unstable roots. The essence of the rational expectations solution 
methodology is to eliminate the effects of these unstable roots by 
allowing for some initial jump in the system. This raises certain 
methodological issues. Thus some alternative to the correspondence 
principle, one based on some welfare criteria, is required to decide 
which of the multiple equilibria may be relevant.
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The basic model 
is outlined in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the problems of non­
existence and nonuniqueness of steady-state equilibria, resulting from 
the nonlinearities in the model, and in doing so, pays particular atten­
tion to the question of the economic feasibility of the equilibrium.
The following section considers the dynamics and stability of the system 
in the respective neighborhoods of the alternative steady states. Section 
4.5 comments briefly on the choice between alternative steady states, 
while Section 4.6 indicates the alternative responses of the system to 
exogenous shocks, these responses depending upon the particular stability 
property of the associated equilibrium. Section 4.7 considers a specific 
example, while the main conclusions of our analysis are reviewed in the 
final section.
4.2 Specification of the Model
Y = D(YD , r-TT, A) + G 0 < D 1 < 1 , D2 < 0, D3 > 0 (1a)
(1b)
A = m + b (1 c)
m = L(Y, r, A) Lj > 0, L2 < 0, 0 S L3 £ 1 (Id)
p  = a(Y - Y) + 7T a > 0 (1 e)
IT = p (If )
m = -8-(G - T +rb) - pm 0 ^ ^ 1 (2a)
b = (1--0-) (G - T + rb) - pb (2b)
where Y = real output (income)
Y = real capacity output,
YD = real private disposable income
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D = real private expenditure,
G = real government expenditure,
T = real taxes, assumed to be exogenous, 
r = nominal rate of interest,
7T = expected rate of inflation,
A = real private wealth, 
m = M/P = real money supply,
M = nominal money supply,
P = price level
b = B/P = real stock of government bonds,
B = nominal stock of government bonds, 
p = P/P = rate of inflation, and 
L = real demand for money balances.
The equations (1 a—If) are very similar to the equations of the 
model considered in Chapters 2 and 3, except that model also included 
unemployment and the dynamics of wage adjustment. Our treatment can 
therefore be very brief. Equation (1a) is the IS curve, with private 
expenditure demand depending upon real disposable income, the real rate 
of interest, and wealth. Disposable income is defined in (1b) and wealth 
in (1c). The LM curve is described by Equation (1d), with the demand 
for money being postulated to depend upon real income, the rate of 
interest and wealth. Equation (1e) is a simple expectations augmented 
Phillips curve, embodying the ’natural rate’ hypothesis, while (If) 
asserts that inflationary expectations satisfy perfect myopic foresight, 
i.e., the instantaneous expected rate of inflation equals the instantaneous 
actual rate of inflation. The dynamics of the system are described by 
equations (2). Equations (2a) and (2b) are derived by assuming M/P and
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•B/P are fixed proportions of the government budget which comprises 
government expenditure plus the interest payments on the outstanding 
government debt less the revenue to government from taxation. Two 
key policy parameters are introduced into the model. These include 
the current government deficit, G-T, and the method of deficit fi­
nancing, described by $. An increase in & implies increased money 
financing and decreased bond financing. Conversely, a decrease in $ 
implies decreased money financing and increased bond financing.
Combining (1e) and (If), it is seen that output is pegged at its 
full employment level, Y, and the model simplifies to
Y = D(Y - T + (r-TT)b - um, r-n, m+b) + G (3a)
m = L(Y, r, m+b) (3b)
m = (MG - T +rb) - TTm (4a)
b = (1 —9-) (G - T + rb) - 7Tb (4b)
where r, t t , m and b are endogenous variables and G, T, and -9- are exog­
enous variables. It is seen that an increase in r(tt) will have both a 
positive (negative) income effect and a negative (positive) substitution 
effect on aggregate demand, D. Assuming that the substitution effect 
dominates in each case we impose the restrictions
D = D b + D0 < 0 r 1 2 (5a)
D = -D.A - D« > 0 TT 1 2 (5b)
Likewise an increase in wealth will have an income and wealth 
effect on aggregate demand, D. The sign of the income effect will 
depend upon whether the additional wealth occurs in the form of bonds 
or money. In both cases we assume that the positive wealth effect
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dominates, enabling us to impose the restrictions
D. = D_ + (r - T T)D. > 0 b 3 1 (5c)
D E n - ttD. > 0 m 3 1 (5d)
The model we have chosen is essentially a short-run model which 
abstracts from the dynamics of physical capital accumulation. This 
assumption has been adopted to make the analysis of the model more 
tractable.
4.3 Steady-State Equilibrium
We begin by considering the steady-state equilibrium for the economy.
• •This is obtained by setting m = b = 0 in (4a), (4b), yielding the following 
equations
Y = D(Y - G, r  -  t t, m + S) + G (6a)
m = L(Y, r, m + b) (6b)
&(G -  T + rb) = TTm (6c)
(1—8*) (G - T + rb) = 7Tb (6d)
where the tilde denotes the fact that the variables are evaluated at 
their steady-state values.
For each choice of G-T and $ there are two classes of steady states. 
This possibility arises because of the nonlinearities stemming from the 
inflation taxes on money and bonds (um, 7Tb) together with the interest 
payments on government bonds (rb). One of the classes of steady states 
which may arise is described by equations (6a)-(6d) which in general 
is characterized by a non-zero steady state rate of inflation (i.e.,
7T j. 0) and is dependent upon both government policy parameters G-T and
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&. We shall refer to this as the inflationary steady state. 
Alternatively, (6a)-(6d) will also be met if
Y = D(Y - G, r, m + b) + G (6a1)
m = L(Y, r, m + b) (6b •)
G - T + rb = 0 ( 6 0
TT = 0 (6d')
In this case the steady state involves government budget balance at zero
inflation and shall be referred to as the stable price steady state.
Note that while it depends upon the fiscal policy parameter G-T, it is
independent of the financial policy parameter -9-.
In examining the two classes of steady states, it will be shown
that each class is associated with the possibility of zero, one, or
multiple, steady-state equilibria. Throughout this chapter we shall
restrict ourselves to equilibria which are economically feasible.
These are defined to be equilibria in which the steady state solutions
for the money supply, bond supply, and nominal interest rate are all
non-negative (i.e., m  ^0, b  ^0, r  ^0); the steady-state output Y is
4non-negative by assumption.
We shall now examine the two alternative classes of equilibria in
turn.
4.3A. Inflationary Steady State
Since we are assuming that tt t 0, equations (6c) and (6d) may be 
combined to give
Y = D(Y-G, r-TT, m+b) + G (7a)
m = L(Y, r, m+E) (7b)
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m = $(m+b) (7c)
&(G-T) + r (1 —90 m = urn (7 d )
The possibility of there being zero, one, or more than one economically 
meaningful steady states arises from the fact that the steady-state 
government budget constraint is a quadratic function. The problems can 
be illustrated most clearly by assuming that D(.) and L(.) are linear 
homogeneous functions. In this case we may solve (7a)-(7c) for r and 
tt in the form
r =
-D2^L1Y + D2 ($-L3 )m
(8a)
-DgSLjY - L2-&(Y-G) (1 -D1 ) + [LgD -D2(L3-■&)]£
* = ----------------- --------------------------  (8b)
and substituting these expressions into (7d), we derive the following 
quadratic equation in m
[D2$(L3-$) - L2D3 ]m2 + [ D ^ L ^ Y  + L ^ (  Y-G) (1-D1 ) ]m
+ l2d2$2(g-t ) = 0 (9)
A necessary condition for an economically meaningful solution for the 
system to exist, is that the solution for m be real, and that at 
least one root be non-negative. For the existence of real roots, the 
discriminant of (9) must be positive; i.e.
-8-2 { [D2-9‘L1 Y + L2 (Y-G) (1-D1 )]2
- 4l2d2(g-t )[d2£(l3~&) - l2d3]} > 0 (10)
Inequality (10) may, or may not, be met. Conditions conducive to it 
being satisfied include: (i) a high income elasticity in the demand
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for money, reflected by a large , when & is non-zero; (ii) a budget
surplus if the fraction of money financing, &, is small (but not zero),
or large (near unity); and (iii) a budget deficit for appropriate values
5of $ lying in between these two extremes. Conversely, if these condi­
tions are reversed, the nonexistence of a solution for m increases in 
likelihood.
From (7c) it is seen that an economically meaningful solution for
b obtains if and only if such a solution for m exists. Finally, whether
the implied solution for r is economically feasible is determined by
substituting the solution for m obtained from (9) into (8a) above.
Looking at extreme cases, if $ = 0 (i.e., the deficit is bond
financed), equation (9) reduces to m = 0. That is, if the nominal
money supply is held fixed, then with a non-zero rate of inflation, the
real money supply must eventually be reduced to zero. The interest rate
r is unambiguously positive. At the other extreme, if the deficit is-
~2entirely money-financed (•0-=1 ) , the coefficient of m in (9) is positive. 
Assuming that (10) is met, so that a solution exists, there will be two 
solutions for m if the government runs a current deficit (G-T > 0).
These may be associated with 0, 1, or 2 positive values for r. However, 
if the government runs a current surplus (G-T < 0), one root of (9) 
will be negative and there will be only one economically feasible solu­
tion for m. This will be associated with a positive value for r (if 
is large enough) or a negative value for r (if is close to zero).
The critical aspect in the determination of the economically 
feasible solution is the root structure for the solutions of m, denoted 
by m^  and m^ say. More generally, these depend upon both (i) the size 
of the current government deficit G-T, and (ii) the mode of deficit
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financing &. Assuming that the roots are real we have the following:
G - T > 0 L2D3* + -D^  > S > 0, > 0
G - T < 0
L D
* + > L3 > 0, < 0
G - T > 0
L D
* + < L 3 m^  < 0, > 0
G - T < 0 2^^ 3a + < L 3 < 0, < 0
Finally, we should note that if the linear homogeneous functions 
D(.) and L(.) are replaced by affine functions, i.e., linear functions 
plus a positive or negative constant, then the sign and magnitudes of 
the steady state equilibria may change drastically, as may the number 
of economically feasible solutions for given values of G - T and &. 
Basically, the constants, DQ and LQ say, of the affine transformation 
may shift the equilibria in either the positive or negative direction, 
depending upon their respective signs. If the functions D(.) and L(.) 
are nonlinear, the problems of nonuniqueness and nonexistence are 
obviously compounded further in complexity.
4.3B. Stable-Price Steady State
This is described by (6a*) — (6d*) and it is immediately evident 
from the third equation of this set that this will not have an eco­
nomically feasible solution if G - T > 0, since then either r or b 
will be negative. Again, assuming that D(.) and L(.) are linear and 
homogenous, we may solve (6a') and (6b1) for r and b. Substituting 
the resulting expressions (not reported) into (6c') yields the following
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quadratic equation in m
-D [D2(1-L ) + L2D3]S2 + {D3L1Y[D2(2-L3) + L ^ ]
+ (Y-G) (1-D1 )[L D2 (1-L3) + D3L2(14-L3)]}m
+ (d 2l3-l2d3 )2 (g-t ) - [ (i -d 1 )(y - g )l3 + l1yd3][d2l1y
+ L2(1-Dl)(Y-G)] = 0
If G - T < 0, but is not too large in magnitude, then there will 
be two economically feasible solutions for m. One of these is associated 
with positive values of r and b while the other is associated with nega­
tive solutions for both r and b. There is therefore only one totally 
feasible solution. As the size of the surplus G - T increases in magni­
tude, the coefficient of the constant term becomes negative, implying 
that there is only one feasible solution for m. This solution is associ­
ated with positive or negative values for both r and b, depending upon 
whether D2L3 “ L2°3 ^ °*
If D3 = 0 and G - T < 0 but not too large, only one economically 
feasible solution for m will exist. However, this will be associated 
with negative values for both r and b, and therefore is not feasible 
overall.
Taking Cases 4.3A and 4.3B together, we draw the following conclusions 
regarding the steady state equilibria. If the government is running a 
deficit, then the only feasible long-run equilibrium is given in 4.3A, 
in which there may be anything between 0 and 2 feasible solutions, 
depending upon parameter values. If the government is running either 
a balanced budget or a small surplus, there is one feasible stable price
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equilibrium, together with either 0 or 1 inflationary equilibria, 
depending upon parameter values. As the size of the surplus increases, 
the possibility arises of there being no stable price equilibrium. In­
deed, it now becomes possible for no feasible solution for either class 
of steady state to exist. This occurs, for example, if G - T < 0,
= 0, while -9- < L^ .
4.4 Dynamics and Stability
We shall now examine the dynamics of the model in the neighborhood 
of each steady state. The general system given by equations (3) and 
(4) can be linearized about the steady state as follows
m 
b
ai1 al2
a21 a22
m-m
b-b
(12 )
where the a _ ’s are functions of the parameters of the model, evaluated 
at the steady state as demonstrated in the Appendix, and where m and B 
denote the relevant steady state values. We shall assume that by the 
appropriate introduction of additive constants and Lq , these are 
economically meaningful. Since our concern in this section is with the 
transitional dynamics about the steady state, this assumption is unimpor­
tant for present purposes.
Hence we can approximate the dynamics of m and b in the neighborhood 
of the steady state by the following dynamic equations
m-m a12 ai2
i tk e 1
b-b V aii V aii k e 2
(1 3)
- 91 -
where k^  and a re  c o n s ta n t s  and X^  and X2 are  the e igenva lues  a s s o c ia t e d  
w i th  the s teady  s t a t e .
I t  i s  c l e a r  from (13) t h a t  the  s t a b i l i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  depend upon the 
s ign  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  o f  the  e ig en v a lu es .  I f  the  r e a l  p a r t s  o f  both ro o ts  
a re  n e g a t iv e ,  the  model i s  l o c a l l y  s t a b l e ;  i f  one ro o t  i s  p o s i t i v e  and 
the  o th e r  n e g a t iv e ,  the  model w i l l  e x h i b i t  " s a d d le p o in t"  type i n s t a b i l i t y ;  
i f  the  r e a l  p a r t s  of  both e igenva lues  a re  p o s i t i v e ,  the  model i s  t o t a l l y  
u n s ta b l e  in  the  neighborhood of  the  s teady  s t a t e .
We s h a l l  now examine X^  , X f o r  the  two c l a s s e s  of s teady  s t a t e  
e q u i l i b r i a  in  tu rn .
4.4A. I n f l a t i o n a r y  Steady S t a t e
As demonstrated in  the  Appendix, the  e igenva lues  f o r  t h i s  e q u i l ib r iu m  
are  given by
X 1 =  - T T (14a)
X0 = {-D0A$* l2 + D0AL0$2 3
D L (T-G)
+ --------  -  d3l2a} / ( d1a + d2 )l2 (14b)
Using (7c) and (8b) ,  these  exp re ss ions  may be w r i t t e n  as
l
D0-8,L1 Y + L_$(Y-G) (1-D. ) -  [ L I .  -  D0 (L_~&)]m
x, = —--- 2---- kjt2---  - ---  (14a,)
- 0 ( £ - L _ ) D 0 + D_L0 ]m2 -  D0L»(G-T)^2
X = -----------2— Z------- ---------------- £_£------------ (14b* )
2 m-3-(D^ A + D2 )L2
where m i s  the  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  to equa t ion  (9) .
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By considering equations (14a'), (14bf) in conjunction with (9), 
it is seen that a variety of sign patterns for the eigenvalues, and 
therefore a range of dynamic behavior is possible. To illustrate 
these possibilities it is convenient to focus on the special case
= 0, when there is no wealth effect in aggregate expenditure demand. 
Using this case, we can characterize examples of the three possible 
types of eigenvalue configurations in terms of the two policy parameters 
as follows.^1
(i) Total Stability: When G - T > 0 and & < < 1 , (14aT) and
(14b') imply X <0, <0.
(ii) Saddlepoint Instability: For G - T > 0 and 0 < < $ - 1
(i.e., the case of all money financing) it can be shown that for the
larger steady-state value of m, given by (9), we have X < 0, X^ > 0.
(iii) Total Instability: For G - T < 0 and 0 < (14b1)
implies X^ > 0. If further & = 1 (i.e., all money financing), then in
the neighborhood of the feasible equilibrium m, X^  >0, yielding an 
example of total instability.
4.4B. Stable Price Steady State
As demonstrated in the Appendix, the eigenvalues for this case 
have the following properties
X + X = [ (1--9-) (r+r, b) + \}r b] — mTT - bn (15a)1 2  b m m b
X X0 = (9-A-m) [ (r+r. b)n - r bn. ] (15b)1 2  b m m b
Thus there are two cases to consider. First, when m > &A,
X X  > 0 and X^  + X^ > 0. Hence in this case the real parts of X^  
and X^ must be positive; i.e., the model will possess two unstable
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roots in the neighborhood of the steady state. Secondly, when m < -9-A,
< 0 and hence the model possesses one positive and one negative
characteristic root; there is therefore saddlepoint instability.
It will be recalled that the equilibrium m (and hence A), which
may or may not be unique, depending upon G - T, is independent of the
debt financing parameter $. Thus whether a particular steady state is
associated with two unstable roots or one unstable root depends simply
upon whether 0 \ m/A. Saddlepoint instability will tend to be associated
with predominantly money-financed deficits, total instability will tend
7to result when the deficit is financed primarily be selling bonds.
4.5 Choice of Appropriate Steady State
In principle it is possible, for given values of the parameters 
•8-, G - T, to find several possible steady states as potential equilibria.
In the case where functions D(.) and L(.) are linear (discussed in 
Section 4.3), up to two feasible equilibria may exist if the government 
is running a small surplus. If D(.) and L(.) are nonlinear, the problems 
of uniqueness become more acute. Unfortunately, the model lacks any 
procedure for choosing among them. As we have seen, most of the equilibria 
are associated with unstable root(s), so that Samuelson's correspondence 
principle, which would eliminate such equilibria is not helpful. Further­
more, as noted in the introduction, the rational expectations approach 
eliminates the effects of unstable roots where they exist, by allowing 
for some appropriate initial jump.
One procedure followed by rational expectations theorists to choose 
between multiple equilibria in nonlinear models is to introduce a welfare 
function and to assume that the economy will be driven to that equilibrium
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which maximizes welfare. However, it still remains unclear what mechanism 
in the model ensures that the utility maximizing steady state rather than 
some other steady state equilibrium will be reached.
4.6 Responses to Exogenous Changes
In Section 4.4 we established that it is possible for the economy 
described in this model to have zero, one, or two unstable character­
istic roots, depending upon the choice of fiscal and monetary policy 
and other parameters of the economy. As a result of this, the require­
ment that the system be stable can impose very different types of adjust­
ment on the economy following an exogenous disturbance, depending upon 
the initial steady state and its associated root structure.
4.6A. Locally Stable Equilibrium
In the case of a (locally) stable equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium 
which is associated with two stable characteristic roots, the adjustment 
is what may be referred to as of the traditional type. The state variables 
in the basic system (m and b) are predetermined. Any exogenous disturbance 
in the system gives rise to instantaneous jumps in the interest rate r
and the inflation rate i t , in accordance with equations (3a) and (3b).
• •These generate change in m and b, and thereafter the dynamics of the 
system ensures that the economy will evolve continuously towards the 
new steady state.
4.6B. Saddlepoint Instability
In the case of saddlepoint instability, i.e., an equilibrium which 
is associated with one stable root, say, the unstable root X is 
eliminated by setting = 0 in (13). In the case when this unstable
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root is eliminated by a jump in the price level, P, an appropriate 
jump following an exogenous change in government expenditure, G, say 
can be derived using Theorem 3.1 of Chapter 3. This jump is given 
by
3P
3G
-[(an-vlü 3b-, _+ al23G]P0
mo(airV + ai2bo (16a)
Once this initial jump has been made, leading to corresponding jumps 
in m and b the economy will then evolve towards the steady-state along 
the stable arm of the saddlepoint, the equation of which is given by
m - m ■(b - b) (16b)
4.6C. Total Instability
The case where both roots are unstable may pose some difficulties.
As shown recently by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Buiter (1982) and also 
in Theorems 3.1 to 3.3 of Chapter 3, a dynamic system containing unstable 
roots can be stabilized only if there are as many variables which are 
free to undergo independent jumps ("jump" variables) as there are unstable 
roots in the system. In effect, it is the appropriate initial jumps in 
these variables which eliminate the instabilities from the adjustment.
In the case of the saddlepoint most frequently encountered and just dis­
cussed, this is no problem; the required jumps in m and b are achieved 
by an appropriate jump in the price level P. When there are two unstable 
roots the choice of a second jump variable is somewhat less obvious; we 
shall assume that this jump in the price level is accompanied by an open- 
market operation which is undertaken by the monetary authority in order 
to stabilize the economy.
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When there are two unstable roots and two jump variables, applica­
tion of Theorem 3.1 of Chapter 3 shows that m and b will jump instan­
taneously to the steady-state following an exogenous shock, i.e., at all 
times.
m = m (17a)
b = b (17b)
Application of Theorem 3.1 when the appropriate short-run responses 
are given by a jump in the price level and an open market operation tells 
us that the appropriate jumps following an exogenous change in say, 
Government expenditure, G, satisfy the following equation system.
3M ' 
3G po --
--
—
N
cr o -mo
3m
BG
3P
> 9G .
3 o + c
r
o -1 -1
3b 
3G ,
(18)
4.7 An Example
To illustrate some of the issues we have been discussing, and in 
particular to show the interdependence between the dynamic adjustment 
of the system and the steady state, we shall analyze the following 
specific example. We shall assume that the government is running a 
small surplus and that it increases its expenditure, but by a suffi­
ciently small amount, to ensure that the budget remains in surplus. We 
shall assume that the deficit is money financed, so that 0 < < $ = 1 ,
and that = 0. Under these conditions, there is a unique feasible 
inflationary equilibrium, in the neighborhood of which both character­
istic roots are positive, so that the system is totally unstable. For 
this same range of parameter values, we have noted that the stable price
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equilibrium will be associated with negative values of r and b, and 
hence is infeasible. However, we shall assume that by an appropriate 
affine transformation, the constants and in the demand functions 
and other parameters are chosen to ensure that feasibility of all 
variables does obtain. Assuming this to be the case, the stationary 
price equilibrium is associated with characteristic roots A^  >0,
A^ <0, so that this equilibrium is a saddlepoint. We shall now dis­
cuss the adjustment of the economy from each equilibrium in turn.
In the case of the inflationary equilibrium, setting -8- = 1 , = 0
(6d), 
Y =
the steady state reduces to 
DQ + D (Y-G) + D2 (r-T?) + G (19a)
m = LQ + LjY + L2? + L^m (19b)
G - T = Trm (19c)
b = 0 (19d)
where the constants and are chosen to ensure that r > 0. With 
G - T < 0, it follows from (19c) that the associated equilibrium rate 
of price change must be deflationary, i.e., tt < 0.
The response of the steady state to an increase in G is given by 
the following expressions
8r
8G
( 1 -L  )
— j ■ - C-D2 + (1-D1 )m] > 0 (20a)
8m
8G -j [(1-D1 )L2m - L2D2J < 0 (20b)
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= - 1  [D2 (1-L ) + L2 (1-Dl ) t t ] $ 0 (20c)
where J = -md-L^JD^ - L^D^tt > 0 in the neighborhood of equilibrium. 
Thus an increase in G leads to an increase in the steady-state rate 
of interest, accompanied by a reduction in the real money stock. The 
rate of inflation may either rise or fall, while the real stock of 
bonds remains zero.
Following the discussion of Section 4.6B, since both X > 0 and 
*2 > 0, the increase in G must be accompanied by an appropriate open 
market operation in order to permit the system to remain in steady 
state. Using equations (18)— (20), the required jumps in M and P are 
given by
9M
9G
Vo 
,rao + V
3m
3G < 0
3P
3G > 0
(21a)
(21b)
If the government accompanies the increase in its expenditure with 
an open market sale of bonds which yields the increase in money supply 
given by equation (21a) and if the price level increases in accord with 
equation (21b) then the overall result will be that the real stock of 
bonds will remain constant, while the real stock of money will fall and 
the economy will remain in equilibrium.
Setting = 0 in (6a,)-(6d’), the stable price steady state is 
described by
Y = DQ + D (Y-G) + D2r + G (22a)
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m = Lq + L^Y + L^r + L^(m + b) 
G - T + rb = 0 
tt = 0
(22b)
(22c)
(22d)
Differentiating these equations with respect to G, the response of the 
steady state is given by
3r
3G
3m
3G
3b
3G
(1-D1)
> 0
(1-D1)[rL2-L3S] + L3D2
- D2 (1- L3 )?
< 0
d 2 - 5(1-D])
< 0
(23a)
(23b)
(23c)
Thus the steady-state rate of interest will rise, while the real stocks 
of money and bonds will fall.
This case is characterized by a saddlepoint behaviour of the dynamic 
adjustment process and the appropriate response in the price level following 
a change in government expenditure is given by equation (16a). The sign 
of this adjustment is dependent on the sign of the terms a ^  and a^2 , 
which are given in the Appendix. With $ = 1, = 0, these reduce to
1-L.
an  = ~ l7
bD - mD_. r 2
D1(m+b) +D 2>
'12 (m+b)+D2
mD0-bD 2 r
(m+b) +D2 _
(24a)
(24b)
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Both of these are indeterminate in sign so that the sign of the jump 
in the price level can be either positive or negative, depending upon 
parameter values.
Assume plausibly, for example, that > 0, a ^  > 0. Then in 
this case substitution with equation (16a) shows that 8P/9G >0. In 
other words, following an exogenous increase in government expenditure,
G, the price level will rise. This will result in corresponding falls 
in both m and b and then the economy will follow a stable path given by 
equation (16b) until equilibrium is reached.
As has been done in Chapter 3 it is also possible to illustrate 
the jump and subsequent dynamic path using a graphical approach. The 
equivalence of the two approaches has been suitably emphasized in 
Chapter 3 and we shall not repeat those arguments here.
The examples given here suffice to show how contrasting behavior 
in the system can result from exogenous disturbances for identical para­
meter values, but beginning from different steady states.
A.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed a simple nonlinear monetary macro 
model under perfect foresight. We have emphasized here how the inherent 
nonlinearities associated with inflation taxes and interest payments give 
rise to problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of equilibria. For 
any choice of fiscal and monetary policy parameters, we have identified 
two sets of steady state equilibria. One of these is associated with 
a non-zero rate of inflation and depends upon both the monetary and 
fiscal policy parameters. The other is associated with a stable price 
level and is independent of the monetary policy parameter. For either
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set of equilibria, there may be zero, one, or multiple solutions, 
depending upon other parameter values.
We have also considered the stability properties that arise as a 
result of the interaction between the sign and size of the current bud­
get deficit and alternative modes of deficit financing. We find that 
these stability properties depend critically upon the associated steady 
state. For the class of inflationary steady states we find that the 
dynamic system may: (i) be totally stable; (ii) have saddlepoint type
instability, (iii) be totally unstable, depending upon parameter values 
and the mode of deficit financing. In the neighborhood of the stable 
price equilibrium, the dynamics is either: (i) totally unstable, or
(ii) a saddlepoint. For either equilibrium, the dynamic response of 
the system to an exogenous shock depends critically upon the root 
structure of the associated equilibrium. While jumps commonly found 
in models of perfect foresight frequently arise in this model, they 
are not the only response. Thus, despite the fact that none of endog­
enous variables have been constrained to move sluggishly, it is quite 
possible for the system to respond in a "smooth" manner, in line with
0
dynamic models of a traditional "sluggish" variety. In fact, depending 
upon the type of fiscal and monetary policy chosen, all types of dynamic 
response are possible.
Finally, we have taken a particular set of policy rules and shown 
how the choice of steady state will influence both the dynamic properties 
of the system and the system’s appropriate response to an exogenous shock. 
The qualitative difference in the system’s responses serves to underline 
the fact that in a real world which is characterized by nonlinearities, 
the possession of limited knowledge about linear relationships (as in,
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for example, a simplified econometric model), may not be sufficient for 
people in the economy to foresee accurately the appropriate response of 
the economy to exogenous changes, in the manner predicted by the rational 
expectations literature.
Throughout the rest of this thesis we shall be emphasizing the 
rational expectations approach to economic dynamics. However, some 
of the questions raised in this chapter about the non-uniqueness of 
short-run responses to an exogenous shock and whether individuals 
have enough information so as to make such responses attainable will not 
be treated further. Chapter 4 has been included in this thesis to empha­
size that the issues are not as clear as some of the recent literature 
would have us believe; rather it should be emphasized that, while there is 
adequate theory to justify the optimality of stabilizing jumps (see 
Brock (1974, 1977)), it is still necessary for economists to develop 
a micro-theory as to how individuals have sufficient information avail­
able to them so that the stabilizing jumps suggested by the rational 
expectations literature can be achieved. This issue, although recognized 
as a need of high priority by the author, will not be treated in this
thesis.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
The dynamics of the linearized model in the neighborhood of the 
steady state are described by the following equation
m
b
12 m-m
b-b
( A.  1 )
where the a..ij s are evaluated at the steady state. This means that
_ 3m « ~ ~ ~a„ „ = -R—  = ^ r b - 7 T - 7 T m  11 9 m  m  m
ai2 = = ^ (? + rbS) - v
a = 3 -^ = d 4 ) r  b - u b 21 dm m m
_ 3b 
*22 " 3b - (1—9-)(r + r.b) - tt - tt, b
(A.2a) 
(A.2b) 
(A.2c) 
(A.2d)
where the tilde denotes that the corresponding variables are evaluated 
at the appropriate steady state and where
r = — 7   < 0 (A.3a)m L2
' Sr. = > 0 (A.3b)b L2
(D1 b + D2) (1 - L3 ) - (D1 tt - D3)L2
(D1A + D 2 )L2
(A.3c)
-1 04-
— (D1 b + D2 )L3 + (D^r-TT) + D )L
tt = -----------------------------------------------------  (A.3d)
( D1 A + D2 ) L2
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  equat ion  of t h i s  dynamic system i s  given by 
2
A -  ( a ^  + a22 )A + ( a ^ a ^  -  a 2a2 ) = 0 (A.4)
Let A^, A2 denote  the  e igenva lues  o r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  ro o t s  of  the  system. 
Then
x i + a2 = a -n + a 22
= [ ( 1 —8*)(r + r^b) + 3-r^b] -  mn^ -  bn^ -  2 tt (A.5a)
X1X2 = a n a22 " a i 2 a21
= —tt[ (1 —90 ( r  + r . b )  + -8-r b -  it -  mu -  bn ] b m m b
+ ($A -  m ) [ ( r  + r,b)iT -  r  bn ] (A.5b)b m m b
As shown in  the  t e x t ,  f o r  each choice  o f  & th e re  a re  two p o s s ib l e  s teady  
s t a t e s .  In the  f i r s t  of these  s teady  s t a t e s  tt ? 0,  m = $A and b = (1 —3-)A. 
In the  second p o s s ib l e  s teady  s t a t e ,  tt = 0 and rb = T -  G.
Using eq ua t ions  (A.5) i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to d e sc r ib e  the  p r o p e r t i e s  of 
the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  in  the  neighborhood of  each s teady  s t a t e .
A. I n f l a t i o n a r y  Steady S t a t e  tt  ^ 0 
In t h i s  case ,
-TT (A.6a)
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X_ = (1—3-) (r* + r.b) + 3-r b - n - mu - t> tt 2 b r a  m b
[-^ D2A + ^(D2AL3 - D2L2r) + (D^fr-n) - D3L2A) ]
(D1A + D2 )L2
D2A + ^D2AL3 + D2L2[(T-G)/A] - D3L2A
(A.6b)
(D^  A + D2)L2
B. Stable-Price Steady State, tt = 0
In this case the two roots satisfy
X + X = [ (1-9*) (r+r. b) + &r b] - mn - bn (A.7a)2 b m m b
X X = (3-A-m) [ (r+r, b)n - r bn, ] I 2 b m m b (A.7b)
It is readily shown that the term [(r+rwb)n - r bn, ] < 0, so thatb m m b
sgn X^X2 = -sgn(&A - m). Turning to (A.7a), the following argument
shows that X^  + X2 > 0 whenever m > $A, provided the following additional
mild restrictions are added: (i) tt < 0, and (ii) either L  = 0 orb • ------ 3 —
b 2 m.
First, substituting from (A.3a) and (A.3b)
$ - U
C (1 — -3)r + &r ]b =(— - -- )b.b m L2 (A.8a)
Thus, (A.7a) may be written as
X1 + X2 = (1-3)r +
■3-L-
b - (mn + bn m b (A.8b)
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But
m(D1b + D2)(L3 - 1) 
"mTTm “ (D1A + D 2 )L2
1 )
Accordingly, if tt^  < 0,
x1 + x2 > $-L.
l L2 j
b  —  mTT
6— L,
b +
m ( L ^ - 1  )
l3 (m-b) ^  _ ~
L3 (m-b) ^  _ ~
> 0 if, b  ^m or = 0, and m > $A
Therefore, in general, when m > $A, A + A^ > 0 and A^A 
real parts of A^  and A^ are positive) and, when m < &A, A^A^ 
A^  and A^ are real and of opposite sign).
(A.8c)
(A.8d)
(A.8e)
(A.8f)
(A.8g)
(A.8h)
> 0 (the 
< 0 (i.e.,
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PART 2
"OPTIMAL STABILIZATION POLICIES 
UNDER PERFECT FORESIGHT"
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CHAPTER 5
SPECIFICATION OF AN OPTIMAL STABILIZATION PROBLEM 
5.1 Introduction
The problem of choosing between inflation and unemployment rates 
continues to be a fundamental one in most modern economies. The ques­
tion of the optimal choice of tradeoff between them has been investi­
gated by a number of authors. The earliest studies, conducted in the 
mid 1960's were purely static; see, e.g., Lipsey (1965) and Brechling 
(1968). Subsequently, the analysis was extended to a dynamic context 
on the assumption that inflationary expectations, known to be a criti­
cal aspect of the tradeoff, follow some gradual evolutionary process 
such as an adaptive scheme; see, e.g., Phelps (1967, 1972), Turnovsky 
(1981). These authors derive an optimal path in which the inflation 
rate adjusts gradually toward some steady-state equilibrium, while the 
unemployment rate converges slowly toward its natural rate. The tran­
sitional dynamic adjustment path depends upon the parameters characterizing 
the economy and the preferences of the policy maker, including in partic­
ular, the rate of time discount.
In Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis we have introduced several 
related continuous-time macro-models and used them to emphasize the 
dynamic properties of the economy when inflationary expectations satisfy 
perfect foresight, which is the deterministic analogue of rational 
expectations. In this chapter we take a similar model which includes 
both unemployment and inflation and add a loss function in order to 
examine the optimal inflation-unemployment trade-off when expectations 
satisfy perfect foresight.
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In the rational expectations approach to economic dynamics, we 
have already shown how the dynamics of the economy are typically 
associated with instability and how there will be a jump in one or 
more endogenous variables (e.g., a jump in the price level or an 
open market operation) in order to stabilize the economy.
In Chapter 6 we examine whether or not we can choose an appropriate 
mix of fiscal and monetary policies in order to minimize the chosen loss 
function. At the same time we require that the optimal policy is con­
sistent with the objective that real money and real bonds converge to 
a finite value. The latter objective is not postulated as being a 
formal requirement of the model but can be justified by appealing to 
the arguments of the rational expectations approach to economic modeling.
When these objectives are simultaneously satisfied it is no longer 
necessary that the price level jump in order to stabilize the economy. 
Thus it is consistent with the rational expectations approach to 
economic dynamics that no jumps in the price level occur. This is the 
assumption adopted in Chapter 6. However if we accept that the price 
level can jump to stabilize the economy as the rational expectations 
literature does, then surely it is equally plausible for the price 
level to jump in order to minimize the loss function. In Chapter 7 
we consider the case when the price level is allowed to jump to mini­
mize the loss function.
Whether or not jumps in the price level are allowed we show in 
Chapters 6 and 7 that under perfect foresight the optimal strategy is 
to drive the economy instantaneously to a zero rate of inflation. How­
ever the time path of unemployment depends on whether or not initial
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jumps in the price level occur. In the rest of this chapter we develop 
a modeling framework which will be used for the analysis of these
subsequent chapters.
5.2 A Dynamic Macroeconomic Model
The analysis of Chapters 5 to 7 will be based on the following
macroeconomic model which is derived under the assumption that labor
S Dsupply is greater than labor demand; i.e., N > N .
Y = D(YD , r-TT, A) + G (1a)
0 < D < 1, D2 < 0,  D3 > 0
Y° = Y - T + rb - ttA (1b)
A = m + b (1c)
m = L(Y, r, A) L > 0, L2 < 0, 0 < L3 < 1 (1d)
ND = ND (z ) ND ' < 0 (1e)
NS = NS (z) NS ’ > 0 (1f)
Y = f(ND ) = Y(z) Y* < 0 (1g)
U = (NS - ND )/NS = U (z) U ’ > 0 (1h)
w = a(5 - U) + tt (1 i)
tt = p, except at points where P jumps (1j)
•
z = w - p (2a)
m = &(G - T + rb) - pm (2b)
b = (1 - $)(G - T + rb) - pb (2c)
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where
Y = real output
yd = real private disposable income
D = real private expenditure
G = real government expenditure
r = nominal interest rate
IT = expected rate of inflation
r - T i  = real interest rate
p = price level
p =
•P/P = actual rate of inflation
M = nominal money supply
m = M/P = real money supply
B = nominal supply of bonds
b = B/P = real supply of bonds
A = real private wealth
W = nominal wage rate
z = log(W/P) = log of real wage rate
w = •W/W = rate of nominal wage inflation
nd = demand for labor
NS = supply of labor
f = production function
U = rate of unemployment
0 = natural rate of unemployment
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The model essentially follows the framework of the model analysed 
in Chapters 2 and 3 combined with the monetary policies analysed in 
Chapter 4.
Equation (1a) is the product market equilibrium condition, in 
which real private demand increases with real private disposable income 
and real private wealth and decreases with the real rate of interest. 
Equation (1b) defines real private disposable income to be real factor 
income plus returns on government bonds, less expected capital losses 
on financial wealth (the expected inflation tax on real private wealth) 
and exogenous real taxes. Real private wealth is defined in equation 
(1c). Equilibrium in the money market is described by equation (Id) 
where the demand for real money balances depends upon the real level 
of income, the nominal rate of interest and real private wealth.
The supply of, and demand for, labor are given by equations (1e)
and (If). Both are dependent upon the real wage (with the appropriate
sign). Equations (1g) and (1h) describe the production function and
the rate of unemployment as being the difference between the supply of
and demand for labor as a percentage of the labor supply. The produc-
D Stion function is written on the assumption that N < N .
Equation (1i) is a simple Phillips curve with the rate of wage 
inflation increasing with excess demand in the labor market and with 
the expected rate of inflation. It is a standard version of the "expec­
tations hypothesis" with the unitary coefficient on expectations reflect­
ing the "accelerationist" view. Equation (1j ) states that inflationary 
expectations satisfy perfect myopic foresight; i.e., the instantaneous 
expected rate of inflation equals the instantaneous actual rate of
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inflation. This equation is assumed to hold everywhere, except at 
points where there are jumps in the price level, in which case p 
becomes infinite.
The dynamics of the system are described by equations (2a)-(2c). 
The first of these equations defines the evolution of real wages, 
while equations (2b) and (2c) describe government financial policy 
and the evolution in the stocks of financial assets it generates. 
Specifically, these equations assert that the government deficit 
consists of government expenditure plus the interest payments on 
government debt less tax revenues and that a fraction & of this 
deficit is financed by money creation, with the balance (1 —8*) being 
financed by issuing bonds.
5.3 Specification of an Optimization Problem
Equations (1) and (2) describe the economy faced by the policy 
maker. We assume that the policy maker regards a state of zero infla­
tion (stable price level) and a fixed rate of unemployment, 6 say, 
as globally optimal. Given these long-run targets we assume that the 
policy maker's objective is to choose some combination of government 
expenditure policy (G), taxation policy (T) and monetary policy (5-) 
so as to minimize the following loss function
L = c|U(0) - UQ | + j e~'t't[ap2 + (U - <5)2 ]dt (3)
where is the previously inherited rate of unemployment, and U (0) 
is the endogenously determined initial unemployment rate, following 
the initial jump in the price level, if it occurs (see below).
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Note that in general U  ^ 6. This reflects the fact that the 
rate of unemployment which the economy tends to approach, i.e., the 
natural rate level, U, may not coincide with the level that the policy 
maker finds socially optimal. The parameter a (0 < a < 00) reflects 
the relative importance attached to inflation and unemployment in the 
intertemporal objective. As a increases, the policy maker is concerned 
increasingly with inflation; as a decreases the objective is weighted 
more heavily toward unemployment. The parameter y (0 < y < co), which 
measures the rate of time preference, reflects the degree of myopia 
of the policy maker; the larger y the more myopic he is.
It will be demonstrated later that if an initial jump in the price 
level occurs then by an appropriate choice of this initial jump in the 
price level, P, the inital rate of unemployment U (0) can be chosen.
This instantaneous initial jump in unemployment from its inherited 
rate is assumed to impose adjustment costs on the economy and these 
are reflected in the cost parameter c. Note that these initial costs 
are assumed to be proportional to the absolute magnitude of the jump.
In order to solve the policy optimization problem it is first 
convenient to use equations (1) to express the short-run rate of infla­
tion and the short-run interest rate in terms of the endogenous variables 
U, m, and b, and the policy variables G and T. These solutions are given
p = p(U, m, b, G, T) (4a)
PU < °> pm < °* pb ^ PG < 0» PT > 0
r = r(U, m, b)
r„ < 0, r < 0, r, > 0 U 9 m b
(4b)
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Note that (4a) implies that an increase in government expenditure is 
deflationary, while an increase in exogenous tax receipts is inflation­
ary. The reason for these seemingly perverse effects is seen from (1a) 
and (Id). In order for product market equilibrium to be maintained, an 
increase in G must be matched by a reduction in private demand, which 
with output and wealth fixed instantaneously, is met by an increase in 
the real interest rate. But since the nominal interest rate is indepen­
dent of G, this increase takes the form of a reduction in the inflation 
rate. And likewise for a change in T. However, it should be stressed 
that these effects are only partial; they do not allow for the jumps 
in the price level which may occur. If changes in the price level 
follow policy changes, then they in turn will impact on the rate of 
inflation. Given that U = U[log(W/P)], m = M/P, and b = B/P, and that 
the nominal wage rate W, and the nominal asset supplies M and B are 
all constrained to move continuously, the complete effect of an increase 
in G on the instantaneous rate of inflation is given by the expression
In addition to the partial effect which is negative, as noted, there 
are the induced effects operating through the jump in the price level 
and this has several induced, positive effects. First, by lowering the 
real wage this reduced unemployment, thereby stimulating inflation. 
Secondly it reduces the real stock of money and bonds and a sufficient 
condition for the combined net effect of this to be inflationary is 
that the wealth elasticity of the demand for money be less than unity. 
In short, if a jump in the price level occurs, the induced effect
dp _ 
dG "
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of increase in G are all inflationary and indeed on balance are likely 
to dominate the perverse partial deflationary effect.
Differentiating (1h) with respect to t and combining with (1i) 
and (2a), we obtain
ü =  ß(ü -  U) +  £ ( 7T - p) (5)
where for convenience we let 3 = U ’a, e = U'.
The question arises as to when the jumps in the price level, if
they occur, will take place. Intuitively it seems reasonable that this 
will occur at the points where the policy variables are likely to undergo
3discrete changes, which is at the beginning of the period of optimization. 
Invoking this assumption it follows that it = p, thereafter.
The objective facing the policy maker can now be summarized by the 
following optimization problem: Choose appropriate policy instruments
so as to
00
Min c |u(o) - U0 | + 1 e”^t[ap2 + (U - 6)2]dt (6)
0
subject to^
P = p(U, m, b, G, T) (7a)
r = r(U, m, b) (7b)
•
m = $(G - T + rb) - pm (7c)
•
b = (1 - $ ) (G - T + rb) - pb (7d)
•
U = ß(Ö - U) (7e)
where W (0) = w o , M(0) = M , and 0 B(0) = Bq are all predetermined and
Pq is either endogenous or fixed depending upon whether the price
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level is or is not allowed to jump in order to minimize the loss 
function. The initial quantities m(0), b(0), and U(0) are also 
endogenous or fixed and satisfy the constraint
m(0) = M /P(0) (8a)
b (0) = B /P(0) (8b)
U(0) = U[log(W /P(0)] (8c)
In Chapter 6 we examine the number and type of policy instruments 
that will be required in order for the economy to remain stable when 
there are no jumps in the price level. In examining this question 
we also look at the associated optimal inflation/unemployment mix for 
the economy. Chapter 7 then examines optimal stabilization policy 
when prices are allowed to jump endogenously.
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CHAPTER 6
OPTIMAL STABILIZATION POLICY WITH NO JUMPS 
IN THE PRICE LEVEL
6.1 Introduction
We now consider the situation when the policy maker has up to 
three policy instruments available to him. These policy instruments 
involve two fiscal instruments: Government expenditure (G) and taxa­
tion (T), as well as a monetary instrument (-9-). We assume that the 
policy maker will choose some or all of these policy instruments to 
satisfy two objectives:
(i) to minimize the given loss function which is a function of 
both unemployment and inflation; and
(ii) to keep the economy on a path which will eventually converge 
to a stable long-run equilibrium.
When the price level is not allowed to jump endogenously in order 
to stabilize the economy the question arises as to how many and what 
type of policy instruments the policy maker will have to employ to 
simultaneously sustain both these objectives. This is the question 
addressed in Chapter 6.
6.2 The Problem Re-Stated
When there are no jumps in the price level, the problem facing 
the policy maker, first given in equations (6), (7a)-(7e), (8a)-(8c) 
of Chapter 5 can be summarized as follows:
Choose appropriate policy instruments so as to
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Min — e "^[ap2 + (U - 6)2]dt (1 )
subject to
p = p(U, m, b, G, T) (2a)
r = r(U, m, b) (2b)
m = $(G - T + rb) - pm (2c)
b = (1 - &)(G - T + rb} -pb (2d)
U = 3(0 - U) (2e)
where
m(0) = mQ, b(0) = bQ, z(0) = zQ 
are predetermined and thus so is U(0) = U(zQ).
The policy maker is also required to choose policy instruments so
that
lim |m(t) | < 00 (3a)
t-K»
lim |b(t)| < ~ (3b)
t-*»
Since lim U(t) = U, equations (3a)-(3b) ensure that the economy
t-K»
converges to its steady-state equilibrium.
As stated earlier the policy-maker is free to choose from two fiscal 
instruments (G and T) and a monetary instrument (-O'). In examining whether 
or not an optimal solution to this problem exists, each combination of
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available instruments is considered in turn.
6.3 Determination of the Optimal Solution
To solve the optimization problem given by equations (1), (2a)-(2e), 
first write down the Hamiltonian functions as follows:
H = j e”yt[ap2 + (U - 6)2] + ye”yt[m + pm - $(G - T + rb) ]
+ cpe“yt[b + pb - (1 - $)(G - T + rb)]
+ ne“Y t [Ü - ß(Ü - U)] (4)
where pe”yt, cpe-yt, ne_yt are the discounted Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the dynamic equations (2c)—(2e) respectively. The 
Euler equations with respect to m, b, U, G, T and & are respectively 
given by1
y = appm + p[4r b + pmm + p + y]
+ cp[ — (1 - $)r b + p b] (5a)m m
cp = appb + y[--9-(rbb + r) + pbm]
+ cp[-(1 - -9-)(rbb + r) + pbb + p + y] (5b)
n = (U - 6) + appb + yC-3-r^ b + Pyin]
+ cp[ — (1 - ^)ryb + Pyb] + (3 + y)n (5c)
appG + y[—■8* + p^ jn] + cp[ — (1 - 8) + pGb] = 0 (5d)
appT + y[$ + pTm] + cp[(1 - $) + prpb] = 0 (5e)
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y = cp (5f)
In addition the dynamics of m, b, and U, are given by equations 
(2c)—(2e). The optimal solution must also satisfy the following 
transversality conditions as t-*30
lim(mye~yt) = 0 (6a)
t-x»
lim(bcpe_yt) = 0 (6b)
t-*°°
lim(Une"yt) = 0 (6c)
t-x»
Finally, we also require that the solution is stable, thus satisfying 
equations (3a)-(3b).
We now consider in turn: the case when the policy maker is able to
manipulate all three of the instruments (this will be known as the 
three instrument problem), the case when the policy maker is able to 
manipulate any two of these instruments (the two instrument problem) 
and the case when the policy maker is able to manipulate only one of 
these instruments (the one instrument problem). We examine the nature 
of the optimal stabilization policy and associated optimal time-paths 
for unemployment and inflation in each case; we also examine whether the 
economy converges to equilibrium.
6.4 The Three Instrument Problem
For the three instrument problem, i.e., when Government expenditure 
(G), taxes (T) and monetary policy ($) are all available instruments, 
the necessary conditions are given by equations (5a)-(5f) and (2c)-(2e).
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In particular, equations (5d), (5e) imply
(pT + PG)[y^  + cp(1 - ■&) ] = 0 (7a)
Hence, since p + pn ? 0,1 u
y-9- + cp(1-&) = 0 (7b)
Combining equations (7b), (5f)
y = cp = 0 (7c)
and then substituting equation (7c) in equation (5d)
P = 0 (7d)
optimal path is given by
n = (U—6 ) + (3+y)n (8a)
p = 0 (8b)
m = $(G - T + rb) (8c)
b = (1 —90 (G - T + rb) (8d)
Ü = 3(0 - u) (8e)
In fact, with three policy instruments, each of p, m, b can be
controlled independently by allocating one policy instrument to each
variable. Thus m can be controlled by the appropriate choice of the
budget deficit, G - T. Given any budget deficit the time-path of b
2can be controlled by the choice of Then given any time-path for
real money, m , and real bonds, b, any time-path for inflation, p, can
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be derived by an appropriate choice of government expenditure, G. In 
particular, therefore, the optimal time-path for inflation, given by 
p = 0 can be derived by an appropriate choice of government expenditure, 
given suitable choices of G - T and $ which lead to stable values for 
real money and real bonds. Such an optimal policy can be achieved with 
an instantaneous jump in the rate of inflation to zero, while m and b 
evolve continuously from the initial condition towards their steady 
state equilibria.
6.5 The Two Instrument Problem
6.5.1 A Monetary and a Fiscal Instrument
When a monetary instrument (i.e., &) and a fiscal instrument (say 
G) are available to the policy maker in order to attain his policy 
objectives, then the relevant necessary conditions are given by equations 
(5a)-(5d), (5f), (2c)-(2e). In particular by using equations (5a), (5b), 
(5d), (5f) we can demonstrate that for the optimal solution
p = y = cp = 0 (9)
Hence the necessary conditions for the optimal path reduce to equations 
(8a)-(8e). We have already shown in section 6.4 of this chapter that 
this path can be attained using three policy instruments. In fact it 
can be attained using only one fiscal instrument and a monetary instru­
ment.
We can easily choose G so that inflation is driven instantaneously 
to zero. In order to stabilize the economy we need only choose -9- so that 
m and b converge to their steady state. This can be achieved as follows:
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Assuming t h a t  G converges  to  G we can show t h a t  the  s t e a d y  s t a t e  
v a l u e s  o f  m and b w i l l  s a t i s f y
p(U, m, b,  G) = 0 
r (Ü,  m, b )b  = T -  G
(10a)
(10b)
Then th e  t i m e - p a t h s  f o r  th e  v a r i a b l e s  m, b and U can be d e s c r i b e d  
by the  f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n s
9 r  bm &( r. b + r ) b * r ub
(1—9*) r  b (1 —90 ( r, b + r ) (1—9)r. .bm b  U
-ß
m-m
b-b
U-Ü
$
1-9
0
(G-G)
But p=0, hence
p p, PTT
G -  G = -  - ( m - m ) ----- - ( b - b ) -----—(U-U)
PG PG PG
Hence, e q u a t i o n  (11a) can be r e w r i t t e n  as
' . ' r
m
•
b
•
l u
$ ( r  b - — ) m pG 9( r, b+r -  —  ) ■9,( r..b -  — ) U PG
(11a)
(11b)
prn ~ PR ~ pn
(1 —9-) ( r  b - — ) (1 -9 )  ( r  b+r — —) (1-9)  ( r T1b — -)
m P b  p G U P G
-ß
m-m
b-b
U-U
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  o f  t h i s  sys tem a r e  g iv e n  by
(11c)
x 1 = 0
X = -9[r b 
2 m
ph
- 21] + (1 -5-) [ r  b + ?  -  - ^ ]  
PG b PG
(12a)
(12b)
x3 = -ß (12c)
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By appropriate choice of $ we can force X < 0 and thus m and b 
will converge.
6.5.2 Two Fiscal Instruments
When the policy maker has two fiscal instruments (i.e., Govern­
ment expenditure, G, and taxes, T) which are available to him to 
attain his policy objectives the necessary conditions for the policy 
maker's optimization problem are given by equations (5a)-(5e), (2c)-(2e). 
In particular as shown in equation (7b)
p-9- + cp (1 —8*) = 0 (13a)
Substituting (13a) in equations (5a), (5b) and combining the results 
gives
[$Pm + (1—8>)p ][*8*ap - cp( (1 —9-)m - $b)] = 0 (13b)
Since in general -3-p + (1 —-8-) p, * 0, thusm b
&ap = cp[ (1 —90m - -G-b] (13c)
Incorporating equation (13c) we can summarize the necessary 
conditions as
n = (u - 6) + (3 + y)n (14a)
= cp(p + y) (14b)
■9-ap = cp[ (1 —9-)m - -9-b] (14c)
•m = $(G - T + rb) - pm (14d)
•b = (1 —8-) (G - T + rb) - pb (14e)
•U = 3(0 - U) (14f)
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From e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 4 b ) ,  (14c)  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  v a l u e s  o f  p a r e  g i v e n
p = 9 = 0  o r  p = -Y (15)
where  a  t i l d e  d e n o t e s  a  s t e a d y - s t a t e  v a l u e .  However when p = - y  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 4 d ) ,  (14e)  r e v e a l s  t h a t  (1—9-)m = -8-b and 
h ence  from ( 1 4 c ) ,  p = 0 .  Hence p = 0 d e s c r i b e s  t h e  o n l y  l e g i t i m a t e  
s t e a d y - s t a t e .  Then s u b s t i t u t i n g  e q u a t i o n  (14c)  i n  e q u a t i o n  (14b)  g i v e s  
t h a t
cp [ (1 —9-) m -  -9-b ]
+ <PY
and l i n e a r i z i n g  a b o u t  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  ( n o t i n g  t h a t  cp 
9 = yep
(16a)  
0) g i v e s  t h a t
(16b)
i . e . ,
cp ( t ) = k ^ e ^ t  (16c)
Then,  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s v e r s a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  e q u a t i o n  
( 6 b ) ,  i s  s a t i s f i e d ,  we must  s e t  k^ = 0 and t h u s  cp( t ) = 0  f o r  a l l  t ;  
b u t  t h e n  s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 4 c ) ,  p = 0 a l o n g  t h e  t o t a l  o p t i m a l  
p a t h .  As i t  i s  u n a f f e c t e d  by any o f  t h e  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  unemploy­
ment  w i l l  f o l l o w  t h e  u s u a l  p a t h  t o w a rd s  Ü.
The o p t i m a l  p a t h  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  can  a lw a y s  be a t t a i n e d  by an a p p r o ­
p r i a t e  c h o i c e  o f  one o f  t h e  f i s c a l  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  s a y  t a x e s ,  T, e . g . ,  
c h o o s e
“ Pp Ptt _ Pm Pk
T -  T = — -  (G -  G) -  — (U -  U) -  —  (m -  m) -  — (b -  b)
P<P Pip Pip Pip
(17a)
The f o l l o w i n g  a rg u m e n t  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  g o v e rn m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e ,
G, can  t h e n  be u s e d  t o  d r i v e  m and b t o  a  s t a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m .
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Subs t i  tu t i n g  equa t ion  (17a) in to  eq ua t ions  (2 c ) - (2e )  and l i n e a r ­
i z i n g  about the  s teady  s t a t e  we o b ta in
( \ 
m
b
U
(Mr b + — ) m PT (M r, b+r +— ) b PT (M r nb +— ) U pt m-m
(1—8“) ( r  b + — ) m PT
(1 —3-) ( r  b+r + — ) b PT (1 —8) ( r  b + — ) u PT b-b
-3 U-U
1--9-
0
(1 + —— ) (G -  G) 
Pt
(17b)
I f  we choose
G -  G = -
lPT + Pgj
{(1 + r b + — ) (m-m)m pT
+ ( r . b  + r  + ——) (b—b )} 
b PT
(17c)
then the  r e s u l t i n g  dynamical system w i l l  be s t a b l e  and thus  eq ua t ions  
(3a) ,  (3b) w i l l  be s a t i s f i e d .
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6.6 The One Instrument Problem
In a similar manner to the arguments of Section 6.4 and 6.5 we 
can show that when the policy maker can only control one instrument the 
solution characterized by a zero rate of inflation satisfies the necessary 
conditions; we shall restrict our analysis here to examining whether 
such a solution is feasible and whether it is consistent with a stable 
equilibrium for the economy.
6.6.1 A Monetary Instrument Alone
The requirement that p = 0 can be rewritten in the form
p (m-m) + p, (b-b) + p.T(U-Ü) = 0  (18a)m b U
Given that U is initially fixed, inflation can thus be driven
4instantaneously to zero by an appropriate open market operation. Once 
inflation has been driven to zero in order that inflation remain there 
we require that p = 0. Noting that
p = p (m) + p, (b) + PTT(U) (18b)
i.e., p = ($Pm + (1-9‘)pt))(G - T + rb) + pu $(0-U) (18c)
we can force p = 0 by an appropriate choice of monetary policy $, and 
thus the policy of driving inflation instantaneously to zero, where it
remains thereafter, is attainable with just a monetary instrument.
Is such a policy associated with a stable economy? The dynamics 
of m, b and U are given by
m
b
U
•8-r b m
(1 —9-) r b m
&( r, b+r) b
(1 -S') (r, b+r) b
0
( 1 - $ ) ry b
-3
m-m
b-b
U-Ö
(19)
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The characteristic roots of this dynamical system are given by
X = 0 (20a)
X = 9-(r b) + (1—9-)(r,b + r) (20b)2 m b
X3 = -ß (20c)
In order for the system to be stable we require that X^ < 0, i.e.,
the asymptotic value of 9-satisfies [(1—9-)/$] < [(-r b)/(r.b + r ) ]. Thism b
5equality may or may not be satisfied and thus we cannot be sure whether 
or not the system is stable.
6.6.2 A Fiscal Instrument Alone
We can always choose a fiscal instrument, say G, so that inflation 
is driven to and kept at zero. As shown in equations (11) and (12) 
whether or not such a policy is associated with a stable dynamic system 
will depend upon whether the exogenously fixed monetary policy (i.e., 0) 
is such that
X2 &[r b - m + (1 --9-) [r b +b < 0 (21 )
This may or may not be the case and thus if only a fiscal instrument 
is available to the policy maker the economy may well not be stable (i.e., 
conditions (3a) and (3b) may not be satisfied).
The use of only one fiscal instrument can, however, in some circum­
stances be unambiguously associated with stability, e.g., consider the 
case when there are no bonds in the model. (This situation is charac­
terized by b = 0, 9- = 1 , whence X_ = -(p /p ) < 0.)2 m u
6.7 Summary of Optimal Strategy
In all cases considered, the optimal time-path for unemployment and 
inflation under perfect foresight is given by:
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p = 0 (22a)
U = U + (U - U)e-ßt (22b)
Although the optimal solution has been derived formally, we can 
always decompose the policy maker's problem into three objectives. 
Firstly, the policy maker aims to minimize the loss associated with 
inflation; i.e., to minimize
The global minimum solution to this problem is given by equation 
(22a) and this minimum can always be obtained provided the policy maker 
has at least one policy instrument available to him.
Secondly, the policy maker aims to minimize the loss associated 
with unemployment, i.e., to minimize
Since no policy instruments will influence unemployment and since 
no jumps of the price level are permitted, the solution to this problem 
is always given by equation (22b).
Finally, the policy maker aims to ensure that equations (3a) and 
(3b) are satisfied; i.e., to ensure the stability of the economy. When 
the policy maker has a second policy instrument available to him, this 
policy instrument can be devoted totally to this purpose, thus ensuring 
stability occurs. However when the policy maker has only one policy
(23)
0
OO
e-^  (U-5 )^dt (24)
0
instrument, this policy instrument will have to ensure that equations
- 131-
6.1 A: TIME-PATH FOR PRICE LEVEL
6.1B : TIME-PATH FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
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(23), (3a), (3b) are satisfied simultaneously. Depending on parameters, 
these dual objectives may not be able to be satisfied.
Figures 6.1 A and 6.1B give examples of optimal time-paths for 
unemployment and the price level. As discussed, depending on the 
number of instruments such time-paths may or may not be consistent 
with a stable economy.
6.8 Conclusion
In Chapter 6, we have shown how, for the given macro-model under 
perfect foresight when there are no jumps in the price level, the 
optimum stabilization policy involves driving inflation instantaneously 
to zero and allowing unemployment to evolve towards its natural rate.
We have also examined how the number of available policy instruments 
influences the stability properties of the economy.
In the chosen model there are three exogenous variables which can 
potentially be used as policy instruments: government expenditure,
taxes and the method of deficit financing. However, a typical policy 
maker may not be free to manipulate all of these instruments in order 
to achieve his policy objectives (e.g., the policy maker may be free to 
change government expenditure and monetary policy but for political 
reasons may be obliged to keep tax revenue below certain limits). 
Accordingly we have examined in turn the implications of the availability 
of all possible combinations of policy instruments. We have shown that 
the fewer policy instruments that are available to the policy maker the 
more likely is the optimum policy to be associated with an unstable 
economy.
In the usual rational expectations approach to economic dynamics, 
any instability is removed by a jump in appropriate endogenous variables
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(e.g., the price level). Thus when instability occurs (e.g., when 
only one policy instrument, say G, is available and monetary policy,
■9-, is such that the economy is unstable) the appropriate solution 
methodology would require deriving a reduced form for the time-path 
of P that restricts m and b to stable time-paths. Such a solution 
would be conditioned on an arbitrary path for the policy instrument 
(i.e., G). Once this is achieved, the optimal path for the price 
level can be derived by maximizing over the policy instrument (i.e., 
over G). The time-path for P would have to take into consideration 
not only whether P stabilized the economy but also how the time-path 
for P affected the loss function given by equation (1). This is an 
extremely difficult problem and has not been treated in this chapter 
where we assume that no jumps in the price level are permitted.
When there are at least two policy instruments, the optimal 
stabilization policy will always be associated with stability and thus 
the price level will not need to jump to ensure that the economy con­
verges to its steady-state equilibrium. Thus there is no need for the 
price level to jump merely to stabilize the economy and the analysis 
of this chapter is quite consistent with the rational expectations 
approach when two or more instruments are available. If the price 
level does jump, therefore, it will only do so to minimize the loss 
function. Analysis of this problem becomes more tractable and is the
subject of Chapter J.
-1 34-
CHAPTER 7
OPTIMAL STABILIZATION POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS JUMPS 
IN THE PRICE LEVEL
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6 we have shown that if the policy maker has a fiscal 
instrument (say G) and a monetary instrument (say &) available to him 
and if the price level is constrained to evolve continuously from a 
given initial point then the optimal policy will be for the economy 
to jump instantaneously to a zero rate of inflation while unemployment 
evolves towards its natural rate. This time-path is typical of the 
time-paths for the economy when the optimal policy mix is such that 
the economy is stable. In this chapter, we consider what happens when, 
for this policy mix and expectations satisfying perfect foresight, the 
price level is also able to jump endogenously to minimize the loss 
function. We show that while the economy can still jump instantaneously 
to a zero rate of inflation, there is a tradeoff between an initial once- 
and-for-all jump in the price level and the subsequent gradual adjustment 
of unemployment to its natural rate.
An important, and widely discussed, aspect of optimal policy deter­
mination under rational expectations, when there are endogenous jumps 
in state variables, concerns the question of the time consistency of 
the optimal policy; see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1977), Turnovsky 
and Brock (1980). This question of time inconsistency did not arise 
with the analysis of Chapter 6, nor does it arise subsequently in this 
thesis with the microfoundations in Chapters 8 and 9, because in all 
these cases the economy is required to evolve continuously from a given
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initial point. Thus there are no endogenous initial jumps in the state 
variables. However the question does arise in this chapter because of 
the endogenous jumps in the price level.
For the problem considered here, we show that with the objective 
function we consider, the solution is indeed time consistent for a 
wide range of parameter values, although for a relatively modest modifi­
cation of the cost function, the optimal solution is rendered always 
time inconsistent.
7.2 The Problem Re-Stated
It is appropriate here to restate the problem which was first given 
in equations (6), (7a)-(7e), (8a)-(8c) of Chapter 5.
The objective facing the policy maker can be summarized by the 
following optimization problem:
Min c|U(0) - U | + 1  e"yt [ap2 + (U - 6)2]dt (1)
•8-,G U  ^J0
subject to
p = p(U, m, b, G, T) (2a)
r = r(U, m, b) (2b)
m = &[G - T + rb] - pm (2c)
b = (1 —9“) (G - T + rb) - pb (2d)
U = 8(Ü - U) (2e)
where W(0) = W^, M(0) = M^, and B(0) = are all predetermined and P(0) 
is endogenous. The initial quantities m(0), b(0), and U(0) are endogenous
and satisfy the constraint
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m(0) = M /P(0) (3a)
b (0) = B /P(0) (3b)
U(0) = U[log(W /P(0) ] (3c)
It will be observed that the magnitude of the instantaneous initial 
jump in unemployment from its inherited rate U^, is assumed to impose 
adjustment costs on the economy and that these initial costs given by 
c|u(0) - U | in equation (1) are assumed to be proportional to the 
absolute magnitude of the jump. This form of cost function turns out 
to be time consistent for a wide range of parameter values. By con­
trast, if these initial costs are represented by the more familiar 
quadratic cost function, time inconsistency always obtains.
Since the function describing the loss associated with the initial 
jump in the price level, i.e., c|U(0) - UQ |, is nondifferentiable at 
U (0) = Uq , the optimization problem specified by equations (1), (2a)- 
(2e), (3a)-(3c) can most easily be solved by decomposing it into the 
following two problems
Problem 1
OO
Find L = Min c(U(0) - UQ ) e”^ t[ap2 + (U - 6)2 ]dt
0
(4a)
subject to U(0)  ^UQ (4b)
and equations (2a)-(2e), (3a)-(3c)
Problem 2:
Find L2 = Min c[UQ - U(0)] + j e"^t[ap2 + (U - 6)2 ]dt
0
subject to Uq  ^ U (0)
and equations (2a)-(2e), (3a)-(3c)
(5a)
(5b)
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The solution to the original problem associated with the loss function 
given by (1) is then a solution for which U (0) = if  ^ , or a
solution for which  ^U (0) if .
7.3 Determination of the Optimal Solution
To solve the optimization problems specified by both Problems 1 
and 2 we first write down the Hamiltonian function as follows
H = e~Yt[ap2 + (U - 5)2] + pe”Yt[m - -8-(G - T + rb) + pm] 
+ Xe""Yt[b - (1 —9-) (G - T + rb) +pb]
+ ne"Yt[U - m  - U)] (6 )
where ye_Yt, Xe”Yt, and ne"Yt are the discounted Lagrange multipliers
associated with the dynamic equations (2c)-(2e) respectively. The Euler
1equations with respect to m, b, U, G and & are respectively given by
p = app^ + p[ —8-r b + Pmm + p + y] + X[-(1 ~80 r^b + p^b] (7a)
X = app^ + r^b+r) + p^m] + X[- (1 -&) (r^b+r)
+ pfeb + p + y] (7b)
n = u - 6 + appn + yE-^ryb+Pym] + X[-(1--8-)rTTb + pnb]
+ (3 + y)n (70
app + p[~&+p_m] + X[-(l4)+p.b] = 0
y  = X
(7d)
(7e)
In addition the dynamics of m, b, and U are given by equations (2c)-(2e). 
Equations (7a)-(7e) can be solved to give the evolution of the variables
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y, X, Ti, tt, m, b, and U along the  po l icy  maker 's  optimal pa th .
In a d d i t i o n ,  the  optimal s o l u t i o n  must s a t i s f y  the  fo l low ing  
t r a n s v e r s a l i t y  c o n d i t io n s  as t-*°°
lim (mye”y t ) = 0 (8a)
t-*x>
lim (bXe’ Y t ) = 0 (8b)
t-K»
lim (Une'y t ) = 0 (8c)
t-K»
Furthermore ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  m(0),  b(0) and U(0) a re  endogenously d e t e r ­
mined in  accordance wi th  (3a ) - (3 c )  imposes the  c o n s t r a i n t s
b (0) = cp1m(0),  where cp = Bq/Mq (9a)
U(0) = U[log cp2m(0)],  where cp2 = Wq/Mq (9b)
Accord ingly ,  the  fo l low ing  t r a n s v e r s a l i t y  c o n d i t io n s  must a l so  be s a t i s ­
f i e d  a t  the  i n i t i a l  time 0; see ,  e . g . ,  Kamien and Schwartz (1971).
For Problem 1 
I f  U(0) > Uq , then
y (0) + cp X(0) + [U'/m(0) ]Cn(0) -  c] = 0 (10a)
i f  U(0) = Uq , then
y (0) + cp X(0) + [U'/m(0) ][n (0)  -  c] $ 0 (10b)
For Problem 2 
I f  Uq > U(0) ,  then
y (0) + cp X(0) + [U ' /m (0 ) ] [u (0 )  + c] = 0 (11a)
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if UQ = U(0), then
y(0) + cp X(0) + [U'/m(0) ][n(0) + c] £ 0 (11b)
The solution given by the system of equations (7) — (11) can be 
simplified considerably. First, (7d) and (7e) imply
P =
y [1 - pga]
apG
(12a)
Also, combining equations (7a), (7b) and (7e) implies a second relation­
ship between p and y
y[rbmP = -----
rbb - r H- (pb - p J A j 
a(pm - pb>
(12b)
In general, equations (12a) and (12b) cannot both be satisfied simul­
taneously unless
p = y = 0, for all t (12c)
Moreover, combining (12c) with (7e) implies
X = 0, for all t (12d)
Hence, using (12a)-(12d), the optimal path reduces to
n = (3 + y ) n  + u - 6 (13a)
•u = ß ( ü  - u) (13b)
p = 0 (13c)
m = &[G - T + rb] (13d)
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b = (1~&)(G - T + rb) (13e)
lim (Une"yt) = 0 (13f)
t-K»
Equations (13a)-(13f), together with the transversality conditions 
(10a,b), (11 a,b ) determine the optimal path for unemployment and infla­
tion. Using (12c) and (12d), the latter simplify to the following:
For Problem 1:
If U (0) > U , then n(0) = c (14a)
U(0) = UQ , then n(0)  ^c (14b)
For Problem 2 :
If UQ > U(0), then n(0) = -c (15a)
UQ = U(0), then n(0)  ^-c (15b)
Equations (13a), (13b), (13f), and the transversality conditions given 
by equations (14) and (15) can then be used to solve for the optimal 
path for U as follows. Integrating (13b), yields
U(t) = 5 + [U(0) - U]e"^fc (16a)
where U(0) is the initial value of U(t), following the jump, which is 
to be determined. Substituting (16a) into (13a) and integrating again, 
we find that
n(t) = - if-yli + e-St + De(ß + (16b)
where D is an arbitrary constant. In order for the transversality 
condition (13f) to be satisfied we require D = 0. Then substituting
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equations (14), (15) into (16b) and comparing the loss functions for 
Problems 1 and 2, we can show that the optimal solution to the general 
problem is given by
U(0) = Ü + C6 - Ü] - (23 + Y)c;
if UQ < U(0) (17a)
Ü + (6 - Ü) - (23 + y)c  ^U(0)
 ^ Ö + (-2g * ^  (6 - 0) + (23 + Y)c; if UQ = U(0) (17b)
U(0) = 0 + — ■ ( 6  - Ü) + (23 + Y)c; if UQ > U(0) (17c)
It will be observed from (17b) that if the inherited unemployment 
rate, UQ, lies in a specific closed interval, bounded by
0 + -(2^ * ^  (6 - Ö) - (26 + y)c S Uq
S Ü +  (2o + f  (6 - Ö) + (26 + y )c (18)
then it will be optimal for no initial jump in the unemployment rate,
U, to occur. However, if lies outside this interval, then the 
unemployment rate will jump instantaneously to the nearest boundary of 
this closed interval. The boundaries of the closed interval depend upon: 
the natural rate of unemployment Ö; the target rate of unemployment 6; 
the cost associated with the initial jump in the unemployment rate, c; 
the coefficient of unemployment in the Phillips curve, 3; the rate of 
time preference of the policy maker, y * Several special cases are
worth noting.
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(i) If the cost associated with the initial jump c 00, then 
it will never be optimal to have an initial jump in unemployment, 
i.e., U (0) = U .
(ii) If the cost associated with the initial jump, c -► 0, then 
the initial unemployment rate will always jump to a level given by
U(0) = Ö + -f + y (6 - Ö) (19)p + Y
(iii) If the policy maker is perfectly myopic, i.e., y -► 00, then 
it will never be optimal to have an initial jump in unemployment, 
provided c > 0,
(iv) If the desired target rate of unemployment equals the natural 
rate, i.e., 6 = Ö, then the boundaries of the closed interval, viz Ö
± (2(3 + y)c are symmetric about the natural rate, Ö.
Note that these jumps in the unemployment rate, when they occur, 
are mirrored by jumps in the price level. Indeed, it is the initial 
jump in the price level which, given the instantaneous stickiness of 
the nominal wage, permits the initial jump in the unemployment rate to 
occur. Differentiating (3c), the relationship between the two jump 
variables is given by
Once the initial value of U (0) has been obtained the implied optimal 
path for U is derived by substituting for U (0) into the solution given by 
equation (16a). To characterize the path of unemployment more precisely, 
we shall assume throughout the rest of this chapter that
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UQ > U  ^ 5 (21 )
i . e . ,  we assume th a t  the  in h e r i t e d  unemployment r a t e  exceeds the  n a tu ra l  
r a t e ,  which in  tu rn  i s  a t  l e a s t  as g r e a t  as the  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b le  t a r ­
g e t .  Using t h i s  assum ption, F ig u res  7.1 A and 7.1B i l l u s t r a t e  the  time 
paths of the  unemployment r a t e  and p r ic e  l e v e l  in  the  th re e  cases  
correspond ing  to :  ( i )  a "sm all"  i n i t i a l  downward jump in  the  unemploy­
ment r a t e ,  such th a t  > U(0) > Ü ^ 6; ( i i )  a " la rg e "  i n i t i a l  down­
ward jump in  unemployment, such th a t  > Ü > U(0) > 6 ;  and ( i i i )  no 
i n i t i a l  jump in  the  unemployment r a t e ,  i . e . ,  U(0) = UQ.
S t a r t i n g  from in h e r i t e d  v a lu es  o f  UQ and pQ, the  optim al p o licy  
c a l l s  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  to  be reduced in s ta n ta n e o u s ly  to  zero  and f o r  unem­
ployment to  jump to  U(0) ,  a f t e r  which i t  evo lves  towards i t s  n a tu r a l  
r a t e  U. In  the  case  where the  param eters  c , 3, y  a re  such as to  render 
only a sm all jump as be ing  o p tim a l,  the  unemployment r a t e  approaches 
i t s  n a tu r a l  r a t e  from above. In  the  case  where a l a rg e  i n i t i a l  jump 
i s  op tim a l,  the  unemployment r a t e  f a l l s  i n i t i a l l y  below the  n a tu r a l  
r a t e  and sub seq u en tly  approaches i t  from below. In  the  f i n a l  case  of 
no i n i t i a l  jump, the  optim al unemployment r a t e  simply evolves  co n tinuous ly  
(from above) towards i t s  n a tu r a l  r a t e .  The two f ig u r e s  a lso  i l l u s t r a t e  
the t r a d e o f f  between the  i n i t i a l  o n c e - a n d - f o r - a l l  jump in  the  p r ic e  
le v e l  and the  subsequent in te r te m p o ra l  ad justm ent in  the  unemployment 
r a t e .  The lower the  r a t e  o f  unemployment d e s i r e d  a long  the  optim al pa th , 
the l a r g e r  i s  the  re q u ire d  i n i t i a l  in c re a s e  in  the  p r ic e  l e v e l .
Although the  op tim al s o lu t io n  has been de rived  fo rm ally  a more 
h e u r i s t i c  approach to  the  problem i s  a lso  p o s s ib le .  Thus i t  can be 
seen th a t  the  op tim al o b je c t iv e s  can be decomposed in to  s e v e ra l  components,
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each of which is associated with a different policy instrument.
The first objective is to minimize the loss associated with
inflation; i.e., to minimize
OO
(22)
0
Noting
p = p(U, m, b, G,T) (2a)
then given values of U, m, b, and T, it is possible to ensure that 
p = 0 for all t, by appropriately adjusting government expenditure
G.
The second objective is to choose the money-bond mix ($■) so that 
the values of m and b converge to finite steady-state equilibria. As 
stated earlier, such an objective has not been postulated as being a 
formal requirement of the model but can be justified by requiring that 
the dynamics of the economy are consistent with the rational expectations 
approach to economic modeling, i.e., the economy converges to its steady- 
state equilibrium.
The third objective is to minimize the loss function associated with 
the time path for unemployment; i.e., to minimize
Since U is independent of fiscal and monetary policy, a global minimum 
can be achieved by choosing an optimal value for the initial condition 
U(0). Recalling (16a), the formal solution of this problem gives pre-
c|U(0) - UQ | + j e“Yt(U - 6)2dt (23)
0
cisely the same results as those given by equations (17a.) — (17c).2
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7.4 Time Consistency of the Optimal Solution
Given the possibility of jumps through the price level, the 
question of the time consistency of the solution to the optimal policy 
problem specified by equations (1), (2a)-(2e) naturally arises. More 
precisely, is the optimal path chosen at time t=0 consistent with the 
optimal path that would be chosen at some time in the future, say at 
t = 1? Clearly it is desirable that this be the case.
Figure 7.2A gives an example which is time consistent. This time 
consistency will occur provided Ü lies within the closed interval
Ü + 2a * 3 (6 - Ü) - (26 + Y)c S Ü 
p + Y
ä Ü + ^  (6 - Ü) + (26 + Y)c (24)
In this example, an initial jump will take the unemployment rate to the 
boundary of this closed interval. Thereafter, the dynamic path given 
by equation (16a) will drive U monotonically towards Ö, which by (24) 
lies within the closed interval. Since the dynamic path never leaves 
the closed interval after the initial jump and since it is not optimal 
to jump within the closed interval, this solution is time consistent.
Figure 7.2B illustrates what will happen if inequalities (24) do 
not hold. In this case the solution is time inconsistent. As before, 
the initial jump takes unemployment to the boundary of the closed inter­
val. However, if (24) does not hold, Ü lies outside the closed interval. 
Accordingly, the dynamic path given by (16a), which following the initial 
jump directs U monotonically to Ö, takes U out of the closed interval. 
Figure 7.2B shows what happens if the decision maker recomputes the 
optimal policy at t = 1. Clearly a jump back to the boundary of the
#11
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U + 2ß+yß+Y (ö-U)
U + 2ß+Yß+Y (ö-U)> t
2A: EXAMPLE OF TIME CONSISTENT SOLUTION
U
7.2B: EXAMPLE OF TIME INCONSISTENT SOLUTION
+ (2ß+Y)c
- (2ß+Y)c
+ (2ß+Y)c
- (2ß+Y)c
Figure 7.2
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closed interval is optimal and hence the solution is time inconsis­
tent.
Note that if the desired target rate of unemployment equals the 
natural rate (6 = Ü) then the inequalities (24) are always satisfied 
and the time path of unemployment is time consistent. Also, if we 
consider the examples given in Figures 7.1 A and 7.1B, then the case of 
a small jump is represented by Figure 7.2A and is thus time consistent, 
while that of a large jump is illustrated by Figure 7.2B and is clearly 
time inconsistent. In general, given values of the natural rate of 
unemployment, Ö, and the parameters 8, y, and c, it is always possible 
for the policy maker to choose his desired target rate of unemployment 
6 so as to ensure that the time path for the optimal unemployment rate 
be time consistent.
It is important to be aware that this property of the time con­
sistency of the optimal path is sensitive to the specification of the 
loss function attached to the initial jumps. If, for example, this is 
replaced by the seemingly natural quadratic function, so that the 
objective function (1) becomes
than it is shown in the Appendix that the optimal value for U(0) is 
given by
L = j c[U(0) - UQ]2 + j e~yt[ap2 + (U - 6)2 ]dt (1 ')
0
(25a)
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so that
U (0) - U = k (U - u) + 6 - U (25b)c(ß + y) ,
where
1 = 1 + c (2ß + y)
c(2ß + y )
However, if following an initial jump from UQ to U(0), the policy 
maker immediately recomputes his optimal policy now using U (0) as 
a given value, the corresponding optimal desired initial condition, 
U(0+) say, now becomes
Since U(0+) - U t U(0) - U, the recomputed path is not continuous 
following the initial jump and thus the problem with a loss function 
specified by (1') does not have a time-consistent solution.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has analyzed the optimal intertemporal choice of 
inflation and unemployment in a dynamic macro model in which infla­
tionary expectations satisfy perfect foresight and in which endogenous 
jumps in the price level are permitted. We have shown that the 
inflation rate can be driven to zero, although there is a trade-off 
between an initial once-and-for-all jump in the price level, and an 
associated jump in the unemployment rate (if such jumps are indeed 
optimal), and the subsequent evolution of unemployment towards its
U(0+) - U = k U(0)
(26)
natural rate.
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Whether or not there is an initial jump in the price level has 
been shown to depend upon certain given aspects of the economy, such 
as the natural rate of unemployment, the slope of the unemployment- 
wage inflation in the Phillips curve, and the cost imposed on the 
economy by the initial jump in unemployment. In addition, it depends 
upon certain parameters that can be chosen by the policy maker, such 
as the socially desired target rate of unemployment and his rate of 
time preference. These factors, together with the precise specifi­
cation of the loss function, affect the time consistency or otherwise 
of the optimal policy.
The results of this and the previous chapter differ from the 
optimal policies obtained for models in which expectations evolve 
sluggishly such as when they are generated adaptively (see e.g., 
Phelps [1967, 1972] and Turnovsky [1981]). Whether or not endogenous 
jumps in the price level are permitted has been shown to have little 
effect on the optimal path for inflation which, under perfect fore­
sight, is always driven instantaneously to zero. Thus there is no 
real trade-off between inflation and unemployment. An important 
consequence of this is that preconceptions about the mechanisms by 
which expectations are formed can radically alter the policy maker’s 
optimal strategy in controlling inflation and unemployment.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7
In this Appendix we briefly discuss the case of initial 
quadratic costs, so that the objective of the policy maker is to 
minimize
L = j  c[U(0)
OO
0
+ (U - 6 )2 ]dt ( A. 1 )
subject to equations (2a)-(2e), (3a)— (3c) of the text.
The optimal path again reduces to equations (13a)— (13f), together 
with a transversality condition. The following transversality condi­
tion must now be satisfied at the initial time 0
y(o) + cp1 x (0) + - c (u (o ) - uQ )] = o
and using (12c), (12d) this reduces to 
n(0) = c[U(0) - U ]
(A.2)
(A.3)
The optimal solution for q(t) must again satisfy (16b), where 
we require D = 0. Then substituting (A.3) into (16b) we derive
U(0)
+
c
_U__  6 - Ö
2ß + Y + ß + Y 
1
+ 2ß + Y
(A.4)
The implied optimal time path for U is obtained by substituting for 
U (0) from (A.3) into the solution (16a). At the same time, the rate 
of inflation is set to zero in accordance with equation (13c).
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PART 3
"SOME RELEVANT POLICY ISSUES"
- 153-
CHAPTER 8
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING THE 
LENGTH OF THE STANDARD WORKING WEEK
8.1 Introduction
"All the 16 Member countries (of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) for which 
fairly precise data are available have experienced de­
creases in actual average annual hours (worked per per­
son) over the last 30 years. The downward trend has 
gathered momentum over this period from an average annual 
decrease of 0.3 per cent in the 1950s to one of 0.8 per 
cent in the 1960s and 0.9 per cent in the 1970s....
"The length of the working week has also been substantially 
reduced between three and six hours over the last ten years 
in nearly half the member countries."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(1982, pp. 18-19).1
The idea of reducing the length of the standard working week 
has become particularly popular because it is seen by some as a 
method of work-sharing that may be able to reduce the high levels 
of unemployment that have persisted in recent years. Popular press 
reports indicate that this trend is particularly marked in some 
European countries (especially France, but also Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Italy).
This notion that the reduction of the working week will lead 
to a form of work-sharing assumes that workers will be willing to 
work fewer hours for the same hourly wage, thus creating new jobs 
at no cost to employers. Frequently, however, this is not the view 
of employees who see a reduction in the length of the standard working 
week, with the nominal weekly wage kept constant, as simply a surrep­
titious way of raising the nominal hourly wage-rate. When workers
- 154 -
insist that their nominal weekly wage-packet remains constant, employers 
frequently require that any reduction in the working week is accompanied 
by associated productivity gains. Such gains may be achieved by changes 
in work rules, shorter lunch and coffee breaks, or the relaxation of 
union regulations (e.g., union regulations related to the number of 
workers required to carry out a particular set of tasks may be relaxed). 
In general, following a reduction in the working week, the extent to 
which productivity gains are achieved and nominal weekly wage-packets 
are reduced will be the outcome of collective bargaining and will 
depend on the political effectiveness of various employer and union 
groups.
We do not examine the process of collective bargaining here, but 
given that an agreement to reduce the length of the standard working 
week has been reached, we provide a methodology for examining the 
economic consequences of that agreement. The cases when the nominal 
hourly wage-rate and the nominal weekly wage are kept constant are 
both considered. Different combinations of work-week reduction and 
productivity gain are also examined to see what effect they have 
on such variables as the real wage, unemployment and the process of 
capital accumulation.
In order to examine the question in a scientific manner, a dynamic 
macro-model, which incorporates the process of capital accumulation as 
well as the dynamics of wage fixation, is constructed. In this model, 
the dynamics of wage fixation are determined by a Phillips curve. The 
manner of incorporating the dynamics of capital accumulation is related 
to earlier works (see Blinder and Solow (1973), Infante and Stein (1976), 
Tobin and Buiter (1976)). In particular we derive a model which is much
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in the spirit of the work of Turnovsky (1977, 1980) and which incor­
porates an equity market, and inflation, as well as inflationary expecta­
tions which satisfy perfect myopic foresight. The particular economy 
that we examine is assumed to be highly capital intensive, with signifi­
cant capital depreciation and to be characterized by the absence of 
speculative bubbles, as suggested by the empirical work of Flood and 
Garber (1980).
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: Sections 8.2 and
8.3 provide microfoundations for the household sector and the corporate 
sector. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 incorporate the derived functions in a 
larger macro-framework. Section 8.6 examines the long-run comparative 
statics while the dynamics of the economy and the short-run responses 
required to maintain stability are examined in Sections 8.7 and 8.8. 
Section 8.9 provides some concluding comments.
8.2 The Household Sector
We assume that households all have similar optimization decisions
to that of a basic representative household. We shall assume that
members of all households must spend a total of N hours in each time
period, either working or looking for work. The objective of this
representative household is then to choose its planned consumption,
demand for money, demand for government bonds and demand for equities
so as to maximize the intertemporal utility function 
T
e"BtU(c, N, m)dt + S(A(T)) (1a)
0
u1 > 0, u2 < 0, u3 > 0
U.. <0, for all ili ’
Ui j  = ° ’ 1 * j  
S' > 0, S" < 0
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s u b je c t  to
• •
c + m + QE + b = PvN + dQE + ib  -  Tim -  T,h (1b)
A — ro + QE + b (1c)
A(0) = AQ (Id )
where:
c = r e a l  p r iv a te  consumption p lans  by households
N = r e a l  supply of la b o r  by households (assumed exogenous) 
expressed  in  man-hours
m = demand f o r  r e a l  money ba lances
b = demand f o r  r e a l  government bonds
E = demand f o r  e q u i t i e s
Q = (expected) p r ic e  o f  e q u i t i e s
p = (expected) employment r a t e
A = r e a l  p r iv a te  w ealth
v = (expected) r e a l  hourly  w age-ra te
= ta x e s ,  assume exogenous
D = (expected) r e a l  d iv idends
d = D/(QE) = (expected) d iv idend  y i e ld ,  taken to  be
p a ra m e tr ic a l ly  g iven to household s e c to r
r  = nominal r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on bonds and e q u i t i e s  which 
a re  assumed p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s
7T = (expected) r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  of p r ic e  l e v e l
q = Q/Q = (expected) r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  of e q u i ty  p r ic e s
i  = r -  7T = d + q = r e a l  r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  on e q u i t i e s  and bonds
which a re  assumed p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s
8 = consumer’s r a t e  o f  time p re fe re n ce .
- 157-
The utility function is assumed to be concave in its three
arguments, c, N and m. Following Brock (1974) and Brock and Turnovsky
(1981), real money balances have been incorporated into the utility
function as a mechanism for capturing the reasons for holding money in
2a world of certainty. The utility function is assumed additively 
separable in all arguments purely as a means of simplifying the analysis. 
Equation (1a) then defines the aggregate utility of the household sector 
as dependent on aggregate consumption, labor supply and money demand 
over all future time periods and also dependent on the utility obtained 
from leaving a bequest.
The budget constraint faced by the household is given by equation 
(1b) which is expressed in real flow terms. At each point in time the 
composite household can acquire income from a variety of sources. 
Individuals in this household have an expected probability, p, of being 
employed and, if employed, they supply labor to firms, at a real hourly 
wage-rate, v; they receive dividend yields, d, on their holdings of 
equities and they face an inflation tax ( = 7 T m )  on their holdings of real 
money. They also pay taxes. Their income can be spent on the purchase 
of real consumption goods or in the acquisition of new holdings of real 
private wealth. Equation (1c) tells us that wealth can be held either 
in the form of government bonds, equities or money. Equation (Id) gives 
the household’s initial endowment of real private wealth.
Crucial for the development of the model is the mechanism by which 
expectations are formed. Throughout this chapter we shall assume that, 
given the current time period t, the value of all variables prior to 
and including t are known with certainty. In the derivation of the 
microfoundations of the household sector we shall then assume that
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expectations of future values of particular variables are determined by 
assuming that all future values are the same as the current value.
Stated another way: current and past expectations are assumed to
satisfy perfect myopic foresight; future expectations satisfy a static 
expectation hypothesis. '
The notion of a static expectations hypothesis needs to be made 
more explicit. This model will satisfy a static expectations hypothesis 
in which the future values of the variables which face each individual 
in the economy are formed by static expectations. These variables are 
the employment rate (p), the real hourly wage-rate (v), the real rate 
of interest (i) and the rate of inflation ( t t ) .
Given a mechanism for the formation of expectations, the house­
hold’s optimization decision can be described as follows: at any
current instant of time, all members of the household know with certainty 
the value of all variables. Using its expectations about the future, the 
household determines its optimal consumption and demand for assets for 
that instant and for all future time. When at the next instant of time 
the values of the appropriate variables become known, the household 
compares actual values with the expectations and, if these diverge, 
then the household's decision variables are revised on the basis of 
the new value of the exogenous variables and current expectations.
We are now in a position to examine the solution to the household's 
optimization problem. Firstly, we rewrite equation (1b) as
c + A = pvN + iA - (i + it)m - T^ (1b')
The necessary conditions for the problem given by (1a), (1b'), (1c), (1d)
can be derived as follows:
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Let
H = e"etU(c,N,m) + e"ßt\p[pvN + iA - (i+7T)m - c - T ]
-ßtwhere H is a Hamiltonian function and e” ^ is the discounted co-state 
variable.
3Then the necessary conditions are given by :
u 1 = ^
U3 = (i+TT ) ip
= (3-i )\p
e”eT^(T) = S ’(A(T))
By equations (2c), (2d),
<|i(t) = e<ß_l)(t'T)>KT)
ip( t> = eßt*l(t'T)S ’ (A(T))
Hence from equations (2), (3)
c = c (4>) 
m = m(4», i+7T)
= \p(i, A(T))
+
But using equation (1b*) and equation (4a)
A(T) = f(t, A, i, pvN, \Jj, -(i+TT)m, T^)
+ + + + + -
Then using equation (4c),
ib = g(t, A, i, pvN, -(i+TT)m, Th) 
+ - +
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
(2d)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)
(4c)
(5a)
(5b)
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Note that the sign of the partial derivative w.r.t. i depends on 
a negative wealth effect derived from equation (5a) and a positive sub­
stitution effect derived from equation (4c). Throughout this chapter we 
have assumed that the positive substitution effect dominates.
Substituting equation (5b) into equation (4b) gives
m = m(t, A, i, pvN, i+n, T^) (5c)
+  -  +  -
Then substituting (5c) into (5b) we obtain
= \jj(t, A, i, pvN, i+7T, T^) (5d)
-  +  -  +  +
Note that the sign of the partial derivative w.r.t. each variable 
in equation (5b) is dependent on a direct effect and also on an indirect 
effect which comes through the variable m. We have followed conventional 
practice in equation (5d) and assumed that the direct effect dominates 
in each case. (In other words, we have assumed that the effect through 
m is minimal.)
Hence using equations (4a), (4b), (5d) we can define the household 
sector as follows:
C = C(A, i, pvN, -7T, Th) (6a)
+  -  +  +  -
md = L(A, i, pvN, —tt, T^) (6b)
+  -  +  +  -
where C denotes planned consumption, md denotes aggregate demand for
money and the demand for bonds-cum-equities has been eliminated by
Walras* Law, since the household will later be incorporated within an
equilibrium model. 4
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8.3 The Corporate Sector
The corporate sector will be represented by a single representative
firm which finances all of its investments through the sale of equities
to stockholders (from the household sector) and which returns all
5profits to its stockholders in the form of dividends. The constraints 
facing the firm can be summarized as follows^*:
Y = n(N)F(K,ND ) = n(N)NDF(-^ -) (7a)
N
F’ > 0, F" < 0, n' < 0
n = Y - vN° - h(I) (7b)
h' > 0, h" > 0
n = D + T (7c)
I = K + XK (7d)
I = QE (7e)
K(0) = KQ> E (0) = EQ (7f)
where
Y = real output
K = demand for physical capital by the representative firm
ftp = real demand for labor by the representative firm expressed 
in man-hours
II = real gross profit
Q = price of equities
E = quantity of equities, issued by the representative firm
D = dividends to the stockholders
Tf = corporate taxes (assumed exogenous)
N = supply of labor by the households to the representative 
firm expressed in man-hours
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v = real hourly wage-rate, taken as exogenous by the 
representative firm
n(N) = productivity factor for given supply of labor, N 
X = rate of capital depreciation (assumed constant).
Equation (7a) describes the production function of the representa­
tive firm, which is assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties 
of positive but diminishing marginal productivities and constant 
returns to scale. In addition it is assumed that if the management 
lowers the number of hours that workers are required to work it can 
use this to negotiate productivity gains within the firm. These 
productivity gains are represented by the function n(N).
Equation (7b) defines profits as depending on real output, less 
wage-costs and less the costs of adjustment associated with new invest­
ment. Following Treadway (1969) and Gould (1968), we have assumed that 
the adjustment cost function is convex to the origin. Equation (7c) 
defines the distribution of profits which are paid either as dividends 
to the stockholders or as corporate taxes to the government.
The firm's investment function is given by equation (7d) which 
tells us that there is a constant rate of depreciation, X, and that all 
new investment is used to either replace depreciated capital or increase 
the capital stock. Equation (7e) states that the firm finances all of 
its investment through the sale of equities to stockholders.
The market value of the firm's securities outstanding at time t, 
is given by
V(t) = Q(t)E(t)
Because the representative firm has a large number of stockholders 
with different life-expectancies, we shall assume that the firm tries
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to maximize the initial present discounted value of these securities. 
Now,
V = QE (8a)
V = QE + QE (8b)
=> V = K + QE + XK (8c)
=> V + n = K + Q E  + D + Tf + AK (8d)
V + n = K + iQE + T + XK (8e)
=5> V + Y = iV (8f)
where
V = n - K - Tf - XK (8g)
i.e.,
y = n(N)F(K,ND ) - vND - h(I ) - I - T (8h)
As for the household sector, it is necessary to define a mechanism 
for the formation of expectations. We shall again assume that current 
and past expectations satisfy perfect myopic foresight; future expecta­
tions satisfy a static expectations hypothesis. In this instance static 
expectations means that all future values of the rate of return on 
equities (i) and the real wage-rate (v) are assumed to be constant.
Then from equation (8f)
V (s ) = els [X - Je_ltY(t)dt] (9a)
0
and, assuming i > 0, then in order for V(s) to remain finite as s -*• OO
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we require that
OO
X = J e_ltY(t)dt (9b)
0
and hence the value of the firm at any arbitrary time s in the future 
is given by
OO
V (s ) = QE(s) = / ei ^S”t \(t)dt (9c)
s
At any time s, we shall assume that the representative firm's 
objective is to maximize the real market value of its securities,
V (s ) = QE(s). Since this is equivalent to maximizing the initial value 
of its securities V(0) = QE(0), the firm's decision problem is to choose 
production decisions K, ND and supply of equities, QE, so as to maximize 
an objective function of the form
OO
V(0) = / e_lt[n(N)F(K,ND ) - vND - h(I) - I - T ]dt (10a)
0 1
subject to
K = I - XK (10b)
The Hamiltonian for this problem is given by
H = e_lt{n(N)F(K,ND ) - vND - h(I) - I - T }
+ e_1S { l  - XK} (11 )
where e_it\p is the discounted co-state variable associated with K.
Then the necessary conditions for this problem are given by:
\p = h' (I) + 1 (12a)
= (i + A )\p - n(N)F* (-^) (12b)
(12c)v = n(N)G(-~)
N
I = K + XK
lim e = 0
t-xx)
( 1 2 d )  
(12e)
where G( ) = F( -j- ) - ( ) Ff ( )
N N N N
and G M  ±  ) = - ( J- ) F" ( ±  ) > 0.
N N N
Now from equation (12b)
\p(s) = e(i+A)s {X - e"(i+X)tn(N)F’(^r)dtj
J0 NU
(13a)
Application of the transversaltiy condition given by equation (12e) 
gives:
X = J e” (l+X)tn(N)F' ( ~ j r )  
0 N
(13b)
Hence
Ms) = e(l+X)s{ / e"(l+X)tn(N)F'(-^r) dt } 
s N
(13c)
Hence
ip = Mi, v, n(N) ) (13d)
Then using equation (12a)
I = I(i, v, n(N)) (14a)
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But from equation (12c)
K K ,
D ' D (V ’ n (N} } N N +
(14b)
Hence,
N (K, v, n(N)) (14c)
+ +
From equation (9c),
QE(s) = e" e~lt[q(N)N°F(-^-) - vND - h(I) - I - T ]dt (15a) 
is FT
But, from equation (12c),
n(N)NDF(-^r) - vND = n(N)KF,(~) 
N FT
(15b)
Hence,
QE(s) = e‘ e"lt[n(N)KF' A  - h(I) - I - T ]dt 
's N
(15c)
Thus using equations (14a)— (14c) we can derive the following equation 
for the supply of equities:
QE = QE(K, i, v, n(N), T ) (16)
+  -  -  +  -
where the sign of the partial derivatives w.r.t. i, v and n(N) assume 
that the partial derivatives of investment given in equation (14a) are
7relatively small.
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8.4 A Dynamic Macro-Model
We a^e now in a position to specify a macro-model which incorporates 
the household sector and corporate sector that have been derived in 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of this chapter. The model, which assumes that 
labor demand is less than labor supply, i.e., ND < N, is given by 
the following equations:
Y = C + I + G0 (17a)
C = C(A, i, pvN, - i t , T ) 
+ - + +
(17b)
m = L(A, i, pvN, - i t , T^ ) 
+ - + + -
(17c)
I = I(i, v, n(N))
- - +
(17 d)
QE = QE(K, i, v, n(N), T )
+ - - +
(17e)
A = m + b + QE (17f)
Y = n (N)NDF(-^ r) 
NU
(176>
v = n(N)G(-^-) = h (N){f (4 t) - (^r)F'(-^-)} 
N N N M
— D
(17h)
u = N - N
N
(17 i)
w = -a(U) + 7T 
„D
(17j)
NP = —  
N
(18a)
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(18b) 
(19a) 
(19b) 
(19c) 
(19d)
where
Y = real national output
C = aggregate planned consumption
I = aggregate planned investment
Gq = real government expenditure assumed exogenous
A = real private wealth
r = nominal rate of return on bonds-cum-equities 
tt = expected rate of inflation
i = r - 7T = real rate of return on bonds-cum-equities 
p = expected employment rate 
v = real hourly wage-rate
N = supply of labor (expressed in man-hours and assumed 
exogenous)
= level of taxes on households assumed exogenous 
= level of corporate taxes assumed exogenous 
T = + T^ , = total tax receipts
m = real supply of (and demand for) money 
b = real supply of (and demand for) bonds 
QE = real supply of (and demand for) equities 
K = real level of physical capital
TT = P
K = I - AK 
v = v(w - p)
m + b = G ß - T + r b - p t m + b )  
m = m
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P = real demand for labor (expressed in man-hours) 
p = actual inflation rate 
U = unemployment rate 
w = rate of wage growth
Equilibrium in the product market is described by equation (17a) 
while equations (17b)—(17e) describe planned consumption, the demand 
for money, planned investment and the supply of equities respectively. 
Equation (17f) is the definition of real private wealth. The produc­
tion function is defined in (17g) while equation (17h) tells us that 
the real wage-rate is equal to the marginal product of labor. Equation 
(17i) defines the unemployment rate and equation (17j ) is a standard 
version of the Phillips Curve.
Equations (18a)-(18b) define the expected employment rate and the 
expected rate of inflation both of which are assumed to satisfy perfect 
myopic foresight.
The dynamics of the model are given by equations (19a)—(19d). The 
rate of capital accumulation is defined as equal to the rate of invest­
ment less capital depreciation. The evolution of the real wage is 
defined in the standard manner and the supply of money and bonds is 
constrained by the government budget constraints. The monetary policy, 
given by equation (19d), is such that the real supply of money is kept 
constant.
The short-run model is represented by 12 equations (equations 17a- 
17j, 18a-18b). In the short-run the dynamic variables (K, v, m and b) 
are fixed and the 12 endogenously determined variables are given by Y, 
C, I, A, U, ND , w , QE, i, 7T, p, p. In subsequent parts of this chapter
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we shall restrict our analyses to examining the short-run and long-run 
effects of a change in the supply of labor N. As can be seen from the 
model, changes in N will have an effect in the short-run through changes 
in the level of unemployment, negotiated changes in the nominal hourly 
wage-rate and through induced changes in productivity (i.e., ri(N)). In 
the long-run there is no unemployment, and changes in N will have an 
effect on the full employment level of output as well as on such variables 
as the hourly real wage-rate and the long-run capital stock.
8.5 Simplifying the Model
In subsequent sections of this chapter, merely in order to simplify 
the analysis, we shall assume that the wealth effects in planned con­
sumption and the demand for money are close to zero and can be ignored.
The model given by equations (17)—(19) can then be rewritten in the form:
Y = C(i, vND , —tt) + I(i, v, n(N)) + G (21a)
-  +  4- -  -  +
m = L(i, vND, - tt) (21b)
- +  +
Y = n(N)NDF(-^ -) , F’ > 0 (21c)
ND
v = n(N)G(~), G' > 0 => N° = ND (K, v, n(N)) (21 d )
tr + - +
v = -avU(K, v, N, n(N)) (22a)
-  +  +  -
K = J(K, i, v, n(N)) (22b)
m + b  = G -  T + i b - 7 T m  (22c)
m = m (22d)
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Throughout this chapter we assume that the economy described by 
the model is highly capital intensive (i.e., characterized by a high 
capital/labor ratio, K/(N^)). As a result, G' (= [K/(N^)]F") will be 
large. In this case the cost of labor will be a relatively unimportant 
part of the firm's decision process and hence the demand for labor,
ND , the unemployment rate, U, and the aggregate output, Y, will be
g
relatively insensitive to the real wage-rate. Also investment will 
only be affected by the real wage-rate to the extent that the interest 
rate is affected by the real wage, i.e., I = I(i, n(N)).
Henceforth we shall let z (= log v) denote the logarithm of the 
real wage-rate. Then, assuming that the economy is highly capital inten­
sive, equations (21a)-(21d) can be solved to give short-run solutions 
for the real rate of interest, i, and the rate of inflation, tt, in terms 
of the dynamic variables z, K, and m and the exogenous variables n(N).
In general, because of the complexity of the model, the partial derivatives 
of i and tt are ambiguous. However it is possible to simplify the model 
given by equations (21 a)-(21d) so that plausible effects can be calculated. 
If we give emphasis to the dominant effects these equations can be reduced 
to the following IS/ LM model
n(N)Z( K) = D (z, i, t t ) + G
+ + - -
(23a)
m  = L(i, tt) (23b)
Then if we further assume that is non-zero but sufficiently small, 
the short-run solutions for i and tt are given by
i = i( K, z, m, n(N) ) (24a)
-  +  +  -
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7T = it(K , z, m, n(N) ) (24b)
+  -  -  +
These sign values are consistent with results derived under perfect 
myopic foresight in simpler models (see Table 2.1C of Chapter 2 and 
equations (4a), (4b) of Chapter 5).
The short-run solutions for i and it have some consequences which 
might contradict the preconceived notions of some economists. Thus 
for example, an increase in the real wage is deflationary. The reason 
for this seemingly perverse effect can be seen from equations (23a)-(23b). 
In order for product market equilibrium to be maintained, an increase in 
z must be matched by an increase in i (since D is close to zero). Then,TT
in order to maintain equilibrium in the money market, this increase in i 
must be matched by a corresponding decrease in tt.
Intuitively this can be justified by noting that the level of infla­
tion, which is most closely affected by the price level, is directly 
influenced by the relationship between the price of goods (P) and the 
cost of labor (W). Thus if the price level increases (falls) by more 
than the nominal wage then z will fall (rise) and inflation will tend 
to rise (fall).
Having derived equations for i and tt we can now describe a simplified 
version of the model by the following equations:
i = i(K, z, m, n(N)) (24a)
-  +  +  -
tt = tt(K, z , m, n(N) ) (24b)
+  -  -  +
z = -aU(K, N, n(N)) (24c)
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K = J(K, i, n(N)) (24d)
-  -  +
• •m + b = Gq - T + ib - um (24e)
m = m (24f)
8.6 Long-Run Comparative Statics
In order to examine the effects of a change in the standard work­
ing week, i.e., N, it is first necessary to examine the long-run com­
parative statics.
The long-run model derived from equations (24a)-(24f) is given by 
the following set of equations:
U(K, N, n(N)) = 0
- + -
(25a)
J(K, i, n(N)) = 0
- - +
(25b)
Gq - T + ib - TTm = 0 (25c)
i = i(K, z, m ,  n(N))
- + 4- -
(25d)
TT = t t (K, z, m, n(N)) (25e)
+  -  -  +
In the long-run unemployment is driven to zero and all capital 
accumulation and wealth accumulation cease. Then rewriting equation 
(25c) as
V(i, 7T, b, m) = 0 ( 2 5 0
+  -  +  -
we can substitute equations (25d)—(25e) into equations (25a), (25b),
a(25cf) to obtain the following steady-state system :
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U(K, N, n(N)) = 0 (26a)
-  +  -
J(K, z, in, n(N)) = 0  (26b)
V (K, z, b, m, n(N)) = 0 (26c)
- + + ?
The long-run comparative static effects of a change in N are then 
given by:
9K
9N
0 (27a)
7= = 1 { - W V3 + tU2 + U3n ' >J1V3 } < 0 (27b)
3b
3N ^ V W 1’ - J2v5n') + (u2 + u3n')(J2vi - Jl V >
(270
where A = > 0 and a tilde denotes the steady-state.
In general, therefore, a lowering of the length of the standard 
working week (i.e., a decrease in N) will lead to a fall in the steady- 
state level of capital stock and a rise in the steady-state hourly real 
wage-rate. If the reduction in the length of the standard working week 
also leads to gains in productivity (i.e., n ’ < 0) then the sign of 
these effects will be the same although the magnitude will be increased.
Intuitively, the decrease in N has made labor more scarce and thus 
pushed up its price (i.e., pushed up the hourly real wage-rate). Also 
by lowering the equilibrium demand for labor the decrease in N has
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lowered the equilibrium level of capital stock that is required to support 
this work-force.
It is interesting to note that while the worker's hourly real 
wage-rate will definitely increase, we cannot say for certain whether 
the worker's weekly real wage-packet will increase or decrease. How­
ever, in general we can conclude that the weekly real wage would only 
increase if productivity gains were sufficiently large (i.e., n' suffi­
ciently large negative).
In general the decrease in N will push up the real interest rate, 
lower the long-run level of inflation and will also lead to a decrease 
in the demand for labor, and a decrease in real output, Y, unless
productivity gains offset the other results of the change in N, while 
the effect on the equilibrium level of bonds is ambiguous. However, if 
we assume that and are relatively insignificant compared with , 
and (i.e., the effect of a change in the capital stock or the 
real wage on the government budget constraint is relatively insignificant) 
then a decrease in the length of the standard working week will raise the
3 ösupply of bonds in the long-run (i.e., —— < 0). Henceforth we shall
3N
assume that this is the case.
8.7 Dynamics
Having examined the long-run effects of a change in the length of 
the standard working week, we can now analyze the dynamics of the 
economy. The dynamic system given by equations (24a)-(24f) can be 
linearized about the steady state to give the following linearized
version of the model:
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•
K
•
al1 al2 0 K - K
z
•
a21 ° ° z - z
l b  ^a31 S32 a33 b - b
where
311 = JK < 0
ai2 = Jz < 0
a21 = ' aUK > 0
a31 = iKb - V < 0
a_0 = i b - T T m  > 032 z z
a33 = i > °
(29a) 
(29b) 
(290 
(290 
(29e) 
(29f)
The characteristic roots of this system then satisfy the following 
constraints:
X + X2 = a. < 0 (30a)
X1X2 = _a12a2l > 0 (30b)
x3 = i > 0 (30c)
Hence X and have negative real parts and the system has one unstable
root given by X . We can now solve equation (28) to give a dynamic system
p
s i
l 
PS
?
__
__
__
«/
x i
X2 0
f . 'S
, X t k e 1
i x_ t
z  -  z a21
O
CM
CO k 2 e 2 
, X. t
b - b
q h ?  1 k e 3
(31 )
of the form
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where
*3j
a_ - A . + a_ . 31 j 32 21
A . - a_J 33
j = 1,2 (32)
The linearized system given by equation (31) can be rewritten in
the form1^:
where
a2 1 (X2_X1 }
“ a21 X 2
a21 - X1
k h31 h32 a21(X2"X1]
' f A tlK-K k1 e 1
, A_ tz-z k2e 2
A^ t
j k b-b l k e 3 .
(33)
h31 = a21(q31 " q32)
h32 = Xiq32 “ X2q31
(34a)
(34b)
Hence
and
31
h31 = a21(X2-X1 )
a33a31 * a32a21 >
(Xr a33) (X2"a33}
(34a’)
a2 1(X2 " X1
~a31X1X2 * a33a32a21 ~ a32a21(X1 + X2 } 
a21(X2 " a33)(X1 " a33}
> 0 (34b')
For the purposes of exposition we shall henceforth assume that h^ < 0 
8.8 Short-Run Comparative Statics
We are now in a position to use equation (33) to examine the short-
run responses of the economy to a change in the length of the standard
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working week. S ince we a re  assuming the  absence of s p e c u la t iv e  bubbles, 
any s h o r t - r u n  response of the  economy w i l l  be such as to keep the 
economy on a s t a b l e  pa th  which converges to the  long -run  eq u i l ib r iu m  
d esc r ib ed  by eq u a tio n s  (2 5 a )- (2 5 e ) .
The most obvious way in  which t h i s  s t a b l e  pa th  could be achieved 
i s  by a jump in  the  p r ic e  l e v e l ,  P, brought about by market f o r c e s .  
Although th e re  a re  s t i l l  no formal m icro founda tions  which j u s t i f y  t h i s  
market response  by the  p r ic e  l e v e l  to  s t a b i l i z e  the  economy th e re  i s  
some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  absence of s p e c u la t iv e  bubbles in  the  em pir i­
c a l  work of Flood and Garber (1980) and the t h e o r e t i c a l  work of Brock 
11(1974, 1977) and we s h a l l  fo llow  the  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c ta t io n s  approach 
to economic modeling by assuming th a t  the  p r ic e  l e v e l  a c t s  in  the  s h o r t -  
run so as to  s t a b i l i z e  the  economy.
In the  s h o r t - r u n  the  c a p i t a l  s to ck  w i l l  remain c o n s ta n t .  Also in  
a c a p i t a l  in te n s iv e  economy la b o r  demand i s  independent o f  the  p r ic e  
l e v e l .  Thus fo l lo w in g  a red u c t io n  in  the  le n g th  of the  s tan d a rd  working 
week, unemployment w i l l  f a l l  in  the  s h o r t - r u n  and agg rega te  o u tp u t  w i l l  
remain c o n s ta n t  o r  may even r i s e  i f  th e re  a re  a s s o c ia te d  p ro d u c t iv i ty  
g a in s  ( i . e . ,  n* < 0) .  I f  the  re d u c t io n  in  the  le n g th  of the  working 
week i s  n o t accompanied by any exogenous change in  the  nominal hourly  
w a g e-ra te ,  W, then the  s h o r t - r u n  response  of the  p r ic e  l e v e l ,  P, i s  
g iven by
fh ' 3i? + 9z 3b p
3P j 1 — +1 J I 9N
11 ^
1 
cxi 
C\J
m
p o
9N >4 + b
(35)
Thus, a d ecrease  in  the  le n g th  o f  the  s tan d a rd  working week, which
we have a l re ad y  shown w i l l  lead  to a d e c l in e  in  the  long -run  r a t e  of
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inflation may also lead to a fall in the short-run price level. Accord­
ingly, a decrease in the length of the standard working week may also 
lead to an increase in the hourly real wage-rate and, unless productivity 
gains are significant (i.e., unless n* is large negative), may also lead 
to a decline in the short-run rate of inflation. Whether or not the 
increase in the hourly real wage-rate is enough to maintain the weekly 
wage-packet will depend upon the parameters of the economy and, in 
general, is indeterminate.
Intuitively, the decline in the price level following a reduction 
in the length of the standard working week can be justified by observing 
that the rational expectations approach to economic modeling is essentially 
a forward looking approach. Thus the agents in the economy observe that 
in the long-run output will be reduced and so will inflation and take 
account of this in setting their current prices, thus revising current 
prices downward.
The short-run response to a reduction in the length of the standard 
working week may not only involve a jump in the price level, P, but may 
also involve an exogenous response in the nominal hourly wage-rate, W, 
which could result from political pressure exerted by workers to main­
tain their nominal weekly wage-packet despite a reduction in the length 
of the working week. For example, if the working week is reduced from 
40 hours to 35 hours then if the nominal weekly wage-packet is to remain 
the same, this would require an increase of the nominal hourly wage-rate 
by a factor of 40/35. More generally, if is the nominal wage before 
the change in the length of the standard working week, then the resulting 
change in the nominal hourly wage-rate, which is required to keep the
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nominal weekly wage constant, can be approximated by
3W
3N
0 (36)
When such an exogenous shock to the nominal hourly wage-rate is 
incorporated into the calculation of the short-run response of the 
price level, then the short-run multiplier is given by
3N h^2 + b
(37)
Thus by comparing equations (35) and (37) we can observe that an 
exogenous shock to the nominal hourly wage-rate will increase the price 
level above what it would have been if no attempt to maintain the nominal 
weekly wage-packet had occurred. Whether or not the exogenous increase 
in the nominal wage is inflationary or deflationary will depend upon 
whether the real wage decreases or increases as a result.
Another important question is whether or not wage-earners can main­
tain their real weekly wage by trying to maintain their nominal weekly 
wage.
In order to examine these questions let us assume that the multiplier 
given by equation (35) is zero, i.e., assume that if there were no exogenous 
response in the nominal hourly wage-rate, W, to a change in N, then the 
real hourly wage-rate, v, would remain constant. Now assume that when 
working hours are reduced there is an exogenous response in the nominal 
hourly wage-rate which is designed to maintain the nominal weekly wage- 
packet. We now ask what will happen to the real wage in the short-run
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after the full impact effects on prices have worked their way through 
the economy?
As a result of the exogenous shock to W, equation (36) shows that 
the impact effects on the real wage, with the price level held constant 
at P = Pq will be given by
l3NjP=PQ
(38a)
Also, from equation (37), the effect on prices will be given by
3P
3N
(38b)
Hence, the total effect on the real wage is given by
3v
3N
3v
P=P,
W 3P
3N
P N 0 P0N h32 + b
< 0
(38c)
(38d)
(38e)
In other words, the result of a conscious attempt to maintain 
nominal weekly wages, will be that wage-earners are better off in real 
terms than they would have been if no such attempt had been made. How­
ever, the attempt to maintain nominal weekly wages will not of itself 
be sufficient to maintain real weekly wages. If workers are to be
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better off (in real weekly wage terms) than they were prior to the 
reduction in the length of the standard working week, then this can 
only come about because prices fall sufficiently after working hours 
are reduced (i.e., because 3P/3N is sufficiently large positive in 
equation (35)). This may or may not occur depending on parameter 
values in the economy and is really out of the workers’ or even the 
government’s control.
Because the real hourly wage-rate rises as a result of a conscious 
attempt to maintain the nominal weekly wage we can also conclude that 
such an attempt will tend to lower inflation. Intuitively this can be 
explained because relative to nominal wages, prices have fallen and 
thus inflation will tend to fall as well.
8.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the effects of reducing the length 
of the standard working week in a capital intensive economy which is 
characterized by a high capital/labor ratio. In this model all expecta­
tions satisfy perfect myopic foresight and we assume the absence of 
speculative bubbles (i.e., we assume that the economy converges to its 
long-run equilibrium).
We have considered the effect of reducing the standard working week 
when the workers seek to maintain either their nominal hourly wage-rate 
or their nominal weekly wage-rate. We have also considered what happens 
when some of the effects of a reduced working week are offset by increased 
productivity gains which are achieved prior to the change by negotiations 
between workers and management.
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In the short-run, a reduction in the length of the standard working 
week will always lower unemployment and, if productivity gains have 
been achieved, raise aggregate output. Also if the nominal hourly wage- 
rate has remained constant, prices may fall, inflation may fall and the 
real hourly wage may rise. If workers have been successful in maintain­
ing the nominal weekly wage-rate then this will increase the short-run 
real hourly wage-rate even further and will also exert short-run defla­
tionary pressure on the economy.
In the long-run, which is characterized by full employment in the 
labor market, the level of capital stock will always be lower. While 
the real hourly wage-rate will be higher than it would be otherwise, (the 
real interest rate), the real weekly wage-packet, profits and the level 
of aggregate output may actually be (larger) smaller unless significant 
productivity gains have been achieved in the negotiations prior to the 
implementation of reduced working hours.
In general we can conclude that the only definite benefits of 
reduced working hours would be lower unemployment in the short-run and 
increased leisure time as well as reduced long-run inflation (unless 
productivity gains are significant). If the nominal hourly wage-rate 
has remained constant in the short-run, a reduction in working hours will 
also be accompanied by probable lower short-run prices, lower inflation 
and higher real hourly wage-rates. An attempt to maintain the weekly 
nominal wage-rate would also tend to lower inflation by raising prices 
less than it raises the nominal wage-rate. However these gains would 
come at the expense of a lower long-run national output (unless produc­
tivity gains are significant). Also there is no guarantee either in 
the short-term or the long-term that workers would be able to maintain
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their real weekly wage-packet. As a rule, any gains made by wage- 
earners as a result of reducing the length of the standard working 
week would come at the expense of employers, although both sides 
could gain if the associated productivity gains are sufficiently 
large.
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CHAPTER 9
A CONTINUOUS-TIME SPECIFICATION OF THE HOUSEHOLD
SECTOR INCORPORATING BOTH UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND PENSIONS
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter we extend the derivation of the household sector 
which was developed in Section 8.2 of Chapter 8, to allow for unemploy­
ment benefits and pensions as well as inter-generation bequests. We 
also take this opportunity to examine the related issue of how the sale 
of government bonds to households will affect the household sector 
functions.
The derived household sector will then be used in Chapter 10 to 
examine the effects of changing unemployment benefits and pensions in 
a larger macroeconomic framework which includes the dynamics of asset 
accumulation, the dynamics of capital accumulation and unemployment.
This question has not, as far as we know, been examined in such a frame­
work before or in conjunction with so many other issues.
For the purposes of this chapter the household will be assumed to 
consume goods, supply labor and demand assets (i.e., both money and the 
composite good known as bonds-cum-equities). The household sector is 
thus uniquely defined in an aggregate sense by the four functions which 
define the demand (and supply) for these quantities. One such specifica­
tion of the household is given by the following equations:
C = C(YD , i, A) (1a)
+  -  +
m d = L(Y, i, -TT, A) (1b)
+ - +  +
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bd + QEd = J(Y, i, - i t , A) (1c)
+ + +
NS = NS(v, i, A) (Id)
+  +  -
Equation (1a) is a consumption function such as might typically be 
derived from the life-cycle hypothesis and defines planned consumption 
as a function of disposable income, the real rate of interest and the 
level of real assets. Equations (1b, 1c) define demand for money and 
demand for bonds-cum-equities in a manner suggested by Tobin (1969) —  
each asset is assumed positively related to national income and the 
level of assets, positively related to its own rate of return and 
negatively related to the rate of return of possible substitutes. Equa­
tion (1d) defines labor supply in a manner suggested by Lucas and Rapping 
(1969) —  in this formulation labor supply is assumed related to the real 
wage, the rate of interest and the supply of real assets. In practice, 
Walras’ Law allows us to eliminate one market, usually the bonds-cum- 
equity market, and so the household sector can be defined by three equa­
tions; i.e. equations (1a, 1b, 1d).
In this formulation of the household sector, government bonds would 
influence the household functions through disposable income, YD , and 
real assets, A. Unemployment benefits and pensions would influence only 
the consumption function, through changes in YD . Unfortunately, equa­
tions (1a-1d) are not derived from the same optimizing model and accord­
ingly may not be consistent.
To derive a consistent household sector which includes unemployment 
benefits and pensions it is necessary to derive all the household func­
tions from the same optimizing model. One simpler prototype model was
- 187-
provided by Barro (1974) based on the Samuelson (1958) consumption-loan 
model. Using this model, Barro argued that the introduction of govern­
ment bonds and government financed pensions did not affect the functions 
of the household sector and therefore did not affect saving or the dynamics 
of capital accumulation —  mainly because people foresee that in the 
future they, or their heirs, will have to pay higher taxes, and adjust 
their bequests so as to just compensate. Feldstein (1974, 1981) argued 
(and had empirical results to prove) that the introduction of government 
financed pensions did affect the dynamics of capital accumulation. The 
degree to which pensions have an affect on the dynamics of capital accumu­
lation is an empirical question which is beyond the scope of this paper.
We shall, however, consider the theoretical issues which underlie the 
different hypotheses and, in an integrated manner, we shall consider how 
the household sector would have to be formulated in order to be consistent 
with the different hypotheses. Finally a specification of the household 
sector will be provided. This specification, it is argued, provides the 
most plausible functional form for the household functions. Also because 
the specification is derived from a continuous framework it can be readily 
integrated into the literature on the dynamics of asset accumulation (see 
Blinder and Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976), Turnovsky (1977)).
9.2 An Optimizing Model
For the purposes of this chapter, time is divided into periods which 
are precisely one unit long. The jth period begins at time j and goes 
until j + 1. Individuals are assumed to live precisely two periods. In 
the first period of life, individuals are assumed to be in the Labor 
Force (and hence either employed or unemployed) while in the second
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period individuals are assumed to be retired (and hence not in the 
Labor Force). At the beginning of each period exactly one generation 
is born. Accordingly at any instant of time there is precisely one 
young generation whose members are in the Labor Force and one old gen­
eration whose members have retired. There is no growth in this model. 
The generation which begins life at time j will be known as the jth 
generation. The objective of the jth generation is to choose planned
consumption, c., supply of labor, 1., and demand for money, m., so as 1 1  1
to maximize:
J +2
V.1
-ßfe" U(c., 1 ., m .) dt + aV. I l l  1j+1 (2a)
1
where > 0, < 0, > 0
U .. <0, for all ili ’
U±j = 0, i * j 
0  ^a < eß
subject to
c. + m. + QE. + b. = pvl . + (1 —p) u + dQE. + ib. — TTm. - 6T 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1
for t e [j, j+1 ) (2b)
c . + m .  + QE. + b. = s  + dQE. + ib. - T T m .  - (1 —6) T 1 1 1 1  1 1 1
for t e [j+1 , j+2) (2c)
0 for t e [j+1, j+2) (2d)
T = Tq + y[i(b^ + b^_1 ) + (1-p)u + s - (b® + b ^  )]
for t c [j, j+1) (2e)
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ft. = b*1 + QE. + m . for t e [j, j+2) (2f)J J J J
A = ft. + ft. . 
3 J-1 for t e [j , j + 1 ) (2g)
bJh(J> = 0 (2h)
ft.(j) = 0 
3 (2i)
ft j (j +1) = A (j+1 ) (2j)
ftj (j+2~) £ 0 (2k)
In this model, Tq , 5 and y are fixed constants. All other variables 
are functions of time and
c . 
J
= real private consumption plans by jth generation
1 . 
3
labor supply (in hours) by jth generation
bs amount of government bonds that have been supplied 
to the jth generation either indirectly, through the 
bequests of previous generations, or directly, through 
the actions of government during the jth generation's 
lifetime
bhj
amount of government bonds held by the jth generation
m .J = real demand for money by j th generation
E.
J
= demand for equities by jth generation
ft.
J
= real private wealth held by jth generation
A = aggregate real private wealth
Q = (expected) price of equities 
p = (expected) employment rate 
W = (expected) nominal hourly wage-rate
pV
q
(expected) price level 
W■p = (expected) real hourly wage rate
= (expected) rate of inflation of equity prices
7T PP (expected) rate of inflation of price level
ß = consumer’s rate of time preference
D. = 
J
(expected) real dividends by jth generation
d
D. + D. 1
Q(E^ + -- T ~ (exPected) dividend yield, taken to be
J + 1-1
parametrically given to the household sector and defined 
for t e [j, j+1 )
u = (expected) real unemployment benefit paid to members of 
a generation who are currently unemployed
s = (expected) real pension paid to any members of a living 
generation who are retired
i = d + q = (expected) real rate of return on equities and
bonds which are assumed to be perfect substitutes
T = aggregate real tax receipts
6 = fixed proportion of taxes paid by the generation which
is currently working, 0  ^5 i 1
Y = the extent to which the buying back (and sale) of
government bonds, pensions and unemployment benefits 
are expected to be financed by taxation, 0  ^y  ^ 1
The utility function is assumed to be concave in its three arguments,
c., I., and m.. As in Section 8.2 of Chapter 8, real money balances have 1
been incorporated into the utility function as a mechanism for capturing 
the reasons for holding money in a world of certainty and the utility
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function is assumed additively separable in all arguments purely as a 
means of simplifying the analysis. Equation (1a) then defines the 
aggregate utility of the current generation as dependent upon consumption, 
labor supply and labor demand over its members’ lifetime plus a fraction 
of the utility of the next generation.
The budget constraint faced by the jth generation in its first 
period of life (i.e., while a member of the Labor Force) is given by 
equation (2b), which is expressed in real flow terms. At each point in 
time households can acquire income from a variety of sources. They have 
an expected probability, p, of being employed and, if employed, they 
supply labor to firms, at a real wage-rate, v, they receive dividend 
yields, d, on their holdings of equities and they face an inflation tax 
( =  TTm) on their holdings of real money. They also receive unemployment 
benefits if unemployed and pay taxes. Their income can be spent on the 
purchase of real consumption goods or in the acquisition of new holdings 
of real private wealth. Wealth can be held either in the form of govern­
ment bonds, equities or money.
In the second period of life (i.e., while members of the jth gen­
eration are retired) the budget constraint is given by equations (2c,
2d). In this period, labor supply is zero. Income comprises dividends, 
pensions and returns on government bonds less government taxes and the 
inflation tax on money.
The precise form of taxes faced by the households is described by 
equation (2e). The case when y = 1 corresponds to the situation when 
the buying back (and sale) of government bonds, debt on government bonds, 
pensions and unemployment benefits are expected to be financed fully by
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taxation. The case when y = 0 corresponds to the situation when the 
tax level is exogenously fixed.
Real private wealth held by the jth generation is defined in equa­
tion (2f) and aggregate real private wealth in any time period is the 
sum of the real private wealth held by the two generations that are 
still living (equation (2g)). Because of the taxation structure, the 
amount of government bonds held by the jth generation, b ^ , in general
will differ from the supply of government bonds to the jth generation, 
s h sb^  . Both b^  and b^. are explicitly defined in the next section. At the 
beginning of their lifetimes, all generations possess zero net wealth 
(equation (2h)). In particular, they possess no government bonds (equa­
tion (2i)). At the end of its lifetime no generation can be in debt. 
Thus people must have zero net wealth at the end of their life or have 
a positive bequest (equation (2k)). All bequests by the jth generation 
(whether in the form of bonds, money or equities) must be left to the 
next generation (j+1). This gives rise to the constraint given by equa­
tion (2j) which embodies a discrete jump in the jth generation's real 
private wealth if it has been left a positive bequest. The jth genera­
tion's bequest is given by ft^(j+2_).1 Note that while the jth genera­
tion's net wealth (ft.) may have discrete jumps at the end of any period, 
the aggregate net wealth function (A) whose evolution is defined by 
equations (2b, 2c), must be continuous. An initial endowment of real 
private wealth provides the initial condition that will close the model. 
In the household's optimization decision the variables c., I., m.,
W W W
and QE. are determined by the household. All other variables are taken J
as given by the household.
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9.3 Net Holdings of Government Bonds
The optimizing model essentially allows work and retirement in a 
framework which incorporates unemployment benefits, pensions and govern­
ment bonds. These are all assumed to be financed either through a bud­
get deficit or through taxes. In particular, we assume that the govern­
ment determines the rate of supply of government bonds to each generation
• 3(i.e., bj) and that each generation is compelled by legislation to buy
sthese bonds. The variable, b^ , denotes the amount of government bonds 
that have been supplied to the jth generation, either indirectly, through 
the bequests of previous generations, or directly, through the actions 
of government during the jth generation's lifetime. Accordingly, for 
t e [j, j+1 )
bs = J bs dt
J J J
(3a)
and
fc3-i bs; . i  d t  ♦ .  *V  T «  I
JIi=-oo J(b? + bf_1 )dt i-1 (3b)
Not all the government bonds supplied to the jth generation will 
be held by the jth generation; some bonds will be used to pay tax liabil­
ities. In order to examine the relationship between the amount of bonds 
held by the jth generation, b” , and the amount of bonds supplied to the
3jth generation, b ^ , it is necessary to examine the budget constraints 
of the household sector more closely. In order to do this, equations 
(2b, 2c, 2e) can be combined to give the following equations:
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. + m. + QE. + [bS - 6y(bs + bS J]  
J J J J J J-1
= pvl^ + dQEj + (1 - 6y)(1 - p)u - (6y)s
- TTm. - 6t _ + i[bS - 6y(bS + bs )] 
J 0 J J J-1
for t e [j, j+1 ) (4a)
c. + m. + QE. + [bS - y(1 - 6)(bs , + bS)] 
J J J J J+1 J
dQEj + [1 - y(1 - 6)]s - y(1 - 6)(1 - p)u
_ TTnij - (1 - 5)Tq + i[bS. - y (1 - 6) (b^ + b^+1 ) ]
for t e [j+1, j+2) (4b)
Hence the rate of growth of bonds held by the jth generation, b^  , 
can be given by
b*? = bsA^ - 5y) - ö y f b ^  )
b*? = bs .(1 - y(1 - 6)) - y (1 - 5)bs
J-1 J-1 J
(5a)
(5b)
for t £ [ j , j+1 )
Hence, the aggregate holding of bonds, at any time, is given by
bh + bh = (1 - y)(bs + bs ) J J-1 J J-1 (6a)
(1 - y) l
vi=-co
(bS + bS )dt 
i-11 1_
• Q  • «5(b® + b^_1)dt (6 b )
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Since
bj(J) =0 (6c)
and
bjtj+1) = bjU+i") + bj_1 (j + D (6d)
then, the current holding of bonds by the jth generation, i.e., b*.1, is
sdifferent from the supply of bonds to the jth generation, i.e., b , but
both variables are uniquely defined by all previous rates of supply of
We can then use equation (6a) to make the following observations 
about the relationship between the type of taxation (in this case the 
choice of y) and the public's holding of government bonds.
(i) When the funding of bond sales is fully paid for by taxes (i.e., 
when y = 1), the aggregate holdings of bonds will always be zero.
(ii) When the tax level is exogenously fixed (i.e., when y = 0), the 
aggregate holdings of bonds is equal to the aggregate amount supplied.
(iii) In intermediate cases (i.e., for 0 < y < 1), the aggregate 
holdings of bonds will be positive but less than the amount supplied.
9.4 Simplifying the Model
Having derived equations (5, 6) which define the amount of bonds 
held by each generation and noting that bonds and equities are assumed 
to be perfect substitutes, we can rewrite the household's optimization 
problem given by equations (2) as follows:
• sbonds, i.e., b..
Max V = e U(c., I ., m .)dt + a V . , j L  J J J J+1 (7a)
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subject to
c . + ß . = pvi . + iß. J J J J (i +  tt )m .J yj
for t e [j, j+2)
(7b)
where
(1-6y)(1-p)u - 6ys - 6Tq , for t £ [j , j+1 )
-y(1-5) (1-p)u + [1 - y( 1 -6) ]s - (1-6)TQ 
for t £ [j+1, j+2)
-T = 0, for t £ [j+1, j+2)
n.(j) = o
. (j+ 1 ) = n. (j+i ) + 2^ .  ^(j+ 1  )U J J '
ßj (j+2” )  ^0
(7c)
(7d)
(7e) 
(7f) 
(7g) 
(7h)
9-5 The Role of Expectations
As was the case in Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of Chapter 8, the mechanism 
by which expectations are formed is crucial for the development of the 
model. We shall again assume that current and past expectations satisfy 
perfect myopic foresight; future expectations satisfy a static expecta­
tions hypothesis.
This notion of a static expectation hypothesis needs to be made 
more explicit. More precisely we require that the variables which face 
each individual in the economy are formed by static expectations. These 
variables are the employment rate (p), the real-wage (v), the rate of
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return on bonds and equities (i), the rate of inflation (tt), the pension 
(s) and the unemployment benefit (u).
Given a mechanism for the formation of expectations, each gener­
ation’s optimization decision can be described as follows: at any
current instant of time, each generation knows with certainty the value 
of all the exogenous variables which it takes as given. Using its 
expectations about the future, the household sector determines its 
optimal consumption, labor supply and labor demand for that instant 
and for all future time. When at the next instant of time the values 
of the appropriate variables become known, the household compares 
actual values with the expectations and, if these diverge, then the 
household's decision variables are revised on the basis of the new 
value of the exogenous variables and current expectations.
9.6 Solution to the Optimizing Model
As demonstrated in the Appendix, provided the rate of return on
bonds and equities is greater than the rate of return on money, i.e.,
2i + tt > 0, then a unique solution to the optimizing model exists and 
conditions for such a solution are given by the following equations:
U1 = (8a)
U = (i + TT )\p.3 J (8b)
U2 = - (pv)ipj for t e [j, j+1 ) (8c)
1 . = 0 J for t e [j+1 , j+2)
(8d)
= (3 - i)vp.J J
(8e)
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4 M  j+1” ) = ^ ( j + 1 ) = 
^  (j+2") = a\p (j+2
Zj[A(j+1)] = Vj
for t e (j+1, j+2)
(j+1")]
where ii.ß. (j+2” ) = 0 
J J
and where
Z [A(j+1)] =
fj+2
e”^tU(c., I., 
J J
j+1
m.)dt + V. , J J+1
(8f)
(8g)
subject to
0. (j+1) = A(j+1 )
Given A^ an optimal program is determined as follows: A (0) = A^
determines \p  ^(0) (equation (8f)) which determines c and m (equations 
8a, 8b). These in turn determine the -1th generation’s bequest (= Q,  ^( T ) ) 
to generation 0 (using equation (7b)). This bequest determines A (1)
(using equation (8f)) and the time path for Cq , mQ , 1^, (using equations 
8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, 8g) which determine the Oth generation’s bequest (= ftQ (2 )) 
to generation +1, and so on.
Given a fixed initial condition (e.g., A (0) = Aq ), the following 
observations can be made about the optimal solution:
(i) As a decreases, the jth generation's bequest (= ft^(j+2 )) 
decreases. Hence as a decreases, the probability increases
that the jth generation leaves no bequest (i.e., ß (j+2~) =0). 
(ii) In particular, when a=0 there is no bequest (i.e., ß (j+2 ) =0). 
This is reasonable since, in this case, the next generation's
utility function does not appear in the current generation's
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utility function and thus there is no motive to leave a 
bequest.
(iii) Whenever the jth generation’s bequest (= ttAj+2~)) is 
non-zero,
ej* >1 m. $ J m. ,J+1 and 1 l 1j+1
In
(a)
(b)
according as a ^ 1 .
the rest of this chapter two cases will be considered:
the case when the optimal bequest (i.e., fMj+2~)) is  ^ 0 
(i.e., p, = 0). This will be referred to as the Operative 
Bequest Motive Case.
the case when the optimal bequest is < 0 (i.e., p > 0). This 
case will be referred to as the Non-operative Bequest Motive 
Case and will be characterized by a bequest which is constrained 
to equal zero.
9.7 Operative Bequest Motive
When the bequest motive is operative, equation (8g) shows that 
4^  = f°r t e Cj+1 , j+2). Hence, assuming that a is fixed, we can
use equations (8a-8d) to show that for t e (j, j+1).
(9a)
m._i = ">j_1 <i  ♦ n. HO (9b)
1. 1 = 0 (90
c . = c . (\p.) (9d)J J J
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m . 
J
m  . (i + it 
3 J
(9e)
1 . - 1 . (pv, ip.) 
J J ^ ’ J (9f)
Also equation (7b) can be combined for two successive generations 
to give
A = pvl . - (c.+c. „ ) + iA - (i+TT)(m.+m. .) + (y.+y. .) (10)
J J J-1  J J-1  J J-1
Hence if we assume that the expectations for all time periods after
At satisfy static individual expectations, then
A(j+1 ) = f[t, A, \p., i, pv, -(i+7T)(m.+m ), (y.+y. .)] (11a)
. «J , , , J J vl . J
But from equation (8f),
ip.(j+1 ) = Z ' (A (j+1 )) J 1
and from equation (8e),
ip.(j+1 ) = e (ß"i)(j+1"t)\p.(t) 
3 3
(11b)
(11c)
Hence,
< M t )  = e (ß-i) (t-j-1 (j+1 j (11 d)
j j
_ e(3-i)(t-j-1)z^(A(j+1)) (lie)
Hence, using the concavity of Z^ (proved in the Appendix) 
v M t )  = g[t, A, i, pv, -(i+TT) (m +m ), (y.+y. -)]
J , J J J J
5
(Ilf)
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Then using equations (9b, 9e)
m.(t) = m.[t, A, i, pv, i+7T, y +y ] dig)
Hence, from equations (Ilf, 11g)
*Mt) = h[t, A, i, pv, -7T, y +y ] (11h)
vJ ^  ^ ^ ^ J
and, from equations (9a-9f)^
c . 
J
CjCt, A, i, pv, -it, y.+y ] 
+ + J+ J
for t £ [j, j+2)
m = m [t, A, i, pv, - tt, y +y ]
J  J + - + + J+ J ”
for t e [j, j+2)
1. = l.[ t, A, i, pv, -TT, Yj+Yj.-,]
for t e [ j , j+1)
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
1 . - 0 for t £ [j + 1 , j+2) (12d)
where y + y  ^ = (1-y)[(1-p)u + s] - TQ is the aggregate income derived 
from unemployment benefits and pensions.
The effect that government bonds have on the household sector will 
depend upon the way government bonds influence real private wealth (A). 
As shown in equations (6a-6b) the supply of government bonds will have 
some effect on the household sector unless they are fully financed out 
of taxation and not even partially, by means of a budget deficit (i.e.,
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they will have some effects unless y = 1). This is essentially the 
result of Barro's (1974) exposition. As the degree of taxation financing 
decreases (i.e., as y decreases), the effect of government bonds on the 
household sector will increase.
In a similar fashion it is clear that unemployment benefits and 
pensions will have some effect on the household sector unless y = 1 .
As y decreases, the effect of unemployment benefits and pensions on the 
household sector will increase.
When we derive aggregate planned consumption, C, aggregate demand
d sfor money, m , and aggregate supply of labor, N , where for t e [j, j+1)
C = c. + c. 1 J J-1 (13a)
dm = m . + m . „ J J-1 (13b)
NS = 1 . J (13c)
then the aggregate functions will have the same properties as the individual 
component functions given by equations (12a-12c), i.e., these aggregate 
household sector functions are given by
C [ A , -7T, i, pv, (1 —Y ) ( 1 - p ) u , (1- Y )s , T q ] ( 1 3 a ' )
+ + - + + + -
L [ A , — 7T, i, pv, (1-y) d - p ) u , ( 1 - Y >3, T q ] ( 1 3 b ' )
+ + - + + + -
N S [A, - it, i, pv, (1-y) (1 — p )u , (1-Y)s, T ] ( 1 3 c ' )
+ +
where C = aggregate planned consumption, md = aggregate demand for money,
5N = aggregate labor supply, and A is aggregate real private wealth 
including holdings of government bonds.
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9.8 Non-Operative Bequest Motive
When the bequest motive for the jth generation is non-operative, 
then ft^(j+2 ) = 0. Also from equations (8a-8d),
c . = c . (\p.) (14a)J J J
m .J . ( i+TTJ
1 . = 1 . (pv, ip•) J J . * J for t e [j, j+1 )
(14b)
( 1 4 c )
1 = 0 for t e [j+1 , j+2) (14d)
Then using equations (7b, 14a-14d), and assuming the bequest motive is 
also non-operative for generation j-1, i.e., ft^ ^(j+1- ) = 0, we can 
show that
ft. (j+2”) = f(t, ft., \p., i, -(i+7T)m., y.,pv) (15)
J +J +J + + J +J + or 0
where the partial derivative w.r.t. pv is positive if t e [j, j+1) 
and zero if t e [j+1, j+2).
Hence, since ft (j+2~) = 0, from equation (15),
(t) = ip.(t, ft., i, - ( i+TT)m., y , pv)J J — J _ — J — J — or 0 (16)
and hence, using equation (14b), we obtain7
m . ( t)J
m . (t, ft., — tt ,
J J+ +
i + 7T, y , ,  p v )
+J + or 0
(17a)
Hence, we can rewrite equation (16) as
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i | U t )J . ( t, ß . , -TT,J J i+TT, y pv)+ - - or 0
Then, from equations (14), the optimal solution for the jth
g
ation, is given by
c . J c .(t, ß ., J 3
m . J m . (t, ß .,j +j *
1 . = 1 . ( t, ß . , -TT,J J J
1 . = 0 
3
i+TT, y pv)
+J + or 0
for t e [j, j+2)
i+TT, y pv)
+J + or 0
for t £ [j, j+2)
i+ff, y., pv)
+  -  +
for t e [ j, j+1 ) 
for t e [j+1, j+2)
Once again we can derive aggregate planned consumption, C,
d sdemand for money, m , and aggregate supply of labor, N , where,
t e [j, j+1)
C = C(ß.,
+J
md = L(ß., 
+ J
NS = NS(ß., J
ßi_1» -71» i, pv, y., y .-1 
+J + - + +J +J
ß , -TT, i, pv, y , y
+J + - + +J +J
1, i, Pv, y,, y. 1
-  + + -  -
)
)
)
(17b)
gener-
(18a)
(18b)
(18c)
(18d)
aggregate
for
(19a)
(19b)
(19c)
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however we will assume in what follows that these coefficients are 
approximately the same. Then planned consumption and demand for 
money (supply of labor) will be positively (negatively) related to:
Hence, when y ^ 1 these respective functions will be positively 
(negatively) related to the supply of government bonds, the unemploy­
ment benefit and the pension and negatively (positively) related to the 
exogenously fixed level of taxes, Tq .
9.9 A General Specification of the Household Sector
In the analyses of the previous sections 9.7 and 9.8 of this chapter, 
we have demonstrated that, in a world in which there are government bonds, 
pensions and unemployment benefits, the household sector functions will, 
in general, depend on these variables. This relationship will occur 
unless expenditure on these items is completely financed out of taxes 
(i.e., y = 1) and each generation has an operative bequest motive.
Even in this special case there are other reasons why the household 
sector functions may still depend on the variables:
(i) The real world is made not simply of two generations but of 
many different individuals who earn different wages, pay 
different taxes and receive different amounts of bonds, 
pensions and unemployment benefits as a result of govern­
ment policies.
(20a)
and
y^ + y^_1 = d-y)[(i-p)u + s] - t q (20b)
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(ii) Feldstein (1976) and Kotlikoff (1979) have pointed out that 
in reality an individual’s retirement age is not fixed but 
rather endogenous.
(iii) Drazen (1978) has shown that the solution will change if 
investment has been made in a form (e.g., human capital) 
which cannot readily be converted back into equities.
(iv) There has also been some debate about the implications of 
incorporating growth in the model (see Feldstein (1975), 
Barro (1976), Carmichael (1982)).
These issues mean that with almost any uniform tax structure the 
household sector functions will still depend to some extent on govern­
ment bonds, pensions and unemployment benefits.
Furthermore, the derivations of the household functions have relied 
on information about the income and wealth of specific generations. In 
general, we would expect that the typical policy maker would only have 
aggregate information available to him. Accordingly, for the purposes 
of tractability, some approximations will have to be made in defining 
a general specification of the household sector.
Some general principles can, however, be observed concerning the 
general structure of the household sector functions. As a rule, these 
functions depend on income (in the form of expected wages (pv)), as 
well as the tax base (= TQ), the rates of return on money (= - t t ) and 
bonds-cum-equities (= i), the current holdings of real private wealth 
excluding the level of government bonds (= A ), and also the expected 
returns from unemployment benefit (= (1-p)u), pensions (= s) and the 
supply of government bonds (= b). As a first approximation these last 
three variables will all be multiplied by 1-y, i.e., the extent to
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which expenditure on these items is not financed out of taxation. A 
general specification of the household sector can then be written as 
follows
C = C[pv, Tq,
+  -
1 ,  -7T, A  , 
-  +  +
(1 — y  ) b , (1 — Y ) (1 — P ) u ,
+  +
( 1 - Y ) s ]
+
( 2 1 a )
md = L[pv, Tq,
+  -
« X1 ,  -7T, A , 
-  +  +
( 1 - Y )b , ( 1 — Y ) ( 1  — P )u ,  
+  +
( 1 - Y ) s ]
+
( 21b )
NS = NS[pv, Tq,
+  +
i ,  -IT, A X , 
+  -  -
(1 — Y ) b , (1 — Y ) ( 1 —p ) u , ( 1 — y  ) s  ] ( 2 1 c )
where C denotes aggregate planned consumption, md denotes the aggregate
3real demand for money and N denotes the aggregate supply of labor. As 
a rule, we would expect that the sign of the effect of b, (1 —p)u and s 
would be as shown. However, when the bequest motive is non-operative, 
the arguments of Section 9.8 show that this may not always be the case.
9.10 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have examined the effects of changing unemploy­
ment benefits and pensions on the specification of the household sector.
We have chosen to do this by extending Barro’s (1974) model to a continuous­
time framework in which there is unemployment and equities as well as 
bequests, government bonds, unemployment benefits and pensions. This 
formal approach rather than an ad-hoc approach has been chosen for two 
reasons.
First, it makes clear the type of assumptions that underlie the 
specification. In particular, the assumptions with respect to the forma­
tion of expectations which are needed to develop the solution to the
model.
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Secondly, it also ensures that the derived household sector is 
internally consistent.
Barro’s results, which conclude that government bonds, pensions 
and unemployment benefits do not affect the household functions, have 
been shown to apply only under a set of very restrictive assumptions; 
it has been argued that even when only some of these restrictive assump­
tions apply, more realistic assumptions will mean that the household 
functions do respond to changes in social welfare payments and bonds.
The most important conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that, 
contrary to what is suggested by the ad-hoc specification of the house­
hold sector given in equations (1 a— Id), if unemployment benefits and 
pensions occur in the specification of the consumption function then 
they will also occur in the specification of the demand for money and 
labor supply. Thus, as will be demonstrated more clearly in the next 
chapter, a change in unemployment benefits and pensions may well have 
different effects than a change in Government expenditure, which will 
only affect aggregate demand.
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Appendix to Chapter 9
In this Appendix we provide a more formal derivation of conditions
for the solution of the optimizing model. The proof uses Hestenes (1965)
otheorem as expounded by Long and Vousden (1977). For convenience we 
shall drop all superscripts and unnecessary subscripts. The problem 
given by equation (1) can then be divided into two parts:
Problem 1
**Given ß
Max 
c,l ,m
1
e p U(c,I,m)dt + Z(ß + ß ) = V(ß )
0
subject to
ß = pvl - c + iß - (i+7T)m + y 
ß  ^ = ß  ^(1 ) 
ß* = ßd")
(A.1 a)
(A.1b)
(A.1c)
( A.1 d )
and where Z is as defined in Problem 2.
Problem 2
#*Given ß
Max
c,m
+ ß
2
-ßte U (c,o,m)dt + aV . (ß )+1
1
XX Xz(ß 1 + ß ) (A.2a)
subject to
ß = iß - c - (i+TT)m + y (A.2b)
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##
n-1 = ß_1 (D (A.2c)
*
ß ßd") (A.2d)
ß ß(2“ )  ^0 (A.2e)
Solution to Problem 1
The Hamiltonian for the first problem is given by:
— fit RfH = e U(c,.Z,m) + e Mpvl - c + iß - (i+TT)m + y] (A.3)
-ß twhere e ip is the discounted co-state variable associated with the 
state variable ß. Application of the necessary conditions gives:
= \p (A.4a)
U2 = -\p(pv) (A.4b)
U3 = (i+TT) ip (A.4c)
ip = (ß-i)\p (A.4d)
Application of Hestenes theorem gives the transversality condition
ip(1 ) = Z f (ß-1 + ß ) (A.4e)
Solution to Problem 2
The Hamiltonian for the second problem is given by
H = e”^U(c,o,m) + e”^  [iß - c - (i+7r)m + y] (A.5)
_ g  t
where e” \p is the discounted co-state variable associated with the 
state variable ip. Application of the necessary conditions gives:
u1 = ip (A.6a)
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U 3  = ( i-HTT) Ip ( A . 6 b )
t  = ( ß — i ) vJj ( A . 6 c )
The transversality conditions are given by
** *\p(i) = z' (ß + ß )
^(2) = aV' (ß ) + \i 
where p,  ^0, pß =0.
(A.6d) 
(A.6e)
Solution of Combined Problem
We shall prove that, for the optimal solution,
** * #*Z*(ß + ß ) = V (ß 1)
Sketch of Proof: Let c, 1, m be a set of solutions defined for 
t e  [0,1) and for which ß = ß. Let
X(ß_1)
_ _ _ _ # £
X(c, 1 , m, ß, ß  ^)
1 _ ß t ----  _= e U(c,l,m)dt + Z(ß + ß).
J0
#  %  .)t %
Hence X*(ß ) = Z*(ß 1 + ß).
Let (c, 1 , m, Ö) denote the optimal solution. If
_       % % ^
(c, 1, m, ß) = (c, 1, m, Ö) then X(ß  ^) = V(ß ^), i.e., X'(ß  ^) = V*(ß ^).
Hence V ’(ß ‘ ) = Z'(ß + ß 1 ).
Then, noting that the transversality conditions given by equations 
(A.6d) and (A.Ae) are identical, we can write down the necessary con­
ditions for the solution to this problem as given in Equation (8).
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S u f f i c i e n c y  and Uniqueness Theorems
In o rde r  to prove the s u f f i c i e n c y  of the  necessa ry  c o n d i t io n s  we 
must f i r s t  prove t h a t  V(ft ) i s  concave.
Sketch of  Proof
#*1 **2
Choose two s e p a r a t e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t io n s  ft  ^ and ft  ^ w i th  c o r r e s -
1 1 1 1  **1 2 2 2  ponding optimal pa ths  given b y ( c , l , m , f t , f t . ] ) and (c , 1 , m ,
2 **2 **1 **2ft , ft  ^ ).  Then Aft  ^ + (1—X)ft i s  the  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t io n  f o r  a
f e a s i b l e  pa th  given by \c + (1-A)c2 , Ai1 + (1 -A) l2 , Am1 + (1-A)m2 ,
1 2Xft + (1—X)ft . This fo l lows  s in ce  such a s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  equa t ions
(7a-7h) .
Hence V(Xft + (1-A)ft )
e_ß tU(Xc1 + (1-A)c2 , XI1 + (1-A)12 , Xm1 + (1-X)m2 )d t
* * i  * * 2
+  a v  .  ( X f t  +  ( 1  - X ) f t  ) +1
(by d e f i n i t i o n  of  o p t im a l i ty )
2
> X e " ß tU(c* 1 , 21 , m1 )d t  + (1-X) - 8 t „ ,  2 ,2 2 , . .• e U(c , 1 , m )dt
**2
+  a V  . ( A f t  +  ( 1 - X ) f t  ) +1
(by concav i ty  o f  U)
i  XV(S2**1 ) + (1-X)V(Ji**2 ).
(Noting t h a t  V , V+2, V+n, __  have the  same p r o p e r t i e s  as V.)
Hence by d e f i n i t i o n  V i s  s t r i c t l y  concave.
Then, assuming V i s  twice d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ,  V" < 0.
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The sufficiency theorem given in Long and Vousden (1977, pp. 25-26, 
Theorem 6) can be used to show that the program which satisfies the 
necessary conditions is optimal.
Application of Long and Vousden (1977, p. 30, Theorem 8) then 
establishes the uniqueness of the optimal solution if it exists.
Existence of Optimal Solution
It is still necessary to prove that the optimal solution is feasible. 
A solution which satisfies the necessary conditions can be constructed 
as follows:
First note that the solution to the equation 4; = (B—i )vp (equation 
8e) exists given any initial condition. Thus an optimal solution exists
provided an appropriate initial condition exists which satisfies the
* ##transversality condition given by \p(1) = Z'(ft + ft ).
To prove that such an initial condition exists, note firstly that 
V ’ (ft 1 ) = Z ’ (ft + ft ). Hence V"(ft 1 ) = Z"(ft + ft 1 ) and since V is
concave, so is Z.
*# # **
Assume ft  ^ is given and fixed and \|>(1) < Z * (ft + ft  ^).
Then ipt => m(0)l, ft(0)t, (by equation 1 )
=0 ml, ft! for all t
*=i> ft t, (since i + tt > 0)
Z ’(ft +ft^)l, (by concavity of Z).
Hence by continuity of and Z we can choose vp(1) so that a solution 
exists which will satisfy the necessary conditions. A similar proof 
obtains if \p( 1 ) > Z'(ft + ft ).
The optimal solution can thus be obtained by choosing suitable 
initial values of m and QE. In general since demand for money will be
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non-zero and since m(0) + QE(O) = 0, this will involve the household 
initially borrowing equities which it will have to repay at the market 
rate of interest (= i).
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CHAPTER 10
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND PENSIONS
10.1 Introduction
"The (Australian) Government has already increased, from 
May, 1983, the rate of unemployment benefit for single 
persons aged 18 and over by $4.25 per week to $68.65 per 
week at a cost of about $100 million in 1983-84. The 
Government has now decided to increase the rate again in 
November 1983 by $4.95 per week, or by $2 a week more than 
needed to allow for inflation, to bring the rate to $73.60 
per week. Commencing in May 1984, this rate will be auto­
matically indexed for increases in the Consumer Price Index: 
at that time a $2 supplement will again be provided. On 
current reckoning, this will amount to a further increase 
of about $4.80 per week. The total increase since the 
Government came to office will then be around $14 per week 
or more than 21 percent; over the same period the combined 
married rate is likely to have increased, with existing 
indexation arrangements, by about 16 percent to around 
$148.90 per week."
Australian 1983/84 Budget Speech1
The increase in unemployment benefits initiated by the recently 
elected Australian Labor Government was also accompanied by restrictions 
on eligibility for old-age pensions which will effectively lower the 
average benefit received from the government by those who have retired. 
It seems quite likely that the election of any new government in 
Australia may frequently be accompanied by changes in the benefits 
accrued to the general population from welfare payments. This will 
occur because the change in government is frequently accompanied by 
a change in ideology as to what welfare policy can be considered 
equitable or socially desirable. Accordingly, changes in unemployment 
benefits and pensions which are financed by the government can be 
expected to recur in Australian historical experience. Here we develop 
a framework for the analysis of the effects of such policy changes and
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also use this framework to examine the consequences of such changes.
At first glance, an increase in welfare payments financed by
the government, would be expected to have similar effects to a change
in any other form of government expenditure, increasing aggregate
demand and, if not financed out of taxation revenue, increasing the
budget deficit. However the household sector developed in Chapter
9 shows that there are important differences. Firstly, changes in
welfare payments will only have an effect if they are not fully financed
out of taxation revenue. Secondly, if changes in welfare payments
affect aggregate demand they will also have an influence on the demand
2for money and the supply of labor.
In this chapter we examine the short-run and long-run effects of 
changing unemployment benefits and pensions in a model of the economy 
which includes the intrinsic dynamics of asset accumulation as well as 
the dynamics of capital accumulation. In the past, the effect of changing 
welfare payments have not been considered in conjunction with these 
issues. One approach has been to examine changing welfare payments 
within a partial equilibrium framework (e.g., Feldstein (1977)).
Another approach has been to examine changing welfare payments within 
the framework of Diamond’s (1965) neoclassical growth model. The most 
extensive model by Hu (1979) is a general equilibrium model capable of 
analyzing long-run effects. However his model assumes that the budget 
is always balanced and abstracts from the stability properties of the 
economy. Here we extend the analysis of Hu by incorporating some of 
the assumptions of the Barro (1974)/Feldstein (1974, 1981) debate with­
in the framework of the dynamics of asset accumulation (see Blinder and 
Solow (1973), Tobin and Buiter (1976), Turnovsky (1977)). This is an
- 217 -
important extension because the mechanism by which unemployment benefits 
and pensions are financed not only affects the form of the household 
sector functions but through its effect on the government surplus/deficit 
will also influence the dynamics of the economy. The stability proper­
ties of the economy will also affect the short-run and long-run responses 
to a change in benefits and pensions.
10.2 A Dynamic Macro-Model
We base the analyses of this chapter on a model which is similar
in many respects to the model of Chapter 8. This model assumes that
all investment is equity financed, unemployment is positive (i.e.,
S DN > N ), and also assumes the absence of government bonds and hence 
the total money financing of the government deficit. The model also
incorporates unemployment benefits and pensions and assumes that a fixed 
percentage of expenditure on these is financed out of taxation on the 
household sector and the rest is financed by printing money. This model 
is given by the following equations:
Y = C + I + Gq (1a)
C = C(A, i, pv, - i t , 
+ - + +
(1 —Y )(1 —p)u, (1-y)s, Tq )
+ + -
(1b)
m = L(A, i, pv, - i t , 
+ - + +
(1 —Y )(1 —P)u, (1-y)s, Tq )
+ + -
(1c)
I = I(i, v) (Id)
A = m + QE (1 e)
QE = QE(K, i, v, T ) (If)
+
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where
Y = NDF(K/ND),  F' > 0,  F" < 0 
v = G(K/ND) = F(K/ND) -  (K/ND)F’ (K/ND)
NS = NS (A, i ,  pv, -7T, (1-y)  ( 1 -p)u,  ( 1 - y ) s ,  TQ)
-  +  +  -  -  +
w = -a(U-U) + it
7T = p
K = I -  AK 
v = v(w-p)
m = GQ -  TQ + ( 1 —y ) ( 1 —P)u + ( 1- y )s -  pm
(IS)
( 1h)
( 1  i )
( 1 J )
(1k)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
Y = r e a l  n a t io n a l  o u tpu t 
C = agg rega te  planned consumption 
I  = agg rega te  planned investm ent
Gq = r e a l  government e x p en d itu re  assumed endogenous
A = rea l  pr i va t e  weal th
r  = nominal r a t e  of r e tu rn  on e q u i t i e s
tt = expected r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n
i  = r-TT = r e a l  r a t e  of r e tu rn  on e q u i t i e s
p = expected employment r a t e
u = r e a l  unemployment b e n e f i t
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v = real wage-rate 
s = real pension
SN = supply of labor 
= demand for labor
m = real supply of (and demand for) money 
QE = real supply of (and demand for) equities 
K = real level of physical capital 
p = actual inflation rate 
U = unemployment rate 
U = natural unemployment rate
w = rate of wage growth
»
Tq = level of taxes on households other than taxes used to 
finance unemployment benefits and pensions
Y = fixed proportion of expenditure on unemployment benefits 
and pensions that is financed by taxation on household 
sector, 0 < y = 1
= corporate taxes (assumed exogenous)
1
Tq = Tq + = aggregate taxation other than taxes which are
used to finance unemployment benefits and 
pensions
Equilibrium in the product market is described by equation (1a). 
Equations (1b) and (1c) describe planned consumption and the demand 
for money under the assumption that aggregate household taxation
includes a fixed proportion of expenditure on unemployment benefits
»
and pensions (i.e., equal to TQ + y (1“P)u + ys). These functions were 
derived from an optimizing framework in the preceding chapter. Planned 
investment is defined in equation (1d), real private wealth is defined 
in equation (1e) and the supply of equities is defined in equation (1f). 
The production function is defined in equation (1g) while the demand
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for and supply of labor can be derived from equations (1h) and (1i). 
Equation (1j) defines the unemployment rate and equation (1k) is a 
standard version of the Phillips curve.
Equations (2a)-(2b) define the expected employment rate and the 
expected rate of inflation, both of which are assumed to satisfy per­
fect myopic foresight.
The dynamics of the model are given by equations (3a)-(3c). The 
rate of capital accumulation is defined as equal to the rate of invest­
ment less capital depreciation. The evolution of the real wage is 
defined in the standard manner and the supply of money is constrained 
by the government budget constraint. In particular equation (3c) is 
derived by assuming that M/P is given by the difference between total 
government expenditure (= GQ + (1-p)u + s) less total taxation receipts 
(= Tq + y(1-p)u + ys).
A possible extension of this model would be to assume that the
natural rate of unemployment U is a function of unemployment benefits;
e.g., we could assume U = U(u). In other words an increase in the
+
unemployment benefit will raise the natural rate of unemployment. This 
specification has some support in the popular press and could also be 
derived from a search theory approach to unemployment. It turns out 
that provided y < 1 this specification will not change the general 
conclusions of our approach except that an increase in unemployment 
benefits will raise the long-run unemployment rate. Accordingly, this 
richer specification will not be considered in detail here.
We could also consider the case when a fixed proportion of the 
expenditure on unemployment benefits and pensions is financed out of 
taxes on the corporate sector. However taxes on the corporate sector
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do not affect the investment decision, or the process of capital accu­
mulation and their only influence on the corporate sector comes about
3by lowering the value of equities. In the economy that we shall sub­
sequently be considering, wealth effects in the consumption function 
and the demand for money function are minimal. Accordingly, partially 
financing expenditure on unemployment benefits and pensions out of 
corporate taxes will simply lower the budget deficit. As a result the 
same general conclusions will apply whether unemployment benefits and 
pensions are partially financed out of corporate taxes or not and we 
shall not consider this case further in this chapter.
10.3 Simplifying the Model
In the rest of this chapter, we shall examine the effects of an 
exogenous change in unemployment benefits and pensions. We shall also 
assume, merely to simplify the analysis, that the wealth effects in 
planned consumption and the demand for money are close to zero and can 
be ignored. The model given by equations (1) — (3) can then be rewritten 
in the form:
Y = C(i, pv, —tt, (1 — Y ) (1—p)u, (1 — Y )s) + I(i,v) + GQ (4a)
m  = L(i, pv, - tt, (1-y)(1-p)u, (1-y)s) (4b)
Y = NDF(K/ND ) (4c )
v = G(K/N°) ^ N D = ND (K,v ) (4d)
U = U(i, v, - tt, (1 -y) (1 -p)u, (1-y)s, K) (4e)
+  +  -  -  -
(4f)1 - p = U
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v = -av(U-U) (Ag)
K = J(K, i, v) (Ah)
m = G - Tq + (1-y) (1-P)u + (1-y)s - urn (Ai)
The dynamic variables of this model are given by v, K and m while 
the short-run model given by the six equations (Aa)-(Af) has the endoge­
nous variables, Y, i, t t , ND , p and U.
As in Chapter 8 we assume that the economy described by the model
is highly capital intensive (i.e., characterized by a high capital/
labor ratio). Hence the firm’s optimization decision will be relatively
independent of the returns to labor. Also the demand for labor, ND ,
and aggregate output, Y, will be relatively insensitive to the real
wage-rate. Investment, I, will only be affected by the real wage to
the extent that the interest rate is affected by the real wage (i.e.,
I = I(i)). Unlike in Chapter 8, where labor supply N is fixed, the 
Slabor supply, N , derived in this model from the household optimization 
problem of Chapter 9, will still depend on the real wage-rate; thus the 
unemployment rate, U, will also still depend on the real wage.
In a similar manner to Section 8.5 of Chapter 8, the short-run 
model given by equations (Aa)-(Af) can be solved for the real rate 
of interest, i, and the rate of inflation, t t , in terms of the variables 
v, K, m and U, as well as the exogenous variables u and s. The equations 
are given by:
i = i(K, v, m, (1-y)(1-p)u, (1-y)s) (5a)
tt = tt( K, v ,  m, ( 1 - y ) ( 1 - p ) u ,  ( 1 - y ) s ) (5b)
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Throughout this chapter, we assume that the real money supply is 
the primary determinant of interest rates and inflation. This assump­
tion is consistent with the stance of recent Australian budgets, which 
have emphasized the use of a monetary instrument to control inflation 
and also has some foundation in recent U.S. historical experience (or 
at least the public perception of this recent experience as represented 
by the reaction of the U.S. stock market to actions by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve System). It is important to note that we are not assuming that 
the other forces do not affect inflation and real interest rates; rather 
what we are saying is that these other forces are secondary compared 
with the impact of the money supply. If we make this assumption and 
also assume plausible sign values for the partial derivatives that are 
consistent with the sign values adopted in earlier chapters, then a 
simplified version of the dynamic model can be described by the following 
equations.
i = i(m) (6a)
+
7T =  7 T ( m ) (6b)
U = U (K, z, i, -7T, (1-y)Uu, (1 — Y )s ) (6c)
+ +
z = -a(U-U) (6d)
K = J (K, i) (6e)
m  = Gq - Tq + (1-y)Uu + (1-y)s - TTm (6f)
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It will be observed that since the nominal money supply, M, is 
fixed in the short-run, any changes in the real money supply, m, will 
come through changes in the price level. Thus an increase in the price 
level will raise inflation and lower real interest rates in the short- 
run and a fall in the price level will have the reverse effect.
Since the primary objective of this chapter is to examine the 
effects of a change in u or s, we can observe that such variables will 
only affect the economy if y < 1, i.e., if pensions are not totally 
financed out of household sector taxes. For the rest of this chapter 
we shall consider the effects of a change in pensions and unemployment 
benefits when this is the case, i.e., when 0  ^y < 1.
10.4 Long-Run Comparative Statics
We shall now examine the long-run effects of a change in unemploy­
ment benefits, u, and pensions, s. To do this we must first consider 
the long-run model derived from equations (6a)— (6f) which is given by 
the following set of equations:
U(K, z, i, - i t , (1 -y)Uu, (1 —y )s ) = U (7a)
+ +
J (K, i) = 0 (7b)
Gq - T0 + d-y)Uu + (1-y)s - urn = 0 (70
i = i(m) (7d)
+
IT =  7T ( m ) (7e)
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In the long-run unemployment is driven to its natural rate, U, 
and all capital accumulation and wealth accumulation cease. Provided 
0  ^Y < 1 , any change in pensions will affect the steady state. Also, 
provided 0  ^y < 1 and Ü > 0, any change in unemployment benefits will 
also affect the steady state. Assuming these are the case we can re­
write equation (7c) as
V (tt, m, (1 -y)Uu, (1 —y )s) = 0 ( 7 0
-  -  +  +
and we can substitute equations (7d)-(7e) into equations (7a), (7b),
(7c*) to obtain the steady-state system, which is given by the following 
equations.^
U(K, z, m, (1 -y)Üu, (1-y)s) = Ü (8a)
J(K, m) = 0 (8b)
V(m, (1-y)Uu, (1-y)s) = 0
+ + +
(8c)
The long-run comparative static effects of a change in s are then 
given by:
|| = j [(1-Y)U„J_VJ] > 0z m s (9a)
$2- = - vY) [U J, V - U J, V - U, J V ] > 03s A m k s s k m  k m s < (9b)
I  = i [-(1-Y)UzJkVs] < 0 (90
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where A = U J. V < 0  and the tilde denotes that these are steady-state z k m
effects.
Thus, provided 0  ^y < 1, an increase in pensions will raise the 
long-run capital stock, lower the real money supply and have an 
ambiguous effect on the real wage-rate. Intuitively these results 
can be justified as follows: first, the increase in pensions will 
raise the government deficit thus lowering the real money supply 
necessary to balance the budget. In turn, the lowering of equilibrium 
money supply will lower the real interest rate, hence raising the level 
of investment and hence increasing the long-run capital stock. The 
ambiguity in the effect on the real wage can be explained as follows:
The increase in capital stock will raise the demand for labor thus 
tending to lower the unemployment rate. On the other hand, the reduced 
real money supply will raise the supply of labor thus having a tendency 
to raise the unemployment rate. If the overall effect is to reduce 
medium term unemployment then labor will be more scarce and hence the 
real wage will rise. If the overall affect is to increase medium-term 
unemployment then labor will be more abundant and hence the returns to 
labor will be reduced (i.e., the real wage will fall).
As a result of the above effects, an increase in pensions will also 
increase the long-run level of inflation and raise output while regard­
less of the magnitude of the effects steady state unemployment will 
remain constant at its natural rate. Also, the larger the percentage 
of the change in pensions that is financed out of taxation, the smaller 
will be the magnitude of the steady-state effects.
All the effects that result from a change in unemployment benefits, 
u, have the same sign as a corresponding change in pensions, s, and can
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be justified in a similar manner. These long-run effects of a change 
in u will be greater the larger the natural unemployment rate U 
and will become smaller as y -* 1 .
10.5 Dynamics
We shall now examine the dynamic properties of the model given 
by equations (6a)-(6f). This model can be linearized about its 
steady state to give the following dynamic system.
• ' >z ai1 ai2 ai3
•K = a21 a22 a23
•m k a31 a32 a33
z-z
K-K
m-m ;
(1 0 )
where, assuming
aii =
a12 =
a13 =
a21 =
a22 s
a33 =
plausible sign values,
-aU < 0 z
-aUK > 0
-aU > 0 m
J  < 0z
J[C < o
I
J < 0 m
(1-y)uU - tt m > 0z z
(l-y)uU^ - TT^ m < 0
(1-y)uU - tt m -  tt >m m 0
(lla)
(llb)
(llc) 
(lid) 
(11 e) 
(Ilf) 
dig) 
(11 h) 
(11 i)
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If we follow the assumptions of Section 10.4 of this chapter and assume 
that the economy described by this dynamic system is capital intensive 
and that the money supply is the primary determinant of interest rates 
and inflation then, as a first approximation, we can let sl =0. If 
in addition we assume that the unemployment benefit, u, is relatively 
small then we can also let a^ = a^2 =0. We shall make these assump­
tions throughout the rest of this chapter.
Accordingly the characteristic roots of the dynamic system can be
*approximated by:
X1 = ai1 < 0 (12a)
X2 = a22 < 0 (12b)
X3 = a33 > 0 (12c)
Hence the system has three real characteristic roots, two of which 
are stable and one which is unstable. We can now solve equation (10) 
to give a dynamic system of the form:
z-z 1 al2a23 ai2a23+al3(a33”a22)
a. „ t^i
h e
K-K = 0 a23(a22’ai1) a23(a33”al1}
a22tk e
m-m 0 0 (a33"a22}(a33"al 1 }
. a33l
lk36 ]
Since a ^  > 0 the economy will follow an ever exploding path unless 
the economy lies on a stable arm which is characterized by k^ = 0. The 
economy will only be on this path if the real money supply is always at
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its steady-state, i.e., m = m. We shall use this property of the model 
in the next section to examine the short run response of the economy 
to an exogenous change in unemployment benefits and pensions.
10.6 Short-Run Comparative Statics
Following the work of Sargent and Wallace (1973), Brock (1974,
1977) and Flood and Garber (1980), we now assume the absence of specula­
tive bubbles and hence that the price level will jump in the short-run 
in such a way as to keep the economy on a stable path which converges 
to the long-run equilibrium described by equations (7a)-(7e).
We know that along the stable path m=m at all times. Accordingly, 
following an exogenous change in the level of pensions, there will be 
a short-run change in m given by
3m _ 3m 
3s " 3s (14a)
This can be achieved by a short-run jump in the price level given
by
3P
3s '
P
m 0 (14b)
in other words, an increase in the pension will lead to a corresponding 
upward jump in the price level.
As a result of this short-run change in prices, in the short-term 
inflation will rise and real interest rates as well as the real wage 
will fall. Meanwhile, the effects on short-run unemployment will be 
indeterminate. Finally, investment will increase, physical capital 
stock will remain constant and output, which is primarily dependent 
on the level of physical capital stock will remain close to constant.
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The effects of an increase in unemployment benefits will have the 
same sign as the effect of an increase in pensions but the magnitude 
will depend on the parameters in the economy.
10.7 Conclusion
We have now examined the short-run and long-run effects as well 
as the dynamic path associated with a change in unemployment benefits 
and pensions. Consistent with the arguments of Barro (1974) and Feldstein 
(1974, 1981) the effect of a change in welfare payments depends upon 
the extent to which these welfare payments are financed out of house­
hold sector taxes. Thus when all welfare payments are financed out 
of household sector taxes (i.e., when y = 1) a change will have no 
effect whatsoever. On the other hand, when no welfare payments are 
financed out of household sector taxes (i.e., when y = 0) a change will 
have its greatest effect.
In the case when y < 1, in the short-run we have shown that an 
increase in pensions will increase the price level thus lowering the 
real money supply and the real wage. As a result, inflation, which 
is assumed to be primarily a monetary phenomenon will increase.
Following these changes the economy will evolve towards a long-run 
equilibrium which is characterized by higher inflation, a higher capi­
tal stock, higher output and a natural rate of unemployment.
In this chapter we have restricted our analysis to positive economic 
questions. As a result we have not examined the welfare effects of a 
policy change nor have we considered optimum levels for the pension or 
unemployment benefits. However, since we have shown that the effects 
of a policy change will differ depending on how such pensions and 
unemployment benefits are financed thus we can conclude that these
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questions must be resolved before, or as an integral part of, any 
normative study.
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CHAPTER 11
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the preceding chapters we have demonstrated some of the tech­
niques that can be employed to examine a few of the important issues 
related to unemployment and inflation. Each chapter includes its own 
introduction and conclusion. Thus, in summarizing the results of the 
thesis here we can be very brief. For broader clarification the reader 
is referred to the relevant chapter.
Following a general introduction to the thesis in Chapter 1 , ’’The 
Role of Expectations and Deficit Financing” was examined in Part 1 
(Chapters 2-4). In Chapter 2 the relationship between adaptive expecta­
tions and perfect myopic foresight was discussed. It was shown that even 
in models of limited complexity it is quite likely for adaptive expecta­
tions to be associated with instability. In Chapter 3 the rational 
expectations approach to economic modeling, which involves the applica­
tion of appropriate endogenous stabilizing jumps, was introduced. Also 
a general procedure was developed for the calculation of appropriate 
short-run responses following an exogenous shock. This procedure was 
used throughout the rest of the thesis in the calculation of appropriate 
short-run responses. Finally, in Chapter 4, the possibility of non- 
linearities leading to non-unique steady-state equilibria and non-unique 
stability properties was discussed. Throughout Part 1, examples of 
different stability properties were provided by considering the consequences 
of different methods of Deficit Financing.
Part 2 (Chapters 5-7) addressed the issue of ’’Optimal Stabilization 
Policies Under Perfect Foresight” in two different ways. Thus, in Chapter
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5 the objectives of a policy maker who wants to fight unemployment 
and inflation simultaneously was formalized. In Chapter 6, we examined 
the solution to this problem when prices were constrained to move 
sluggishly, while Chapter 7 examined the solution to this problem when 
'prices were allowed to jump in the short-run. We showed that, in both 
cases, the optimal policy involved driving inflation to zero instanta­
neously. However if prices were allowed to jump the optimal path for 
unemployment was possibly different than if prices evolved sluggishly.
It was also shown that a meaningful solution could not always be 
obtained if the policy maker had only one policy instrument available 
to attain his objectives. Also, depending on parameters which can be 
determined by the policy maker, the optimal jump in the price level may 
or may not be associated with time inconsistency.
"Some Relevant Policy Issued’ were discussed in Part 3 (Chapters 8-10). 
Here we introduced the most complex models of the thesis. Thus for the 
first time the dynamics of capital accumulation as well as a crude stock- 
market were introduced. Also the more unusual properties of the models 
were derived from optimizing behaviour.
In Chapter 8 we examined the consequences of lowering the length 
of the standard working week. As expected, the implementation of this 
policy lowered short-run unemployment. Surprisingly, however, unless 
accompanied by significant productivity gains, such a policy also lowered 
long-run inflation and output. As a consequence of the forward looking 
nature of the rational expectations approach, short-run inflation was 
then also lowered.
In Chapter 9 and 10 it was shown that, in general, increasing 
unemployment benefits and pensions will raise short-run inflation and
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have an indeterminate effect on unemployment. In the long-run, inflation 
will be higher and unemployment will converge to its natural rate.
Having summarized the general conclusions of the thesis, we now 
devote the rest of this chapter to an examination of possible extensions 
of the results.
Even without perfect foresight, if expectations adjust sufficiently 
quickly in the real world then the economy will typically exhibit the 
instability properties associated with rational expectations. Thus, 
in the real world, it is possible to have many of the properties asso­
ciated with rational expectations even though expectations are not 
truly rational. Among the unresolved questions from this thesis is 
whether or not there is actually sufficient information available in a 
world without perfect foresight for individuals to be able to stabilize 
the economy in the manner suggested by the rational expectations litera­
ture.
Another question concerns the choice of appropriate jump variables 
which will stabilize the economy. In models with static expectations 
or adaptive expectations, which have stable dynamic paths, the typical 
short-run response involves an adjustment to short-run equilibrium and 
can be achieved by means of the traditional tatonnement process. In the 
rational expectations approach, the literature shows that it is optimal 
for stability to be achieved by jumps in the appropriate endogenous 
variables. However there is no equivalent to the tatonnement mechanism 
which describe what makes the jumps occur. The choice of appropriate 
jump variable!s) is to some extent an open question and is frequently 
treated in an ad-hoc manner. Basically it depends upon how quickly 
relevant dynamic variables react to new information ("news”) as it becomes
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available. In a closed economy model like those treated in this thesis, 
we frequently choose the price level as the jump variable. In other 
contexts, other variables might be more appropraite choices for jump 
variables. For example, in the exchange market literature, the goods 
market is often assumed to clear slowly in relationship to financial 
markets. In this case the exchange rate is typically taken to be the 
jump variable, with the price of output being constrained to move 
sluggishly. The choice of appropriate jump variables and the mechanism 
by which the jump is achieved present an avenue for future research.
By taking several alternative forms of deficit financing in Part 1 
we have also been able to show that the stability properties of the 
economy are sensitive to monetary policy and also to the interrelation­
ship between monetary policy and the sign and magnitude of the govern­
ment deficit. This issue could have been emphasized throughout the 
thesis. Thus in Part 3 we could have treated the effects of changing 
the length of the standard working week, unemployment benefits and 
pensions in conjunction with the means for financing the deficit. Since 
this would have clouded the central issues, we instead adopted an approach 
of highlighting one monetary policy and examining the consequences in 
full detail. The results of Part 1 illustrate that the choice of a 
different mechanism for financing the deficit could well affect the 
conclusions of the rest of the thesis.
Part 2 showed that the optimal policy for fighting inflation and 
unemployment under perfect foresight involves driving inflation instan­
taneously to zero and thus no short-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment exists. This is in marked contrast to results derived 
under adaptive expectations where inflation converges along a dynamic
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path towards its equilibrium. The question arises whether it would 
ever be possible to obtain such a trade-off under perfect foresight.
Essentially the no trade-off results are a consequence of the 
specification of the Phillips Curve in Chapter 5. Thus it appears 
likely that some form of trade-off would occur if we adopted a less 
conventional formulation of the Phillips Curve, e.g., we could replace 
equations (1i, 2b, 2c) in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 by the following 
equations
w = a(U - U) + n (1 i
•m = •(|j,-p)m (i.e., M = p.M) (2b
•m + b = G -  T + r b -  p(m+b) (2c
In this equation system, the rate of monetary growth p is also taken 
to represent some underlying core rate of inflation.
Another alternative would be to treat the economy as an open
economy. Thus we could replace equations (1a, 1b, 1j) by
Y = D(YD , r - 6 tt - (1 -6)tt* , A) + G (1aM
YD = Y - T + rb - (6tt + ( 1 - 6 ) tt* ) A  (1b')
*6 tt + (1 —6)7T = p, except at points where P jumps (1 j *)
and leave equation (1i) as
w  = a ( Ü  - U) + tt (1 i)
where tt is expected inflation of domestically produced goods and it 
is expected inflation of foreign produced goods, assumed exogenous.
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Thus equations (1aT, 1b', 1 j ’) are derived under the assumption that 
inflation of domestic price levels is a trade-weighted average of infla­
tion of domestic and foreign produced goods, whereas equation (1i) assumes 
that wage claims are based on the price increases of domestic produced 
goods.
Either of these alternative specifications could give an optimal 
short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation, and provides an 
opportunity for future research.
The models of Part 3 could be generalized to incorporate different 
methods of deficit financing as well as alternative methods for financing 
investment but we have chosen to highlight only the central issues. The 
interrelationships between several issues would probably best be handled 
in a perfect foresight equilibrium framework (e.g., as in Brock and 
Turnovsky (1981)). This would be a suitable extension of Part 3 of the 
thesis.
The topic of unemployment and inflation is so broad that it encom­
passes nearly all of macroeconomics. We have examined only a few issues 
in a closed economy framework. The next step would be to examine some 
important issue as pertaining to open economies. One obvious issue 
would be to examine the effects of imported inflation as a result of 
exogenous shocks (e.g., the Oil Price Shocks). Another issue would be 
to examine the effect of particular government policies in one country 
(e.g., tight money policy in U.S.) on other countries. Such work may 
well involve the use of Game Theory (e.g., as in Canzoneri and Gray 
(1983)).
In conclusion, it should be emphasized once again that this thesis 
is not in any way meant to be an exhaustive study of inflation and
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unemployment. Rather it is meant to be a presentation of a few 
techniques that can be used to examine the economic implications of 
government policy decisions. Only a few topics have been examined; 
many topics are yet to be considered.
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NOTES
Notes to Chapter 1
1. A more extensive approach to the importance of the role of 
expectations is given in Begg (1982).
2. This is a quote from the 1983/84 Australian Budget Speech which 
was delivered to the Australian Parliament on 23 August 1983 by the 
Honourable P.J. Keating, M.P., Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia.
3. We can also show this result algebraically as follows:
L = ap* 12 + U2 = a[a2 (U-Ü)2 - 2a7T(U-Ü) + 72] + U2 
= a[a 2 (U-U) - 2a7T] + 2U = 0
Hence letting a ~ denote optimal solutions
n aa2U + aaiT v _U = ----2----- > 0
aa + 1
f  - 2aa + 1
where the signs assume tt > 0, U > 0.
4. We can show this result algebraically as follows:
L = ap2 + Ü2
"5p = 2aP = 0 
Hence p = 0.
5. These figures were provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
6. This issue is discussed further in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (1982).
Notes to Chapter 2
• •
1. The government budget constraint is given by M + B = P(G-T) + rB. 
Using the fact that M/P = m + mp, B/P = b + bp, equation (2b) follows.
2. This assumption was adopted by Foley and Sidrauski (1971). In a 
more formal sense the zero change in the expected inflation rate can be 
interpreted as the integral of an infinite jump over a set of measure 
zero.
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3. This assumption has been formulated in this heuristic manner 
by Boyer (1976). We can formalize the notion more rigorously as 
follows:
Let us represent the price level, P, in the neighbourhood of the 
jump by
P = PQ + H( t-"t )dP
where H(t-t) denotes the Heaviside function, i.e.,
H(t-t) = 0 for t < t, H(t-t) = 1 for t  ^ t 
Taking the derivative of P at t = t we can express 
P/P = 6(t-tj[dP/P]
where 6(t— t) denotes the Dirac delta function 6(t-t) =0, t / t
/°°6(t-t)dt = 1 and is a generalized function representing an impulse at 
0
time t. Since
• •y(P/P) = tt +  yn_ •hence yö(t-t)(dP/P) = tt + yn 
and integrating both sides
tt = e"y( t-T) (dP/P)
in the neighbourhood of t = t
Hence, at t = t, dir = y(dP/P)
4. The nonlinearities in this model occur because of the return 
on government bonds, rb, and the inflation tax on wealth, ttA, even if 
all other functional forms are linear.
5. When the coefficients are not well-behaved, Burmeister (1980)
has pointed out that it is possible to have a deterministic model for 
which the resulting time series appears stochastic: it does not converge
to a point, does not diverge and is not cyclic; see also Diamond (1976).
Notes to Chapter 3
1. Here we simply require that lira | y (t) | < °°. More formally wet-*o°would require that the present discounted value of the y variables 
converge. Such a requirement could be justified by considering the 
model as having been derived from underlying optimization models. The 
assumption (1c) is actually a stronger requirement than the above, and 
is therefore sufficient to demonstrate the basic methodology of the 
rational expectations approach.
2. The symbol A will be used to represent real private wealth and 
an nxn-matrix. Similarly z will have the meaning of a jump variable and 
the log of the real wage and D will be used to represent aggregate 
demand and an nxm-matrix. The correct meanings should be clear from the 
context.
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3. This equation and the rest of this section apply for both 
real-valued and complex-valued eigenvalues.
4. This result is obtained by noting that
A B -1 A'1 10 CQ1eC1
k 0 C
=
0 o'1
Notes to Chapter 4
1. This result has been obtained for models in which the underlying 
utility function is separable in real money balances and consumption and 
for which appropriate "super Inada" type conditions hold. The extent to 
which it holds for more general utility functions is not known.
2. Non-linearities and corresponding non-uniqueness of solutions 
are not restricted to the models considered in this chapter. Such non- 
linearities also arise in the models considered in Chapters 2 and 3.
The issue of non-uniqueness of equilibria was ignored in these earlier 
chapters by assuming plausible sign values and considering only specific 
examples.
3. This source of uniqueness is not to be confused with non-unique­
ness encountered in linear stochastic rational expectations models, 
arising from the arbitrariness of the constant of integration. This 
type of non-uniqueness has been extensively discussed by Taylor (1977) 
and procedures such as finite variance criteria and minimum variance 
criteria have been proposed for determining the arbitrary constant in 
these cases.
4. Turnovsky and Brock (1980) develop a model in which through lump 
sum taxation an equilibrium stock of bonds b < 0 is feasible and indeed 
optimal. We, however, do not consider such equilibria in this analysis.
5. This statement needs to be made somewhat more precise. The criti­
cal expression is quadratic in 9, and is positive for
both -9- = 0 and 9 = 1 . Provided < 41^0^, this quadratic quantity
changes sign for $ lying in the range 9^  < -8- < 9^, where 9^  , and 9^
are the roots to -D292 345678+ ” L2D3 = °*
6. These conditions have been determined for the case of linear 
homogeneous functions D(.) and L(.). They can be suitably modified for 
the affine case.
7. Scarth (1980) and Turnovsky and Scarth (1982) produce results 
which are consistent with these. Their results are produced in a 
stochastic framework with no inflation and considering only the polar 
cases (i.e., 9 = 0, 9 = 1).
8. Burmeister and Turnovsky (1978) discuss the case when perfect 
foresight, coupled with sluggish adjustment of the appropriate market,
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can give rise to perfect foresight (rational expectations) being 
associated with total stability.
Notes to Chapter 5
1. More formally we would require that the present discounted 
values of money and bonds converge. This requirement can be justified 
by considering the model as having been derived from an underlying 
optimization for the consumer. The assumption that real money and 
bonds converge to a finite value is actually a stronger requirement 
than the above, and is therefore sufficient to demonstrate the basic 
conclusions of the rational expectations approach.
2. In deriving the restrictions on the partial derivatives in 
(4a) and (4b), we have assumed that
D m  + D2 < 0 
b + D2 < 0
3. This result can be proved formally. Using a modification of 
the proof of Vind's Theorem (see Arrow and Kurz (1970, p. 51)) it is 
possible to show that since the Hamiltonian is convex in U, an optimal 
solution will only jump at the initial time point.
4. Throughout the rest of Chapters 5-7 we shall assume that p and 
r can be described by affine functions.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. More precisely equation (5f) reduces to (p-cp) (G-T+rb) = 0. 
Since monetary policy would be ineffective if G-T+rb = 0, we have 
assumed that G and T have been chosen so that G-T+rb t 0 for all finite 
values of time, t. In this case equation (5f) reduces to y=cp as given.
2. The conclusion that m and b can be controlled by G-T and $
respectively rests on the assumptions that G-T+rb ^ 0.
3. The steady-state equilibrium p = -y will be recognized by the 
reader as the Friedman (1969) full liquidity rule.
4. An open market operation can be considered a special case of 
monetary policy $ involving an instantaneous infinite value for $.
This notion can be developed more formally as follows: Suppose
that G-T+rb is non-zero and we wish b to jump from b, to b^  + db and
m to jump from m^  to - db at time t = t. We can represent b as:
b = b^  + H(t - t)db
where H(t — t) denotes the Heaviside function, i.e., H(t - t) = 0  for 
t < T, H(t - T) =1 for t £ T.
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Taking the derivative of b at t = t, we can express 
b = 6(t - t)db
where 6(t - t) denotes the Dirac delta function. In general this is 
defined by
6(t - t) = 0, t j. t, 5(t - t) = 1 
and is a generalized function representing an impulse at time t.
Thus if we choose
6 (t — t) db = $ ( G - T + r b ) - 7 T b
where r, b, G, T, tt and b are evaluated after the jump in b has occurred, 
then b will jump from b^  to b^  + db. In other words we need only choose
q 6(t - t)db + nb 
G - T + rb
Since tt, b, r, G and T will all remain finite such a procedure involves 
an infinite instantaneous jump in -9-.
5. This can be proved more formally as follows. 
U = 0 and substitute into equation (18b).
• ~ ^ b  •Hence m = ---  (b)
and thus
Assume initially
1-$&
Since p^ can be given neither sign nor magnitude the inequality which 
has been derived under the assumption that -9- > 0, may or may not be satis­
fied.
Notes to Chapter 7
1. The equation 9H/9& = 0 reduces to ( y - A ) ( G - T + r b )  = 0 .  Since 
monetary policy would be ineffective if G - T + rb = 0, we have assumed 
that G and T have been chosen so that G - T + rb ^ 0 for all finite values 
of time, t. In this case (7e) reduces to y = A, as given.
2. This result can be derived formally as follows, 
objective is to minimize
L = c | U (0) <5 )2dt
Suppose the
Substituting for U(t) from (16a) gives
L = c|U(0)-U. 1+ 2
(U-6)1 2 2[U(0)-U][U-6]
Y 3 + Y
[U(0)-U]2' 
2 6 + Y .
= c|U(0)-Uq + cp[U(0) ].
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We can now divide the general problem into two subproblems. 
Problem 1:
Minimize L = c[U(0) - U ] + cp[U(0) ] 
subject to U (0)  ^Uq
and Problem 2:
Minimize = c[U^ - U(0)] + cp[U(0) ] 
subject to UQ  ^U (0)
Differentiating the appropriate expressions for and with respect 
to U (0) then yields expressions equivalent to (17a.) — (17c).
Notes to Chapter 8
1. The Members of OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
2. Similarly to Brock and Turnovsky (1981), we do not wish to 
suggest that putting money into the utility function is good monetary 
theory. What we are saying is that until fully satisfactory micro­
foundations of the demand for money are developed, the procedure we 
are following is a useful analytical tool.
3. We assume here and throughout the rest of this thesis that 
all solutions to optimization problems are interior solutions, unless 
otherwise stated.
4. The use of Walras' Law here is a special one which is not 
uncommon in macroeconomics. Walras' Law, which can be derived from 
the various budget constraints (see Turnovsky (1977)) tells us that 
if the labor market does not clear then another market (i.e., goods, 
bonds, money or equities) will not clear as well. Here we follow 
Patinkin (1965, p. 333) and dodge this difficulty by attributing to 
workers a completely passive behavior pattern accordingly to which 
they adjust the expected supply of labor to the amount demanded by 
employers. Hence, by definition, "equilibrium" always exists in the 
labor market.
5. It is also possible for a firm to finance its investments out 
of retained earnings (i.e., by not returning all of its profits to its 
stockholders) or by the sale of private bonds. These cases have not 
been considered here.
6. Note that F is assume homogeneous of degree one. The following 
notations will be used interchangeably:
NDF(K/ND ) = NDF[(K/ND ), 1] = F[K, ND ]
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7. This assumption can be justified if
h(I) = h2I2 + h i  
where h^ is sufficiently large.
8. More formally
3T
3v
-N
n(N)G'K
< 0
3Y w , K . ,,D „, . K .1_  B n(N)—  F ( 3 )  + N F ’ <-d >g
3ND 31Assuming G* -► 00, 0 and 0.
9. The sign of J (< 0) has been derived by assuming that the rate 
of capital depreciation, X, is sufficiently large.
10. Equation (33) can be derived by noting that
' A 0 -1 • A’1 \0
> B C
=
-C"1BA-1 1Ü
11. There is a possible inconsistency here in that, in the deriva­
tion of the microfoundations of both the household sector and the corpor­
ate sector, we have assumed that expectations are formed by a combination 
of perfect myopic foresight and static expectations whereas much of the 
theory behind the absence of speculative bubbles (Brock (1974, 1977)) 
assumes perfect foresight. However, Flood and Garber (1980) merely 
tested the existence of speculative bubbles in the real world. Since 
the basis of our microfoundations is probably reasonably close to 
decision making in the real world where individuals do not have perfect 
foresight, we shall rely on the Flood and Garber (1980) analysis to 
justify the absence of speculative bubbles here.
Notes to Chapter 9
1. Throughout this paper ß.(j+2~) denotes the limit of fl. as t1 1
approaches j+2 from below. Note that ß.(j+2) is undefined. Similarly, 
when the previous generation's bequest motive is operative, fMj+1 ) t 
(j +  1 ).
2. If i + 7T < 0, i.e., i < - T T ,  then the rate of return on bonds- 
cum-equities is less than the rate of return on money and there is no 
reason to hold bonds-cum-equities in the model.
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3. This result is consistent with Drazen (1978) who has shown 
that crucial in determining if the bequest motive is operative is the 
rate at which the current generation discounts their descendant's 
utility. The higher the discount rate, the more likely is the bequest 
motive not to be operative.
4. Throughout this chapter, when a variable is written as the function 
of time, t, and several other functions of time, this will denote that
each of the functions are evaluated at t.
5. The effect of i on \p. (t) is made up of a wealth effect and a
J
substitution effect which have conflicting signs. Throughout the rest 
of this chapter we shall assume that the substitution effect is dominant.
6. The sign of the partial derivative w.r.t. pv in equation (11c) 
depends upon whether a "discouraged worker" or "additional worker" effect 
dominates. The "discouraged worker" effect measures the number of people 
who in times of high unemployment abandon the futile search for jobs and 
drop out of the labor force or supply less labor. A dominant discouraged 
worker effect thus corresponds to(9l/3p) > 0. The "additional worker" 
effect results from the hypothesis that in married couple families in 
which the husband is unemployed, the current fall in current income below 
permanent levels drives the wives to seek work. A dominant "additional 
worker" effect corresponds to Ol/9v) < 0. Empirical results for the 
United States (see Barth (1968) and Wächter (1972)) and Australia (see 
Gregory and Sheehan (1975) and Scherer (1978)) confirm the dominant 
discouraged worker effect. Although more recent work in the United 
States by Fleisher and Rhodes (1976) has argued that this result is 
caused by aggregation problems and that the true net effect is insignifi­
cant, we have assumed throughout this chapter that the discouraged worker 
effect predominates and accordingly that the sign of the partial deriva­
tive w.r.t. pv in the labor supply functions (e.g., equation (11c)) is 
positive.
7. Again, we assume that the substitution effect is dominant (see 
footnote 5).
8. Again, we assume that the discouraged worker effect predominates 
(see footnote 6).
9. The method used in this Appendix is a generalization of the 
methods used by Pitchford (undated) who took Barro and Grossman's (1976) 
work/retire model and derived the household sector rigorously using 
optimal control theory. As this work/retire model involved only con­
sumption, labor and money, with no discounting, no bequests, no unemploy­
ment and no equities the analysis of this Appendix involves a considerable 
extension.
Notes to Chapter 10
1. The 1983/84 Australian Budget Speech was delivered on 23 August 
1983 by the Honourable P.J. Keating, M.P., Treasurer of the Commonwealth 
of Australia.
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2. Government expenditure would also have an effect on the demand 
for money and labor supply if the household sector was derived from an 
optimizing framework which assumed that Government expenditure influenced 
individual's preferences (i.e., if Government expenditure was included
as an argument in the individual's utility function). While this is a 
plausible assumption, the standard approach to the household sector does 
not assume this.
3. In a world of all equity financing before-tax profits are 
allocated between stockholders and the government as follows:
II = D + Tf. The statement that corporate taxes do not affect the
investment decision or the process of capital accumulation assumes 
an additive tax function, i.e., = TQ + y(1-p)u + ys. This statement
no longer remains true if we assume a multiplicative form for the tax 
function, i.e., Tf = 311, where 3 = 3 f (1 — P ) u , s }.
+ +
4. The effect of a change in the real money supply on the government 
deficit depends on a positive effect through the inflation rate as well
as a direct negative effect. Throughout this chapter we assume that the 
positive effect dominates. The effect of a change in the real money 
supply on unemployment is also ambiguous. We assume here that the nega­
tive effect through inflation dominates.
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